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Abstract 
 
This thesis defines the philosophical concept of speculation and assesses its emergence 
in Kantian and post-Kantian German philosophy, in the attempted construction of a 
post-Enlightenment “scientific” philosophy and alongside early work in anthropology 
and gynaecology. It argues that in the historical elaboration of the problem of 
speculation “race” and “sex” emerge as concerns for this newly defined scientific 
philosophy. Moreover, a concept of performativity is introduced in the attempt to think 
the ontological implications or “effects” of speculative thought. This thesis proposes 
that Hegel is the originator of such a concept of performativity, introduced as the 
conclusion to the Science of Logic. Here, performativity is defined as activity of form 
or determinate being in contrast to the empty notion of being pure being with which 
the Logic begins. Speculation, the Logic proposes, is not only a methodological 
necessity giving rise to an essentially epistemological problem, as Kant had defined 
it, but is also to be thought as ontological Thätigkeit (activity) proper. 
 
Rewriting speculation as an ontological concept of form, Hegel uses, among others, 
social and political examples to illustrate the nature of speculative thought. The 
surprising appearance of the state and the sexual relation in the Logic, alongside the 
concepts of violence, resistance, power and freedom, demonstrates that speculative 
(theoretical and non-empirical) reason necessarily encounters political categories and 
suggests that these might be exemplary of its nature. While it remains unclear, in 
Hegel, precisely how the unfolding of conceptual form leads to political categories, 
both Irigaray and Butler offer answers to this question. In doing so, they separately 
outline ways of thinking the ontological dimension of speculative thought: Irigaray by 
modifying speculation as specula(riza)tion – an attempt to visualise speculation and 
to render its social dimensions visible; and Butler by formulating the concept of gender 
performativity. This thesis offers its own answer, too, by situating the emergence of 
speculation and performativity as philosophical concepts in the context of the history 
of modern gynaecology and the speculum. It reads these concepts alongside those of 
sexual difference, Geschlecht and gender, arguing that only in this way can speculation 
and performativity be thought. 
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Some men say an army of horse and some men say an army on foot 
and some men say an army of ships is the most beautiful thing 
on the black earth. But I say it is 
 what you love. 
 
– Sappho  
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How do the two concepts of speculation and performativity relate to each other? And 
what is their philosophical relevance, both historically and into the contemporary 
period? This thesis sets out to answer these two questions. While speculation has in 
recent years made a return in theory, circulating in academic, artistic and activist 
discourses under various banners of speculative realisms and materialisms, this thesis 
addresses itself to an alternative ‘speculative turn’, one firmly anchored in feminist, 
queer and black studies, in which speculation is used as a methodological tool—for 
instance, in the works of Hortense Spillers, Luce Irigaray (specula[riza]tion), Donna 
Haraway (speculative fabulation) and Saidiya Hartman (speculative fiction and 
history). Here, speculation becomes inherent to the critique of philosophy as such, as 
well as to the possibility of constructing alternative philosophical concepts. But what 
does it mean, first, to speculate in philosophy? And, second, to speculate on the future 
of philosophy? Despite the seeming familiarity of the term, our grasp of speculation 
remains rather vague and its relation to performativity unexplored. 
 
Performativity, too, is often described in terms of a “turn” which, prior to the (re)turn 
of speculation, affected the humanities and social sciences, in particular linguistics, 
anthropology, history, philosophy, feminist and queer studies, and which led in large 
part to the founding of a new (inter)disciplinary field, that of performance studies. 
Whether as a theory of speech act (J. L. Austin, John Searle, Jacques Derrida), of 
gender and queer performativity (Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgewick), or of 
visual and performance art (Peggy Phelan), performativity focuses on the aspect of the 
social construction of language, gender, bodies, works of art, etc. and foregrounds 
social and political contexts, institutions and norms in the analysis of particular 
phenomena. Like speculation, performativity has been employed to construct 
alternative theories of subjectivity, linguistics, ethics, art, etc., that do not abstract from 
social and political contexts. As such, performativity and speculation both function 
not only as means of criticizing the canon, philosophical or otherwise, but also as tools 
for philosophizing. 
 
Speculation 
 
The word “speculation” originates in late sixteenth century Latin and old French, 
speculat-meaning to ‘observe from a vantage point or watch tower’, and the verb 
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speculari, ‘to look at’, or ‘to view’, as well as to ‘contemplate’.1 From the 1570s, a 
divergence in meaning, the disparaging sense of ‘mere conjecture’ is recorded. From 
1774, speculation also describes the activity of buying and selling in search of profit 
from the rise and fall of market value. The speculum, moreover, based on its Latin 
definition as mirror, is the name for the gynaecological speculum that is used to make 
the insides of the vagina and cervix visible to human eyes. 
 
While the following analysis illustrates that these meanings overlap, speculation will 
be analysed not in general but as a philosophical concept, and as such within a very 
specific context. Immanuel Kant, it will be argued, is the first to identify speculation 
as a specifically philosophical and more precisely, a modern problem. This thesis 
attempts to situate philosophical speculation in Kantian and post-Kantian German 
philosophy, and to outline the role of speculation in the attempted construction of a 
post-Enlightenment “scientific” philosophy, as well as its effects on the newly 
emerging academic disciplines of anthropology, biology, comparative anatomy and 
gynaecology. It will be argued that in elaborating the problem of speculation, “race” 
and “sex” emerge as concerns for this newly defined scientific philosophy. This is 
because these concepts function in Kant and Hegel as examples to outline a legitimate 
use of non-empirical, speculative reason. In this function, concepts like “race” and the 
“sexual relation” are crucial for the definition of modern European philosophy – its 
attempt to set its own boundaries and to define itself as science. Philosophy, and those 
specialised disciplines that are descended from it, therefore have a common interest, 
namely the attempted scientific investigation and definition of these terms. This thesis 
will focus in particular on the example of the “sexual relation” in Hegel’s Science of 
Logic and the connection of theoretical speculation to the speculum. For this reason, 
the relation between modern European philosophy and the “science of woman” 
emerging as an academic field in the nineteenth century will be analysed. 
 
Throughout this thesis, speculation is defined as the activity of theoretical (as distinct 
from practical or empirical) reason, and as such is synonymously referred to as 
“speculative reason”, first by Kant and Hegel and subsequently by Irigaray and Butler. 
                                                     
1 John Simpson and Edumd Weinter, eds., ‘Speculation’ in The Oxford English Dictionary, Second 
Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 171-174. 
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It is the relevance of this meaning of “speculation” that will be assessed here, focusing 
on these four thinkers in particular. Even though defined by Kant and Hegel as entirely 
non-empirical, speculative reason will be contextualised throughout this thesis, which 
will bring its empirical conditions and effects to light. Historical and political contexts 
are important because both Kant and Hegel rely on socio-political concepts to 
exemplify and justify the use of non-empirical speculative reason. It will be argued 
here that these examples matter, even when they are only referred to in passing, such 
as Hegel’s reference to the “sexual relation” (Geschlechtsverhältnis) in the Science of 
Logic. These examples are of significance because they are meant to prove that 
speculation is not imposed onto “nature,” but instead inherent to human experience 
and to what we consider “material.” 
 
While other examples are also employed, social and political categories in particular 
demonstrate that certain concepts and categories, even though they are not properly 
empirical as such, are also not merely logical – where the latter is understood as being 
without any connection to experience (Kant) or life (Hegel). With reference to these 
concepts, Kant and Hegel both attempt to redefine in their own ways the relation 
between the logical and the empirical. This thesis outlines, first, how an investment in 
these concepts links philosophy to the newly defined sciences of anthropology, 
biology, gynaecology and comparative anatomy, which collectively develop the 
modern concepts of “race” and “sexual difference” alongside philosophy. Secondly, 
it will be argued that speculation, defined as the activity of theoretical or speculative 
reason, has consequences not only for thinking and only for philosophy, but also has 
an impact on life outside of philosophy, as it plays a role in how we come to 
conceptualise social and political categories such as sexual difference and gender as 
Luce Irigaray and Judith Butler illustrate. 
 
Performativity 
 
In this thesis performativity will be both implied as well as explicitly discussed as a 
philosophical concept. As such, performativity will be defined as ontological concept, 
distinct from its meaning as language, speech act and/or (art) performance. The 
relationship between an ontological notion of performativity, and speculation as 
epistemological problem and possibility, is discussed with regard to the work of Hegel 
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and Butler in particular. This is because these two thinkers propose a speculative 
concept of being, defined as performative ontology. While in Kant speculation is 
strictly epistemological, a problem as well as a possibility for knowledge, it becomes 
clear in Hegel, Irigaray and Butler that speculative reason does in fact have ontological 
effects. What this precisely means differs for each thinker. Hegel, it will be argued, 
proposes an implicit concept of the performative to signify the ontological dimension 
of speculative thought. 
 
This thesis proposes that performativity as ontology is thought for the first time in 
Hegel’s work, but is subsequently named and redefined by Butler. Both Hegel and 
Butler aim to think a speculative concept of being which is not static, but which is 
constituted by and as its own past and future acts. While Butler’s claims about 
ontology work in relation to Hegel, as will be shown, she also redefines performativity 
with and against Hegel as a social ontology. Her project is to construct not only a 
concept of being that is open to change but one that includes an understanding of social 
temporality in its definition. This is an attempt to move both philosophy and feminist 
theory away from ontological essentialism and towards a speculative ontology that is 
neither a voluntarism nor entirely pre-determined. Such a philosophical concept of 
performativity then serves in Butler’s work as a foundation for explaining the working 
of gender. 
 
While Butler’s claims about ontology work in relation to Hegel, they also clarify what 
remains unexplained in Hegel, namely the references to violence, resistance and 
freedom, and the use of social and political categories – which appear rather abruptly 
at the end of the Science of Logic – to exemplify the working of speculative reason. 
Butler illustrates that claims about ontology are inherently political, even when 
presented as neutral claims about being. It will therefore be concluded that after Butler, 
performativity has to be understood as social ontology. 
 
Aim, method, structure 
 
The first chapter introduces the problem: the role of speculation for philosophy. The 
thesis begins with Kant and his Critique of Pure Reason because it is here that 
speculative reason is first defined. Kant explains what is at stake in speculative reason, 
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and he uses the delimitation of the latter to reach a definition of philosophy as 
scientific. Because it is a form of thought that cannot possibly be verified by 
experience, the first Critique calls speculative reason into question. Speculation, 
according to Kant, is to be limited to those instances where it is unavoidable and 
intrinsic to making cognition, knowledge, and science possible. 
 
While speculative reason oversteps the secure bounds of human knowledge by using 
formal concepts and principles in abstraction from the sensible conditions under which 
objects can be experienced, it nonetheless also has a positive use. Throughout Kant’s 
three Critiques, speculation names a number of related activities that work together to 
make knowledge possible. Most importantly, speculative reason enables the 
systematic ordering of cognitions, of knowledge and of empirical laws. As such, 
according to Kant, it makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge and thus 
transforms ordinary cognition into science. This definition of speculation, as 
synonymous with systematicity and science, is adopted by Hegel, despite the latter’s 
critique of the Kantian limitations of reason. 
 
Chapters two and four look at the final sections of Hegel’s Science of Logic – from 
‘Mechanism’ (first chapter of ‘Objectivity’) through to ‘The absolute idea’ (final 
chapter of ‘The Idea’) – and their attempt to rethink the Kantian definition of 
speculative reason. Initially, the Logic adopts Kant’s understanding of speculation as 
the systematic but non-empirical positing of relations independent of sensibility and 
the understanding. However, Hegel makes two significant interventions in relation to 
the Kantian definition of speculation. First, he purposefully alters the Kantian question 
whether it is possible to derive knowledge from speculative reason. Instead, Hegel 
asks whether reason, in its speculative capacity, needs to exercise any violence in order 
to make the object of knowledge conform to its conceptual structures. In the Logic, 
the question of speculation is thereby turned into a discussion of power, violence, 
resistance and freedom. Though speculation is entirely non-empirical, these political 
concepts are, following Hegel, necessary for an analysis of conceptual form. Chapter 
two therefore looks at Hegel’s use of these terms and at his deployment of the concepts 
of the state (in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter) and the sexual relation (in ‘Chemism’) to 
exemplify the nature of speculative reason. The political dimension of speculation, 
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hinted at in the final chapters of the Science of Logic, is explored in particular as it 
relates to questions of sex and gender.  
 
Hegel’s second intervention is the proposition that speculation is to be understood not 
only epistemologically but also ontologically. It is at this point that the concept of 
performativity becomes relevant. Chapter four therefore examines Hegel’s attempt to 
construct an ontological definition of speculative reason. Performativity, it will be 
argued, is implicitly put forward by Hegel as a speculative concept of being. 
Speculation, Hegel argues, is not only of epistemological relevance but should equally 
be thought as ontological Thätigkeit (‘activity’). For Hegel, to speculate is not merely 
to think being abstractly – speculation is furthermore a “doing,” a performative act, 
which has ontological as well as epistemological consequences. 
 
Even though the history of speculation and performativity in modern and 
contemporary European philosophy is narrated in a linear/chronological fashion, 
beginning with Kant and ending with Butler, this thesis intentionally works with 
interruptions throughout. These displace the chronological order but also the focus on 
the individual philosopher, be it Kant, Hegel, Butler, or Irigaray. Thus, while chapters 
two and four offer a close reading of the concluding chapters of Hegel’s Science of 
Logic, chapter three disrupts this chronological textual analysis and situates the Logic 
– and specifically its reference to the “sexual relation” – in its broader historical 
context. This is done by looking at the meaning of Geschlecht (sex, gender, 
race/ancestry) in 18th and 19th century Germany. Moreover, this chapter looks at the 
relation between Hegel, the philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie), and the 
emerging science of gynaecology, and the respective roles of each in further 
determining the notion of Geschlecht as sex/gender, as well as their attempts at 
elaborating a modern concept of sexual difference as essential not only for medicine 
and health care but also for the theoretical understanding of nature and of culture. 
Since Hegel’s reference to the “sexual relation” in the Logic has so far been 
overlooked in the vast (and otherwise notably thorough) scholarship on Hegel, an 
attempt is made to explain and contextualise its use. This chapter concludes by 
demonstrating that certain examples, such as the “sexual relation,” are not accidental. 
Sexual difference was in the process of being constructed as a scientific concept at the 
time when Hegel was writing. Moreover, at this time a broader shift in the meaning of 
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the terms Geschlecht (sex/gender) and sexual difference took place across a range of 
disciplines. 
 
Chapters five and six further investigate the material reliance of speculative thought. 
In chapter five this is done by looking at the history of the gynaecological speculum, 
which is analysed alongside Irigaray’s Speculum of the other Woman. While chapter 
three looks at the influence of the gynaecological concepts of Naturphilosophie, a 
second moment within the history of gynaecology will be analysed in the context of 
Irigaray’s work in chapter five. Here the reinvention of the speculum by James Marion 
Sims, the “father” of American gynaecology and a key figure within American 
medical history, is examined more closely. Sims is of interest because his practice is 
exemplary for what Irigaray tries to uncover, namely a masculine philosophical and 
medical gaze and mode of inquiry that claims for itself the name of science. However, 
an analysis of Sims’ practice also brings to light the limits of Irigaray’s work. The 
example of Sims demonstrates that the categories of “woman”, “femininity” and 
“embodiment” are more complex in their constitution than Irigaray allows them to be 
in her analysis. These concepts, as the history of American gynaecology makes 
evident, must also be understood along axes of race and class, and not solely along 
that of sex/gender. 
 
Chapter six outlines the extent to which Butler’s concept of (gender) performativity 
relies on a Hegelian notion of the Thätigkeit or “doing” of conceptual form. Though 
Butler herself is critical of ontology, it will be shown that a different understanding of 
ontology comes out of her work, more precisely out of her conception of 
performativity. While Butler, like Hegel, seeks to demonstrate that there is no 
preestablished ontology and that ontology does not constitute a foundation of any sort, 
her argument differs from Hegel’s in that she proposes, in line with Foucault, that 
ontology should be understood in terms of a series of normative injunctions that 
operate by installing themselves into political discourse as the latter’s necessary 
ground. Any ontology thus understood will always ask questions about power, 
violence, resistance and freedom. By reading Butler’s formulation of performativity 
alongside Hegel’s, it becomes evident that ontology is always fundamentally political, 
even when it presents itself as a neutral discourse on being. 
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The aim of this thesis is to show that the concepts of speculation and performativity 
rely, in their very constitution and definition, upon categories such as race and sexual 
difference, and thereby upon the categorisation or conceptualisation of certain bodies 
thought to be external to philosophy or thought. While these concepts seem abstract 
and often remain vague, they have a very specific history, as the thesis sets out to 
demonstrate. The historical “interruptions” in each chapter illustrate this point. Thus, 
in chapter one reference is made to Kant’s attempt to contribute to the project of 
natural history. In chapter two, an analysis of Antigone and Goethe’s social novel 
Elective Affinities is included in a discussion of Hegelian ‘Mechanism’ and 
‘Chemism’. Chapter three looks at Carl Gustave Carus, a German philosopher of 
nature, as well as medical practitioner and gynaecologist, and the relation between 
philosophy of nature and gynaecology in 19th century Germany. Chapters five and six 
further examine the concepts of sexual difference and gender alongside the history of 
medicine, chapter five by looking at Sims’ reinvention of the speculum in the context 
of slavery and chapter six by highlighting the clinical origin of the concept of gender 
in post-World War II attempts to establish a scientific treatment protocol to “correct” 
and control intersex and trans bodies. 
 
These interruptions give a sense as to how speculation and performativity rely, in their 
definition as philosophical concepts, upon social and political categories. As Irigaray 
and Butler demonstrate, even though theoretical reason is distinct from other types of 
reason, there is no apolitical, ahistorical power of reason. Thus, the questions raised 
by Kant and Hegel about speculative reason still require a response. But if our 
responses are not sufficiently historically situated, then speculation, as well as 
performativity, remain obscure. However, the relation of speculation and 
performativity to political categories matters for yet another reason. Speculation, as 
well as a notion of the performative, is needed for a definition of political concepts 
and categories, as becomes evident in the analysis of Butler’s gender performativity. 
This thesis, accordingly, is a first attempt to illustrate how, on the one hand, the 
concepts of speculation and performativity are necessary for an explanation of social 
and political concepts such as “race”, “sexual difference” and “gender”, while on the 
other hand these very concepts exemplify the nature of speculative, performative 
thought. 
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Chapter one 
An a priori necessity of reason: The role of speculation in Kant’s 
critical philosophy 
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Introduction: Speculation as philosophical problem 
 
We might ask, with Derrida, what is there to be gained in approaching a philosophical 
question by beginning with and thus seeking authority from Kant: ‘What benefit do 
we still derive from a discussion or explication with Kant?’2 It will be argued in the 
following that Kant defines a specific philosophical problem, the question of 
speculation, that had an effect beyond the Kantian oeuvre. In returning to Kant, mainly 
the first and third Critique, we will attempt to re-situate this question and to outline 
the philosophical stakes of speculation in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European 
philosophy, its role in the attempted construction of a “scientific” philosophy, as well 
as its effects on the emerging disciplines of anthropology, biology, comparative 
anatomy and gynaecology. 
 
It will be argued that in elaborating the problem of speculation, “race” and “sex” 
emerge as concerns for the newly defined scientific philosophy, though “sex” is not a 
scientific question or structuring principle in Kant and will only be developed as such 
by Hegel, Schelling and the project of Naturphilosophie, as will be outlined in chapters 
two and three. “Race” in Kant and “sexual difference” in Hegel and Schelling 
function, though not in a critical way, as an orientation for thinking3 by means of 
which the problematic nature of speculative reason can be addressed. The limits but 
also the possibilities that speculative thought opens up for scientific research, for 
instance for the newly defined disciplines of anthropology, biology and later 
gynaecology, is outlined with reference to these terms. The chapter will work towards 
explaining this latter claim, to outline how speculative reason is formative in this 
regard. At first, however, a number of explanatory questions need to be addressed. 
The chapter thus begins with a definition of speculation in Kant, to outline what Kant 
addresses under the heading of this term. The definition given at the start will then be 
looked at more closely throughout the entire chapter as it unfolds. In so doing, the 
consequences of speculation, as defined by Kant, for philosophy and the natural 
sciences will be elaborated. 
                                                     
2 Jacques Derrida, Who’s Afraid of Philosophy?: Right to Philosophy 1, trans. Jan Plug (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 48. 
3 See Stella Sandford, “Race and Sex in Western Philosophy: Another Answer to the Question ‘What 
Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?’,” Critical Philosophy of Race, 6, no. 2 (2018): 180–197. 
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Definition of speculative reason 
 
In the Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter CPR), Kant explains that reason is a human 
faculty which, in a certain mode, is speculative. Speculation, in consequence, is what 
reason does in this mode. By speculative reason Kant means theoretical as distinct 
from practical reason. The terms “speculative reason” and “theoretical reason” are 
mostly synonymous and used by Kant interchangeably; however, as we will see, there 
are certain instances where theoretical reason does not seem particularly speculative. 
In these instances, reason does not seem to be overstepping its bounds. This reveals 
something about the paradoxical nature of speculation, which is at once necessary and 
poses difficulties.4 As such, speculative reason, according to Kant, raises a number of 
epistemological problems. 
 
Kant never offers a straightforward definition of speculation but points toward a 
number of speculative activities throughout his critical project, some of which more 
problematic than others. Speculative reason as such is called into question because it 
is a form of thought that cannot possibly be verified by experience, and thus what 
speculative reason posits can ultimately not be known. Since speculation is without 
foundation, Kant attempts to set limits to its power and its use. Kant explains that 
speculative reason oversteps the secure bounds of human knowledge by using formal 
concepts and principles in abstraction from the sensible conditions under which 
objects can be given.5 The nature of the soul, the world, and God – the questions that 
traditionally concern metaphysics – are, according to Kant, outside the bounds of 
human knowledge. Moreover, ‘the proud name of ontology,’6 which explains the way 
of being, or the nature of things in general, is put into question by Kant. These 
speculative claims are criticised in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, where speculation 
also refers more generally to reason’s syllogistic use of pure categories to make 
illusory claims about appearances. 
 
                                                     
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), BXXIV-V. I have also consulted the German text throughout: 
Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998). 
5 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, BXXX. 
6 Ibid., A247/B304. 
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However, throughout the three Critiques, speculation also gains a positive meaning, 
as it describes a number of related activities of theoretical reason that work together 
to make knowledge possible. The following aspects fall under the scientific and 
necessary use of speculative reason, which will be discussed at a later point of this 
analysis. Speculative reason, according to Kant, makes possible the systematic order 
of thought, cognitions, as well as of the empirical laws.7 The main task of theoretical 
reason is the systematisation of all possible relations,8 also referred to by Kant as the 
problematic unity of nature and, synonymously, of cognition. Although he critiques 
ontology and metaphysics, previously the Queen of the Sciences, in the end Kant once 
more assigns an essential role to speculation when he pairs up theoretical reason, 
systematicity and science in the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ and 
‘Doctrine of Method.’9 This definition of speculation, as synonymous with 
systematicity and science, is later adopted by Hegel, despite the latter’s critique of the 
Kantian limitations of reason. 
 
Reason, according to Kant, always strives for a continuous and consistent unity of all 
empirical objects or objects of cognition. Having declared illegitimate the use of 
reason beyond experience in the first part of the CPR, Kant nonetheless identifies a 
positive, even necessary moment of speculation, as just discussed. This positive 
employment becomes possible by means of the “ideas” that introduce a principle of 
purposiveness10 and in doing so project order onto law-like nature. Thus, by means of 
the ideas, human reason progresses beyond its own limits of knowledge. This will be 
further discussed in the following, as will the allusion to sight in ‘speculation’ that is 
introduced by defining the ideas of reason as ‘focus imaginarius’11. Speculation, Kant 
seems to suggest, makes it possible to adopt another standpoint, or point of view. 
 
Though already introduced in the CPR, the role and meaning of purposiveness changes 
thereafter, first with the essay ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ 
and later with the Critique of the Power of Judgement, where purposiveness is 
assigned a new and more specific role. What happens in the third Critique? 
                                                     
7 Ibid., A645/B673, A647/B675, A648/B676, A650/B678. 
8 Ibid., A645/B673. 
9 Ibid., A642/B671ff., ‘On the regulative use of the ideas of pure reason.’ 
10 Ibid., B128. 
11 Ibid., A644/B672. 
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Purposiveness is here no longer only a law from above, projected by speculative 
reason, but is also an objective concept concerned with the production of singular 
entities, namely of organised or living beings – this separation of purposiveness from 
speculation will be analysed more closely at a later point of this analysis, as will the 
relevance of these two concepts for the newly emerging sciences, mainly anthropology 
and biology, that in turn inspired Kant. But before that, what is the importance of the 
essay on teleological principles, where the specific meaning of purposiveness is 
outlined through a discussion of the division of humankind into distinct races? Is 
speculation, as ordering principle but not yet objective law of purposiveness, already 
evoking this question?  
 
An analysis of these questions will allow us to understand how philosophy changed 
with Kant, that is, in what sense there was a reorientation in methodology and thought. 
It will be argued, by looking at the role of speculation and purposiveness in Kant, that 
there was common ground between nineteenth and twentieth century anthropology, 
biology and the project of a scientific philosophy as regards their guiding questions 
and methodological tools. Anticipating the later chapters, particularly chapters two 
and three, the occurrence of political questions – the discourse on race to outline the 
principle of purposiveness in Kant and of the state and the sexual relation in Hegel in 
order to exemplify the nature of speculative reason – will be addressed. In order to 
situate the discussion of speculation in Kant, the chapter begins with a discussion of 
Leibniz who, it will be argued, provides the conditions for the Kantian critical project. 
In returning to Leibniz and by anticipating Hegel, the problem of speculation will 
come to the fore. 
 
From the fact of being to the constancy of the law: In search for organizing principles 
 
In his first published book, Leibniz’ System in seinen Wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen 
(‘Leibniz’ system in its scientific foundations’), written in 1902 but not translated into 
English, Ernst Cassirer suggests that Leibniz initiated a broad philosophical shift, 
further developed by Kant. This is the shift away from the constancy of being that 
Leibniz replaces, according to Cassirer, with the constancy of the law.12 Because 
                                                     
12 Ernst Cassirer, Leibniz' System in seinen Wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen (Marburg: N.G. Elwert, 
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Leibniz does not recognise the unity of being as a pre-established fact, the law or 
lawful principle of organization emerges as the central concern of his philosophical 
analysis. Unity, following Leibniz, is always an activity, something to be achieved 
rather than a given. The task of the philosopher, accordingly, is to determine those 
organizing forces that can account for and secure unity, be that the unity of being, of 
cognition or of thought. In his work, Leibniz identifies two such forces. Connection, 
he claims, is of either of mechanical or metaphysical kind. As Leibniz outlines in, for 
instance, the Monadology, these two unifying forces are encountered at every level of 
philosophical inquiry. Following the Monadology, there are two principles of reason, 
two kinds of truths, two types of causality, two forms of necessity, two states of being 
and two natural kingdoms. Organization is of two kinds; that is, every phenomena or 
state of being and every principle of reason can be categorised, according to Leibniz, 
as either mechanical or metaphysical.13 
 
Mechanical organization adheres to the principle of contradiction, also referred to by 
Leibniz as efficient causality. The truths thus produced are contingent facts that are 
either physically or hypothetically real. They present us with a physical kingdom of 
nature, which explains the being and motion of bodies. Metaphysical organization by 
contrast introduces the principle of sufficient reason.14 While the mechanical laws 
describe an infinite sequence or series of a multiplicity of contingencies, metaphysical 
truths are, for Leibniz, outside of such a sequence. Metaphysical truths are final 
causes, accounting for the being of souls rather than the movement of bodies. 
However, both mechanical and metaphysical explanations, according to Leibniz, 
ultimately account for the same phenomena.15 Both principles attempt to offer a 
coherent and ordered account of the real. 
 
In his analysis, Cassirer draws on the concept of “function” to further explicate this 
point. Mechanical and metaphysical principles, and lawfulness more generally, are in 
Leibniz best defined as a function of unity. While the law of contingency secures a 
                                                     
1902), 343. 
13 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology,” in Discourse on 
Metaphysics and Other Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis & Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), §31-34 and §87. 
14 Ibid. §32. 
15 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” in Discourse on Metaphysics and Other 
Essays, trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 24. 
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continuous “functional” connection and linkage between phenomena,16 metaphysics 
accounts for the persisting coincidence of contingency on a higher level.17 God, 
according to Leibniz, signifies the possibility of representing the whole process 
(Gesamtprozess) at once, in one stable term.18 God, accordingly, is the name for the 
highest unity. For Kant, as we will see in the following analysis, the name or the idea 
of God fulfils a similar function. Kant, moreover, adopts the Leibnizian distinction 
between a function of unity and fact of composition.19 While composites are, 
according to Leibniz, immediately given, simple substances require reference to an 
organizing principle for their explanation. This is because ‘although it has no parts, 
there must be a plurality of properties and relations in the simple substance.’20 Because 
everything, including the monad, is always subject to change, and because this change 
is also continual in each thing, there must, Leibniz concludes, be diversity in that 
which changes.21 The simple substance might not have any parts,22 but this, according 
to Leibniz, does not mean that it cannot contain multiplicity or distinctness. With the 
monad, too, unity remains a task rather than a supposition. This is why, Cassirer 
writes, that in place of the fact of unity we gain the expression of the law.23 
 
While Leibniz is not primarily concerned with the idea of a system and does not see 
systematization as a prerequisite for a scientific philosophy,24 his concern for unity, 
however, prepares the way for the Kantian notion of an architectonic. This is because 
the single unit in Leibniz, regardless of whether it is referred to as monad, substance 
or soul, is no longer a rigid or static logical being and can only be determined in the 
context of a logical system.25 In this way the thought of a system already emerges. An 
attempt is made to account for the most general principles of unification and relation 
without which no identity – whether of a concept, a being or a thought – can be 
                                                     
16 Cassirer, Leibniz' System, 239, 282. 
17
 Ibid., 300-01. 
18 Ibid., 300. 
19 See, for instance, the introduction to the ‘The Transcendental Doctrine of Method’, A832/B860. 
20 Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology,” §13. 
21
 Ibid., §§10-12. 
22 Ibid., §1. 
23 Cassirer, Leibniz' System, 359. 
24 Some Leibniz scholars think he is centrally concerned with this question, even if his own writings 
were fragmentary. See, for instance, Donald Rutherford, Leibniz and the Rational Order of Nature 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
25 Cassirer, Leibniz' System, 220. 
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understood. For Leibniz, the problem of unity and organization is at the same time a 
logical and epistemological as well as an ontological and metaphysical concern.  
 
What we encounter in Kant, Cassirer suggests, is an attempt to translate Leibniz’s 
language of metaphysics into a language of method.26 The question of how to account 
for unity in diversity is here first and foremost an epistemological and methodological 
question that defines philosophy as science. Thus, while the concept of purposiveness 
and of a final purpose is already present in Leibniz, speculation, the possibility and 
relatedly the danger of constructing a systematic order, is specific to the Kantian 
critique of metaphysics. Speculation for Kant specifically concerns the systematicity 
of knowledge. The problem of how to account for and scientifically justify an order 
within the contingency of cognitions and of empirical laws forms a guiding thread 
throughout Kant’s work. It is a question that Kant attempts to answer not only, as we 
will see, in the three Critiques, but also in his writings on anthropology and race. 
 
Logical unity, synthesis, and systematic order 
 
The Kantian system is concerned with a number of unifying principles. Kant identifies 
different types of unity, most importantly logical unity, synthesis, and systematic 
order, that ought to be distinguished in order to explain how cognition becomes 
possible and to define the limits of human knowledge. According to Kant, formal 
unity, the logical identity of A = A, can only account for the unity of logical or 
mathematical objects but not for objects of knowledge or objects of experience. Since 
Kant distinguishes a formal and merely possible object from an object of experience, 
he must introduce an additional ground of unity. Synthesis, Kant proposes, is the 
function of unity that establishes a real, as opposed to merely logical, connection. A 
synthetic unity, Kant explains, involves not only the concept of a possible object, but 
goes ‘beyond that concept and say[s] more about it than was thought in the concept, 
namely, that to this concept in the understanding corresponds an object outside of the 
understanding.’27 
 
                                                     
26 Ibid, 400n. 
27 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 5:139. 
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The object of experience, also referred to as object of nature, is not, as Kant outlines 
in the ‘Transcendental Analytic,’ a mere factual given. While all appearances 
correspond to something given and received by sensibility, such givenness cannot, 
according to Kant, be known in any meaningful way. Our objects of experience, 
accordingly, are not immediate but are, as Kant outlines, the synthesis of a manifold 
of appearances. What comes to be an object of nature has already been pre-processed, 
ordered, reproduced and synthesised into the form of an object. The order, regularity 
and coherence of appearances depends, Kant argues, on our subjective grounds for 
cognition,28 which make the general unity of an object possible. Nature, Kant writes, 
complies with our conditions for the possibility of knowledge.29 Nature and 
experience are thus ruled by the same laws, for nature, as Kant explains in the first 
part of the CPR, refers to the field of all possible objects of experience, that is, to the 
combined and synthesised manifold of appearances. 
 
The ideas of reason as focus imaginarius 
 
Defined as ‘the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping what 
is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge’,30 synthesis is cast by Kant as the 
fundamental activity of the human mind.31 However, while the act of synthesis 
establishes the unity of objects and their relation, this unity of the understanding and 
of nature is only distributive.32 The ‘Transcendental Analytic’ explains how a law-like 
but orderless nature is possible,33 but, as Kant outlines in the Appendix to the 
‘Transcendental Dialectic,’ some rational presuppositions that are necessary for and 
assumed by the natural sciences – such as the hierarchic classification of beings into 
genera and species – are not only lawful according to the rules of the understanding, 
but yield an order34 and thus necessitate a further principle of unification and relation. 
As becomes apparent in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic,’ only theoretical, i.e. 
                                                     
28 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A114. 
29 Ibid., A125. 
30 Ibid., A77/B103. 
31 Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 382. 
32 Distributive refers to the unity of the understanding in contrast to the unity of reason, which is said 
to be systematic. 
33 Philippe Huneman, “Reflexive Judgment and Wolffian Embryology: Kant’s Shift between the First 
and the Third Critiques,” in Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology, ed. Philippe 
Huneman (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 78. 
34 Ibid. 
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speculative reason can establish an orderly and systematic constitution of nature. This 
is because the speculative kind of reason allows for an examination of all possible 
connections according to the principle of systematic unity.35 
 
Kant suggests that the human mind can unify the aggregative knowledge of the 
understanding by means of an idea.36 Ideas are, as defined in the ‘Transcendental 
Dialectic,’ the principles of application that enable the organisation of objects of 
empirical cognition into the form of a system.37 They are, in other words, the principles 
of systematic unity. The ideas create a vantage point that lies outside of the 
understanding and its rules. One posits an idea, Kant argues, ‘only as a unique 
standpoint from which alone one can extend the unity that is so essential to reason and 
so salutary to the understanding […].’38 In so doing, reason, ‘extends systematic unity 
over all practice.’39 Such a standpoint, though it raises problems, is, according to Kant, 
necessary for scientific knowledge. Kant, moreover, seems to suggest that our 
experience already indicates such an order. While systematic relations cannot be 
established as a fact of nature, systematicity is, according to Kant, a necessary ideal 
that has very real epistemological effects. As Günther Zoller argues, it is with Kant 
that the form of the system becomes, for the first time, a necessary methodological 
presupposition.40 
 
According to the first Critique, only by means of the ideas are we able to account for 
the relational order of empirical cognitions. Ideas offer a mode of both recognizing 
and expressing systematic coherence, and thus of navigating the contradiction of 
scientific knowledge requiring the thought of the totality of relations that, though it 
can never be experienced, is necessary for knowledge. Thus, while we are unable to 
experience the totality of empirical relations, that is, the possibility of a world whole, 
we yet need to be able to imagine this idea and, as Kant suggests, employ it as an 
                                                     
35 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A686/B714. 
36 Caygill, A Kant Dictionary, 385-86. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A681-82/B709-10. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Günther Zoller, “‘Die Seele des Systems’: Systembegriff und Begriffssystem in Kants 
Transzendentalphilosophie,” in Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants, eds. Hans Friedrich 
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analogue41 or a guideline.42 According to Kant, we can give content to systematic unity 
in terms of the ideas of the soul, the world whole, or God, phenomena that do not exist 
as such but can function as schemata of approximation for human knowledge. Not 
unlike the categories of the understanding, these ideas are in themselves static. In order 
to be meaningful, they have to be applied as regulative principles. 
 
In the Appendix to the ‘Transcendental Dialectic,’ Kant refers to the ideas as a ‘focus 
imaginarius.’ The ideas, Kant writes, direct the understanding towards a certain goal 
where all its rules converge in one point.43 This point lies entirely outside the bounds 
of possible experience and is thus a point from which the concepts of the 
understanding cannot really proceed.44 This focus, Kant emphasises, is nevertheless 
necessary because it ‘serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside 
the greatest extension.’45 Is speculation a condition of possibility for the 
understanding? It seems that the unity of the understanding, projected by the ideas of 
reason, is necessary a priori. Kant concludes that the only way to bring unity into 
cognitions is by ‘approximating the rule to universality.’46 By means of the ideas, 
reason constantly and continuously approximates its own coherence and self-identity 
and in so doing also speculates on the closure of its world, that is, the whole of 
cognition. If the idea of the whole of cognition really precedes the determinate 
cognition of all the parts, then the ideas would be a necessary function that sustains 
the understanding at every moment and not just in retrospect. The fiction of the whole 
of cognition would accordingly ground the understanding, rather than adding another 
layer to it. It would be its founding fiction or idea. 
 
Applicability of logical systems to the classification of nature 
 
The question of speculation, that is, the possibility of a systematic ordering of 
cognitions and of empirical laws and thus of an ordered presentation of the natural 
world, is not specific to Kant’s philosophy, but rather, as Stella Sandford and Ernst 
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43 Ibid., A644/B672. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., A647/B675. 
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Cassirer outline, occupied the natural sciences of his day. Speculation is therefore not 
a problem internal to critical philosophy. Rather, critical philosophy is an attempt to 
prove the legitimacy of natural history, that is, of the possibility of a natural, as 
opposed to an artificial, system of nature and scheme of classification.47 What justifies 
us, Kant asks, to see nature as a whole, to assume that nature adopts the form of a 
logical system and can be treated as such?48 In other words, what justifies the harmony 
between natural and logical forms that is assumed in natural history? These questions 
are addressed first and foremost at Carl Linnaeus49 who, in his 1735 Systema naturae, 
attempted a comprehensive classification of nature. In this work, the whole of animate 
nature is constructed according to genus, species, class and order, and every individual 
is assigned its determinate place in the whole scheme.50 
 
Linnaeus identifies sexual difference as potent principle of organization and bases his 
botanical taxonomy on the sexuality of plants.51 Though disputed, this classification 
was widely adopted after 1737 and until the first decades of the nineteenth century 
was considered to be the most convenient system of classification.52 However, as 
Susanne Lettow, among others, has argued, more was needed in order for Linnaeus’ 
system to become possible than only a general structuring principle. Characteristic of 
Linnaeus’ taxonomy and of the classification projects of natural history is ‘the 
systematic disentanglement of living beings from their original locations and 
contexts.’53 This disentanglement, as Lettow outlines, has a specific historical context, 
as it was made possible by the colonial mobilization of humans, animals, and plants, 
which also led to a new understanding of procreation, generation and to a theory of 
race in philosophy.54 Londa Schiebinger refers to this period as ‘colonial 
bioprospecting,’ that is, the task of searching the world for useful plants to be brought 
                                                     
47 Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel, trans. 
William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 128. 
48 Ibid., 124. 
49 For better understanding the link between Linnaeus and Kant, see, for instance, Silvio Marcucci, 
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back to Europe for profit.55 It is in this context that ideas about the number and variety 
of plant species and thus ideas about the scope of the undertaking of botanical 
taxonomy emerged. In Nature, Human Nature, and Human Difference, Justin Smith 
remarks that it is not surprising to find that alongside bioprospecting we can identify 
a parallel activity of ‘ethno-prospecting,’ an effort to carry out an exhaustive global 
survey of human diversity.56 
 
According to Lettow, only when living beings are mobilised and dislocated from their 
original surroundings can a general taxonomy of nature and something like a force of 
reproduction that is autonomous and independent from local circumstances come into 
view.57 The introduction of “sexual difference” as structuring principle of nature and 
the colonial dislocation of living beings from their immediate contexts thus functions 
as pretext for a general order and classification of nature. The question to what extent 
historical and political conditions underlie the attempt at a scientific ordering of nature 
will be resumed in Chapter 3, in the section on Geschlecht in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century German philosophy. But this immediate context is not addressed by either 
Linnaeus or Kant, who focus instead on the problem of the relationship between the 
presumption of a natural order immanent to nature, and the recognition of the 
artificiality of these systems of classification.58 
 
Kant draws a distinction between Naturbeschreibung, natural history as artificial 
description, which he accused Linnaeus of doing, and a kind of natural history that 
would ground its own taxonomy, which he named “a history of nature” or 
Naturgeschichte.59 When justifying the use of speculative reason, what is at stake is 
the possibility of advancing beyond Linnaeus’ descriptive science. Kant asks what 
criterion we can employ to judge whether we are on the right path: how can we know 
that our classifications are not mere verbal cloaks but refer to real objective 
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differences?60 According to Kant, the natural historian does what the CPR describes 
as reason’s attempt to systematise.61 In both instances, knowledge is ordered via 
“logical” principles, that is, via the presupposition of the form of a whole of cognition 
and of nature that precedes the determination of its parts and contains the conditions 
for determining a priori the place of each part and its relation to all others.62 The 
question of speculation in the CPR is accordingly not an abstract concern. It is not just 
the coherence of his own system that is at stake. Rather, Kant responds in his first and 
third Critiques to methodological problems confronting the natural historians of his 
time.63 
 
In the end, however, the question of speculation as it is outlined in the first Critique is 
only able to restate the problem. It is the concept of purposiveness, as outlined in the 
essay ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ that offers a solution that 
goes beyond an exposition of natural history’s methodological dilemma. As will be 
outlined in the following sections, from this essay onwards Kant locates the specificity 
of natural history in its presumption of the principle of purposiveness.64 Kant now 
suggests that the description of nature stays on the theoretical, that is, speculative path, 
whereas natural history is obliged to take the teleological path.65 It is thus not 
speculation, the positing of an idea of reason, but the definition of the principle of 
purposiveness that offers a solution to Kant. 
 
From the ideas of reason to the concept of purposiveness 
 
The problem of the systematicity of knowledge, as just outlined, restates a 
methodological concern first raised in the natural sciences. Rather than understanding 
the problem of the order of nature that occupies natural history as a metaphysical or 
ontological concern about kinds of being, it is, according to Kant, an epistemological 
question.66 In the first Critique, systematic unity is the projection of order onto law-
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like nature by means of an idea of reason.67 In the third Critique, however, Kant 
reframes the problem by introducing the principle of objective formal purposiveness. 
While the concept of purposiveness is not absent from the first Critique, where it slips 
into the discussion in the Appendix of the Dialectic, it is never properly defined, and 
is only introduced as an a priori principle of transcendental idealism in the third 
Critique. Its use in the introduction to the Appendix is, however, revealing. It is argued 
here that ‘[e]verything grounded in the nature of our powers must be purposive.’68 
Thus, while we must, following Kant, guard ourselves against the misuse of our 
powers and define their proper direction,69 which is precisely the task that the three 
Critiques undertake, a purposeful function, even of speculative reason, can 
nevertheless be assumed. The ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ and ‘Doctrine of Method’ 
identify the striving towards systematic unity as the proper, that is, purposeful 
direction of reason. Even though the determination of the place of each object and its 
relation to all others exceeds the laws of the understanding, such determination is in 
line with our faculties. Because it advances the purposive use of the understanding, 
and facilitates the scientific ordering of human cognition, speculative reason is just as 
‘natural’70 and ‘immanent’71 as the lawfulness of the understanding. In the first 
Critique, speculation is thus justified by reference to its purposive character. 
Purposiveness, Kant argues, is the language with which we can justifiably extend our 
knowledge beyond the understanding. 
 
In the third Critique, purposiveness is no longer ‘just a convenient language, with 
which to describe the required systematicity of a nature founded on mechanistic 
grounds.’72 Kant introduces a distinction absent from the CPR, namely a distinction 
between the purposive ordering of empirical laws, the scientific and hence justified 
employment of speculative reason, and an objective concept of purposiveness 
concerned with the production of singular entities. The latter is a specific concept of 
purposiveness that emerges from reflective judgement, a particular form of judgement 
first introduced in the third Critique, under which a peculiar ontological kind is 
                                                     
67 Sandford, “Kant, Race, and Natural History,” 953. 
68 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A642/B670. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., A643/B671. 
72 Huneman, “Reflexive Judgement and Wolffian Embryology,” 87. 
 26 
described, namely living beings as organised beings. In the third Critique, the 
subjective purposiveness of the human understanding and of nature must also make 
room for the concept of an objective and material purposiveness of natural beings.73 
The introduction of a reflective kind of judgement and of a formal concept of 
purposiveness is Kant’s response to the natural historian. It becomes clear in the third 
Critique that the presupposition of purposiveness cannot remain an idea of reason to 
guide the investigation of nature from above but that it has become a concept arising 
from the investigation of nature itself.74 The possibility of such a concept is first 
elaborated in the essay ‘On the Use of Teleological Judgements in Philosophy,’ with 
the example of “race.” The essay is of interest because race is here not a topic of 
interest in and of itself, but it emerges as a solution to the philosophical problem of 
order and systematicity in natural history.75 As such, the question of race cannot be set 
aside as a special topic relevant only to Kant’s anthropological work. Rather, it is in 
his theory of race that Kant first formulates a concept of objective purposiveness and 
reflective judgement and thus introduces the problematic that concerns the second half 
of the third Critique. 
 
‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ 
 
The essay ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ is Kant’s third and 
last on the natural history of the human species. Published in 1788 in the Teutscher 
Merkur, the essay is primarily intended as a response to a publication in the same 
journal by Georg Forster, an ethnologist, natural historian and travel writer who had 
accompanied his father Johann Reinhold Forster on several expeditions, including 
James Cook’s second voyage to the Pacific.76 Forster had raised objections first to 
Kant’s conception of a human race, in particular Kant’s exclusive focus on skin colour 
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as criterion of racial differentiation, which Kant bases on the predisposition of germs 
rather than the influence of climate, and second to what he saw as Kant’s precedence 
for theory over observation.77 Kant responds to these two objections by outlining the 
peculiar nature of the concept of race, which he argues Forster has misunderstood. It 
is this type of concept, though not the concept of race as such, that is also at stake in 
the third Critique, particularly in the second half on teleological judgement. 
 
What is race? The word does not figure in a system of the description of nature, 
therefore presumably the thing itself is nowhere in nature either. Yet the 
concept designated by this expression is well grounded in the reason of each 
observer of nature […]78 
 
Race, Kant argues, is not a simple fact and by consequence is not part of the 
description of nature. And yet it is a necessary concept for natural history because the 
observer of nature finds it indispensable to make recourse to this concept.79 What, 
then, does “race” refer to? And what is the peculiar status of this concept? At issue for 
Kant is outlining the possibility of a concept that refers neither to a “fact” of nature 
that can be explained in terms of cause and effect, that is, in terms of natural laws, nor 
an artificial logical category forced onto nature by human reason. The former would 
be an empirical category and as such refer to a merely aggregative unity of nature. The 
latter would mean to repeat the mistake of natural history, which is unable to ground 
its logical categories as empirical concepts of nature. The ideas of reason, introduced 
in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of the first Critique, could not offer a satisfactory 
answer to this methodological problem. Kant now, by example of the concept of race, 
aims to introduce a new concept for natural history that can bridge this divide. 
 
Kant seems to suggest that while the ideas of reason are not objectively valid, the 
concept of “race” is. Because it belongs to the natural history of the human species, 
race is not merely a logical category or idea.80 This type of concept, Kant argues, 
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renegotiates the relation between the empirical on the one and the systematic order of 
reason on the other hand. How to explain those phenomena that have an empirical 
reference but, because they require recourse to the language of purposiveness, cannot 
be explained in terms of the natural laws of the understanding, which so far had been 
the prerogative of reason? This question, Kant seems to suggest, is at the heart of 
natural history. The difference between description of nature and natural history, he 
argues, is ‘grounded in the constitution of things.’81 While the appellation of “classes” 
and “orders” expresses a merely logical separation, introduced by human reason for 
the purpose of comparison, Kant argues that “genera” and “species,” by contrast, also 
refer to a physical separation that nature itself makes among its creatures with respect 
to their generation (Erzeugung).82 “Genera” and “species,” accordingly, are not just 
logical but empirical categories and as such are grounded differently in the constitution 
of things. It is in this sense that they differ from Linnaeus’ categories. Kant seems to 
suggest that, in contrast to the logical categories of reason, their employment is 
justified for the taxonomic project of natural history.83 While Linnaeus is also using 
empirical categories and divides things into genera and species, he does not, following 
Kant, distinguish between merely logical categories and empirically-founded 
categories of reason. As such his system remains arbitrary. 
 
The peculiar status of the concept of race accordingly raises wider methodological 
questions about natural science, about its epistemological claims and the ontological 
status of its object. In natural science, Kant argues, ‘everything must be explained 
naturally, because otherwise it would not belong to this science.’84 Yet this same 
principle ‘also indicates the boundaries of natural science. For one has reached its 
extreme boundary if one uses the last of all explanatory grounds that can still be 
confirmed by experience.’85 While the scientist will always remain ignorant of the 
efficient causes of natural phenomena, which are scientifically unknowable,86 this 
does not mean, following Kant, that she can only make use of mechanical causality as 
scientific description of nature. The use of teleological principles, as will be explained 
                                                     
81 Kant, “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” 197-98. 
82 Ibid., 199n. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 213. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid., 195. 
 29 
in more detail with reference to the third Critique, is justified with respect to nature, 
though only, Kant argues, if it is empirically conditioned.87 Race is one such concept 
that is empirically conditioned but requiring a teleological explanation, that is, 
recourse to the language of purposiveness and ends. Kant remarks, already in the first 
Critique, but now in relation to the question of “race” and heredity, that the concept 
of an organised being, the subject of biological analysis, raises similar methodological 
questions. 
 
Since the concept of an organised being already includes that it is some matter 
in which everything is mutually related to each other as end and means, which 
can only be thought as a system of final causes, and since therefore their 
possibility only leaves the teleological but not the physical-mechanical mode 
of explanation, at least as far as human reason is concerned, there can be no 
investigation in physics about the origin of all organization itself.88 
 
Now the concept of an organic being is this: that it is a material being which is 
possible only through the relation of everything contained in it to each other 
as end and means (and indeed every anatomist as well as every physiologist 
actually starts from this concept). Therefore, a basic power that is effectuated 
through an organization has to be thought as a cause effective according to 
ends, and this in such a manner that these ends have to be presupposed for the 
possibility of the effect.89 
 
Kant indicates that biology, anatomy, and physiology effectively already work with a 
concept akin to the teleological principle described here: ‘Finality is the language with 
which physiologists and anatomists can extend their knowledge […].’90 These new 
disciplines nonetheless remain committed to the definition of natural science that 
everything must be explained naturally without recourse to God as final divine 
causality. Kant accordingly aims to contribute towards theorizing the necessary 
methodological tools for an advanced natural science that does not base its laws on a 
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divine being as final ground of explanation, as well as towards a specialised discipline 
of natural history. The discussions on race outlines that such a scientific debate is 
possible. 
 
Rethinking the problematic: ‘The Critique of Teleological Judgement’ 
 
So far it has been argued that the CPR points to the anticipatory function of reason 
which orders the contingent by means of regulative ideas. Such an order, however, 
remains static and ultimately uncertain. The problem of the difficulty of justifying a 
taxonomy of nature, first encountered within natural history, is not resolved at this 
point. Kant concludes that only knowledge of the general object but not its place 
within an overall system of nature can be secured. The essay ‘On the Use of 
Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ and the Critique of the Power of Judgement 
(hereafter CJ) complicate this account. Here, the distinction between the formal laws 
of nature on the one hand and nature’s overall systematic order on the other is less 
antithetical. Kant explains that systematicity is not merely an idea of reason but 
empirically grounded, as it can be experienced in certain natural phenomena. While 
the essay focuses on the concept of “race,” the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgement’ 
posits that there are certain empirical phenomena – organised or living beings – that 
are purposive in themselves and thus of systematic character. Even though the overall 
order of nature remains unknown, systematicity can nevertheless be experienced and 
justified. It moreover means that speculation, the problem of the systematic order of 
nature, is not just a question for reason, of ordering cognitions after the fact, as was 
argued in the CPR. In the first Critique regulative principles were assigned to the 
faculty of reason, which was defined as the source of the ideal of systematicity. Kant 
explains in the third Critique that what reason wants for itself, namely the systematic 
interconnection of phenomena, it already experiences outside of itself, in an encounter 
with certain products of nature. In the CJ, Kant identifies the faculty of judgement, 
more precisely a new power of reflecting judgement, as the source of this possibility.91 
It is, Kant suggests, reflecting judgement and not reason that attempts to realise the 
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architectonic ideal by finding a particular systematization of the empirical laws 
discovered by the understanding.92 
 
The first introduction to the third Critique formally introduces the power of judgement 
into the architectonic of reason. Since judgement, unlike the understanding and reason, 
provides neither concepts of possible objects nor ideas but simply subsumes the 
particular under the universal, it had not been regarded as an independent cognitive 
faculty until now.93 Applying the schemata of the understanding to every empirical 
synthesis, judgement was supposed to proceed only mechanically, and in the CPR was 
considered as a function of the understanding and equated with the latter. The CJ 
complicates this account by introducing a distinction between determinate or 
mechanical and reflective or technical judgement. The latter is also characterised as 
the “power of judgement.” With the addition of reflective judgement, the third 
Critique introduces a concept or rule that originates from the power of judgement 
itself. If such a rule is possible, Kant argues, then  
 
it would have to be a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to 
our power of judgement, and thus a concept of a property of nature such that 
one cannot form any concept of it except that its arrangement conforms to our 
faculty for subsuming the particular given laws under more general ones even 
though these are not given.94 
 
The premise of the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgement’ is that the empirical cognition 
of certain objects already requires a concept of reason.95 This is elaborated, for 
instance, in §65, where Kant describes the difference between final and efficient 
causes. Lawfulness, Kant writes, insofar as it is conceived by the understanding, is a 
connection that constitutes a series of causes and effects that is always descending. A 
causal nexus can also, however, be conceived in accordance with a concept of reason, 
or of ends, which, if considered as a series, would carry with it descending as well as 
ascending dependency.96 Because this type of causality requires reference to a concept 
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or an idea, it is referred to as a connection of ideal causes, while the former is that of 
real or efficient ones.97 Since, as Kant admits, dependencies are not just linear in a 
causal sense, another schema is needed, one that can also explain reciprocal relations 
in nature. With the power of reflective judgement, which prescribes a law not for the 
determination but the reflection of nature, Kant justifies a causal principle outside of 
the understanding but not in contradiction with it. The principle of purposiveness, 
then, is the ground for reflective judgement. A purposive order of nature can assert a 
claim to necessity, even if this professed necessity does not rest on concepts of the 
object a priori but instead on the subjective conditions for concepts, which ground 
these transcendentally.98 Thus, Kant writes 
 
We can and should be concerned to investigate nature, so far as lies within our 
capacity, in experience, in its causal connection in accordance with merely 
mechanical laws: for in these lie the true physical grounds of explanation, the 
interconnection of which constitutes scientific cognition of nature through 
reason. But now we find among the products of nature special and very widely 
distributed genera, which contain within themselves a combination of efficient 
causes that we must ground in the concept of an end, even if we wish to employ 
only experience […].99 
 
In the CPR, final causality or purposiveness was not considered as an individuating 
principle, as a means to explain the functioning of particular empirical phenomena. In 
the CJ, it becomes apparent that these two functions cannot be separated. The 
organizing principle of the particular living being also explains systematic coherence 
as a whole. Reflective judgement is a tool for the evaluation and research into nature, 
both for finding the general law of particular experiences as well as for the systematic 
ordering of experience as a whole.100 Nature organises itself teleologically but without 
recourse to a transcendent element, thus fulfilling the requirements of modern science. 
All causal relations are fully immanent. The CJ, by introducing the role of the power 
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of reflective judgement, is to finally secure the empirical unity of nature that 
speculation posits but ultimately cannot justify. 
 
In a teleological judgement, the power of judgement compares the form of the object 
with the rational form of the system, that is, with an idea. If this comparison is 
successful, the object is judged to be a living being. It seems that in the third Critique, 
judgement is the higher faculty that realises both reason and the understanding. Yet 
even once the reflective power of judgement is introduced, the ideas of reason still 
play a central role. Even though final causes are objectively recognizable, for Kant, 
the crucial point is that such a causality introduces an external point of reference into 
the explication of nature and as such is based on a concept or idea. The concept of a 
thing as a natural end, Kant explains, can only lie in an idea since it is conceivable 
only by means of a principle of reason, and thus transcends the realm of the sensible.101 
Accordingly, the capacity to judge teleologically, even if such judgement is justified, 
leads us, as far as its ground is concerned, beyond the sensible world.102 At the same 
time, ‘the consequence that answers to it [the product] is still given in nature.’103 The 
idea of a natural end is empirically conditioned. 
 
Kant argues that while an idea might be immanent to specific phenomena that we 
judge and reflect upon, it nevertheless constitutes an abstract point of reference. 
Because it is abstract, such a point of reference is potentially valid not only for this 
one object but also for others. As Philippe Huneman explains, only by means of this 
vantage point, that is, only by means of the ideas of reason, can the principle of 
purposiveness create a gap between nature’s lawful regularity, as laid out by the rules 
of the understanding, and a possible reflection about nature’s meaning.104 Since 
meaning does not consist of isolated, disconnected facts, it requires a universal system 
of reference that is law-like but not fixed. This is what makes a non-mechanical 
causality possible. By contrast, the objects of the understanding or objects in general 
do not reveal any specific characteristics and are not placed within a broader 
interconnected system of phenomena. Because they contain no ambiguity, such 
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objects do not require interpretation. Meaning is of no concern at this point. This is 
why the determining power of judgement does not need a special concept or, in Kant’s 
words, any ‘autonomy, for it merely subsumes under given laws or concepts as 
principles.’105 Reflection is necessary only once experience provides us with a 
manifold of particular phenomena and laws. It becomes apparent that speculation, that 
is, the possibility of a system of relations, is also a question of the possibility of 
meaning. In this respect, the third Critique further outlines and clarifies the positive 
and necessary use of speculative reason. 
 
Organisms and organicism  
 
It is the projected anticipation and closure of a world that defines the problem of 
systematicity for Kant in the first Critique. Here, the idea of a system is static. The 
question addressed in the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgement,’ of the epistemological 
status of organised life, displaces this systematic moment of the first Critique. Once 
the transcendental character of purposiveness, as the structure of the power of 
judgement, is established, the thought of interdependent dynamic relations comes into 
view. It turns out that we already encounter, through reflection, specific empirical 
phenomena that are themselves of systematic character. For the first time, systematic 
relations are discovered outside of the strict realm of subjectivity. Systematic or 
purposive relations are thus no longer understood primarily as a law introduced by 
reason from the outside, but are regarded as internal to certain specific objects of 
nature. Kant, already in the first Critique, makes use of biological terminology to 
describe the epistemological field.106 In the ‘Methodology of Pure Reason,’ for 
instance, Kant describes the growth of rational knowledge with the terminology of the 
theory of germs (Keime).107 In the third Critique, though, organisms come to signify 
a form of fully systematic, internal relations.108 Even though the purposive character 
of living beings in the third Critique is said to be discursive rather than ‘material,’ a 
decisive shift in argument is introduced. In the organism Kant finds what he is looking 
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for, that is, ‘an object with the “form of a system,” a self-defining whole.’109 
Systematicity is no longer purely logical, but is in the world.  
 
The term ‘organic,’ or ‘organism,’ that comes to signify the idea of a dynamic system 
in Kant, was not primarily a biological concept, but functioned until the seventeenth 
century and beyond as a description for anything that has interrelated, working parts. 
These could be either physical or conceptual.110 As such, the organic was not opposed 
to the mechanical. Rather both terms, like those of organism and machine, overlapped 
and were used synonymously, both referring to an organization that unifies a plurality 
of parts which interact with one another.111 This, as Justin Smith argues, changes with 
Leibniz, who introduces a distinction between the two when he denies the “organicity” 
of the horse to the watch.112 For Leibniz, an organic being is distinct from a mechanical 
body not because the former requires the introduction of an immaterial vital principle, 
but because it is infinitely more complex.113 While initiating a new turn in the history 
of the concept, Leibniz, however, does not refer to the organic as an antonym of the 
mechanical, but still uses both terms interchangeably, as in a letter to Arnauld that 
refers to ‘an organized body, or rather a machine […].’114 Organism, for Leibniz, is a 
variety of mechanism – both are ways to describe the general condition or structure of 
nature as a whole, and in that function they complement each other.115 Similarly for 
Kant what is of interest is not the ontological status of organisms, which remains 
ultimately uncertain, but rather their epistemological value. Organisms exemplify the 
structure of internal purposiveness, i.e. of a system of interrelated dynamic relations 
without an external end. As such, the concept of “organism” functions as a 
methodological tool to outline the general structure of knowledge as well as to open a 
new way for the investigation of nature. 
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The possibility to know the biological and organic constitution of life is in Kant the 
result of a discursive shift. An immanent concept of life, that is, a concept of life 
independent of a divine creator, is linked with the conditions of possibility for human 
knowledge.116 As Philippe Huneman outlines, ‘the central Kantian idea – the internal 
productivity of the organisms, their epigenetic character, is essentially bound to the 
specific epistemological character of the biological knowledge (i.e. the regulative 
status of the idea of an organism).’117 Proving that a teleological discourse of nature 
is not dependent on the idea of a highest being, Kant contributes to the methodological 
discourse of the newly found biological science. However, as Jennifer Mensch 
explains, Kant’s biological language and metaphors were not unusual for his time. 
Mensch argues that ‘the latter half of the eighteenth century is a period best defined 
by its organicism.’118 Organicism, she argues, is a framework of thought that begins 
to take shape in a number of fields and that ‘can be defined by its view of nature as 
something that cannot be reduced to a set of mechanical operations.’119 Though 
seemingly an argument internal to the natural sciences, this discourse on organicism 
is not politically neutral. Kant uses the analogy of biological development not only as 
an explanatory tool for his transcendental system, but, as outlined in the three essays 
on “race,” to address anthropological concerns, most importantly for Kant being the 
question of the unity in diversity of the human species. The use of biological 
metaphors in Kant’s thought, of germs and epigenesis, cannot be isolated from this 
discussion, that is, from Kant’s philosophical thought on race, as the first definition of 
teleological judgement being outlined in such a context in ‘On the Use of Teleological 
Principles in Philosophy’ shows us. Kant's organicism, accordingly, is neither a 
disinterested methodological tool, nor a strictly methodological intervention into 
natural history and biology, but is socially and politically invested. 
 
While it might seem that speculation has disappeared from the discussion in the last 
paragraphs, this is not without reason. This disappearance illustrates something in 
Kant, namely that the power of theoretical reason to speculate, if further defined in its 
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necessary and scientific use, is no longer particularly speculative. Once reason has 
been critiqued and once it is solely employed for the purposes of expanding knowledge 
in the natural sciences, such as natural history, where its concepts are empirically 
grounded, it is just that: theoretical. It seems that speculative reason at this point loses 
its problematic status. 
 
In addressing speculation as a problem, the possibility of a scientific philosophy first 
comes into view. By distinguishing between a dangerous and misleading employment 
of speculative reason on the one hand, and its necessary use as the power to order and 
to systematise on the other hand, scientific philosophy delineates itself from former 
metaphysics. Moreover, it is with reference to the positive use of speculative reason 
that the new scientific philosophy engages with the natural sciences, offering a 
theoretical answer to some of its problems and questions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Speculation, according to Kant, though it is a source of error and illusion, at the same 
time allows for the possibility of science. In the CPR speculation is defined as the 
capacity or striving for systematic unity. It is, as Kant explains in the ‘Transcendental 
Doctrine of Method,’ the systematic unity of nature, which is also the systematic unity 
of reason, that first makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge and thus 
transforms ordinary cognition into science.120 Anticipating Hegel’s opening to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, it thus turns out in the first Critique that everything depends 
on the system.121 And that it is only as a system that knowledge is actual and can be 
presented as science.122 
 
With the introduction of the principle of purposiveness, not only as a convenient 
language for reason but as the formal structure of reflective judgement, it becomes 
possible to demonstrate that the idea of a system is not just introduced from above by 
speculative reason but is also immanent to certain objects of nature and thus can be 
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empirically experienced. This, however, does not mean that speculation is replaced or 
becomes irrelevant. The explanation of living beings still requires recourse to an idea 
of reason and thus to speculation, that is, to the capacity or striving for systematic 
unity as defined in the first Critique. Rather than replacing speculation, the language 
for what speculation is to address, and with it the discourse on science and 
methodology, becomes more complex, first with the essay ‘On the Use of Teleological 
Principles in Philosophy,’ and then with the third Critique. 
 
It turns out in the first Critique that the speculative discourse, though only discursive, 
addresses a number of concrete questions, such as the ways in which we group 
together and name the manifold met in experience and the extent to which we are 
allowed to divide nature between kinds and species, or group individuals into species 
and genera.123 The question after the kind of category that “genera” and “species” 
present us with is, in the first Critique, meant to justify the use of speculative reason. 
These concepts, though technically only concepts of reason and thus purely logical, 
seem to lose their speculative “as if” character. This epistemological problem, Kant 
observes, also affects natural history. The introduction of purposiveness, as formal 
structure of judgement, addresses the question of the status of the categories of 
“genera” and “species” raised in the first Critique. The third Critique, however, not 
only further elaborates the problem of systematic unity of the first Critique, but 
proposes a broader discourse on the methodology of natural science. Kant suggests 
that the internally systematic character of certain natural phenomena allows a 
rethinking not only of the possibility of a biological science but also of the project of 
natural history.  
 
The concept of “species,” by means of which the possibility of a non-descriptive but 
nevertheless empirical rather than merely logical category of taxonomy is, in Kant’s 
work, intrinsically related to the definition of a human race and thereby to 
anthropology.124 This is because the example of “race” functions to justify the use of 
the logical category of “species”. According to Kant, through this example, the 
categories of natural history can be shown to be empirically grounded. This is also 
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true of the concept of “life,” as it relates to the question of species and generation. The 
concept of “life” thus entails, in its philosophical definition, reference to debate in 
anthropology and natural history, even if this is not always explicitly mentioned. The 
possibility of a natural history that can ground its categories empirically is accordingly 
explained by Kant as a critical as well as anthropological endeavour. Here lies the 
contemporaneity of the Critiques with Kant’s anthropological project. The attempt to 
ground natural history philosophically and the attempt to define philosophy as science 
also explains, as will be argued in the following, the use of social and political 
categories, in particular the concept of “race” in Kant and, later, of “sexual difference” 
in Hegel. 
 
In what sense, then, do “race” and “sex” emerge as a concern for the newly defined 
science of philosophy? “Race” and “sex,” alongside the concepts of “species” and 
“life,” are employed by Kant and Hegel as examples that justify the use of non-
empirical speculative reason. These concepts, they argue, are objective, even though 
they do not refer to a simple fact in nature. In Kantian terms, they name not an 
aggregative unity of knowledge but require recourse to an idea of reason. Since these 
concepts, like that of the living being, can be experienced, they differ from the ideas 
of reason, defined in the first Critique in terms of the world, the soul and God. In 
contrast to the latter, these concepts demonstrate that speculation, as the striving for 
systematic unity, is not imposed onto “nature” but is inherent to human experience 
and to what we consider “material.” Using the example of “race,” Kant aims to account 
for a type of concept that is neither a fact of nature nor a logical category imposed by 
reason solely for its own purposes. The third Critique and the essays on race try to 
outline this middle ground. As such, Kant’s critical philosophy and anthropological 
work marks an attempt to redefine the relation between the logical and the empirical. 
In particular these texts aim to demonstrate that certain concepts of reasons are not 
only logical but are also empirically grounded. This observation, according to Kant, 
opens up new possibilities for the classification and ordering of nature. 
 
What both Kant and Hegel have in common and what is of interest to this thesis is the 
use of social and political categories for a definition and explanation of the legitimacy 
of non-empirical speculative reason. “Race” is proposed by Kant as a scientific 
concept that justifies the use of teleological principles for a scientific discourse on 
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nature. In Hegel, “sexual difference,” already in the Logic, functions as an organizing 
principle of pure reason. The concepts of “race” and “sex” raise the question of the 
distinction between the material and the purely speculative. In defining the categories 
of “race” and “sex” and their legitimate use, the role of speculative reason for scientific 
knowledge can be analysed. Because “race” (Kant) and “sexual difference” (Hegel) 
are employed as examples of the legitimate use of non-empirical, speculative reason, 
these concepts are crucial for the definition of modern philosophy, its attempt to set 
its own boundaries and to define itself as science. This links philosophy to the newly 
defined sciences of anthropology, biology, gynaecology and comparative anatomy 
which develop the modern concepts of “race” and “sexual difference” as scientific 
markers alongside philosophy. The importance of these concepts for the self-definition 
of modern European philosophy and the delineation of its discourse on nature will be 
further outlined in the following chapters. To do so, emphasis will be put on the role 
of the concepts of sexual difference, Geschlecht and gender and of the relation of 
philosophy and gynaecology in the definition of these terms.125 
  
                                                     
125 For a close analysis of the central importance of “race” for modern European philosophy see Denise 
Ferreira Da Silva, Towards a Global Idea of Race (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2007). 
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Chapter two 
The logical is political: Or, how thought thinking thought itself ends 
up speculating about the sexual relation 
 
 
 
 42 
Opening 
 
To make a point about the Science of Logic demands a certain amount of exposition, 
especially if the passages at stake are the central but less well-known ones. This is 
inevitable because the meaning of the terms employed by Hegel, and even more so 
towards the end of the Logic, can rarely be said to be intuitive or obvious. Concepts 
such as “mechanism”, “chemism”, but even such terms as “subject,” “object,” and 
“life” lose their immediate meaning and require exposition. In order to arrive at a point 
where it is possible to no longer be analytically internal to Hegel’s writings, the 
categories of the Logic first need to be explained. Only in this way can an argument 
be made about their broader functioning, beyond the Logic. It is also worth 
emphasising from the outset that to address the concept of ‘speculation’ in the Logic 
rarely overlaps with straightforwardly tracking the term as it appears or disappears 
throughout the work. This is because, and as explained above, every category or 
concept in the Logic requires contextualization and needs to be understood in relation 
to a number of other conceptual movements, for instance that of the meaning of 
Allgemeinheit, as will be explained.126 Moreover, an exposition is necessary because 
of the way that Hegel writes or rather does not write about speculation, mentioned 
mainly in the introductions to his works but never properly defined in the main body 
of his texts. This is also true of the Logic; and yet, as I will show, everything, especially 
its concluding chapters, is about speculative reason, its nature and meaning. 
 
The reading of speculation which I propose hinges on the meaning of the curiously 
political concepts which Hegel introduces in the final sections of the Logic, in 
particular the chapters on ‘Mechanism’ and ‘Chemism’. In my examination of each of 
the chapters, I introduce a literary figure, Sophocles’ Antigone and Charlotte, one of 
the characters of Goethe’s Elective Affinities, to open up the wider stakes of Hegel’s 
logical project. In the feminist literature on Hegel Antigone is unavoidable. Here, I 
will locate her in a context where she is not often found and where indeed we might 
be surprised to find her, that is in the chapter on ‘Mechanism’ in the Science of Logic. 
Locating Antigone in the Logic opens up questions about how to relate political and 
logical concepts. This chapter therefore begins by introducing Antigone, and the 
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feminist literature on Antigone, followed by a discussion about the role of exemplarity 
in the Logic. This then provides a framework for a close reading of the concluding 
sections of the Logic, which will be continued in chapter four. 
 
Introducing Antigone into the Science of Logic 
 
More than any other aspect of his work, Hegel’s treatment of Antigone has inspired 
numerous, at times contradictory feminist responses that aim to re-appropriate 
Antigone as a feminist figure outside and beyond Hegel’s telos, and, from the 
standpoint of Antigone, attempt to read the Hegelian system against itself. These 
reinterpretations are not necessarily aimed at turning Antigone into a hero, but at 
letting her stand for something other than (mechanistic) fatality. Throughout this 
chapter it will be argued that the contested figure of Antigone is embedded in the 
‘Mechanism’ section of the Logic. This is because the structure of the universal-
particular relation is the same in both Hegel’s presentation of Antigone, for example 
in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and in his outline of the principle of “mechanism” in 
the Logic. The feminist literature on Hegel’s Antigone presented here is read against 
this background. 
 
Both Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray, whose work will be analysed more closely in 
chapters five and six, comment on Hegel’s interpretation of Sophocles’ Antigone.127 
Butler’s Antigone’s Claim, as well as Irigaray’s essays ‘The Eternal Irony of the 
Community’ in Speculum of the Other Woman and her lecture ‘The Female Gender,’ 
delivered in Rotterdam in 1985, search for another universal and ethical law through 
a reading of Hegel’s Antigone. It is Butler’s reinterpretation in particular that I would 
like to briefly comment on here. Her question of whether it is possible to re-approach 
Antigone’s (mechanistic) fatality and to think ‘an alternate legality’ directly addresses 
the theoretical concerns elaborated in the ‘Doctrine of the Concept.’ This is because 
what Antigone illustrates for Butler, as for Hegel, is not an individual fate, but the 
                                                     
127 Sophocles wrote Antigone in 441 BC. The tragedy is set in the aftermath of a civil war in which 
Eteocles and Polyneices, two brothers and sons of Oedipus, kill each other. The king, Creon, orders 
that Polyneices should not be buried as a punishment for his deed. Antigone disrespects this decree, as 
she sees it as her duty to bury her brother. This conflict between family duty and state law is the focus 
of Hegel’s rewriting of the play in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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question of the universal law. It is in this sense that Antigone’s Claim asks a similar 
question to the Logic. 
 
The Phenomenology is not the only place where Hegel makes direct use of Sophocles’ 
Antigone. Antigone is a recurring figure in his work, appearing also in the Philosophy 
of History (1824), in The Early Theological Writings (1795-1800), The Aesthetics 
(1821), and The Philosophy of Right (1821).128 In all these works, Antigone stands for 
a specific paradox that is also addressed in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter, namely the 
coexistence of two contradictory laws: determinism (fate) and freedom (deed). If she 
expresses the particular form of the relation between the universal law and the 
particular object that the ‘Mechanism’ chapter seeks to define, then it follows that 
Antigone is present within the Logic, even if not mentioned by name. In the Logic as 
elsewhere, Hegel counts on Antigone’s exemplarity, that is, her ability to demonstrate 
that the particular is always already the universal while, at the same time, it ‘is also 
always singular, and in this sense is non-universalizable.’129 
 
The feminist literature on Hegel’s Antigone does not agree on her fate and its 
significance for political theory. According to Irigaray, ‘Antigone already serves the 
state in that she tries to wipe away the blood shed by the state in its bid for power 
[…].’130 Doing the necessary work of mourning, which like all feminised work is 
supposedly a labour of love, she serves the interests of the state more than her own. 
The divine, Irigaray observes, ‘has already been taken away from the female and is 
now the province of the male gender, even in respect to the guardianship of the family, 
of living being, of the gods.’131 In other words, in adhering to the rules and norms of 
the family, Antigone is really, even in her defiance of Kreon, serving the state and its 
necessary internal contradictions. The division of roles that Hegel establishes thus 
seems odd, for it masks that the power associated with feminised labour has already 
been lost. Irigaray accordingly suggests that Hegel sets up a certain power dynamic 
only to hide another bleaker reality.  
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129 Ibid., 125. 
130 Luce Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), 110-11. 
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Though this is an interesting claim, Irigaray’s broader analysis raises problems as she 
insists on a gender binary that, even if not primarily grounded in biological sex 
dimorphism, does not question or further specify the social and historical context of 
the categories of “woman” and “the feminine” on which her presuppositions are based. 
Given these broader problematic claims, the more revealing insights of her analysis 
are often overlooked. Butler, for instance, chooses to position her own reading of 
Hegel’s Antigone in opposition to Irigaray’s. In her introduction to Antigone’s Claim, 
Butler notes that it is striking that Antigone has not been read as a political figure by 
either Hegel, Lacan or Irigaray, but that she is seen to take, in her representation of the 
sphere of kinship, a pre-political position.132 Though she makes possible the social, 
which ‘is inaugurated through a violent supersession of kinship,’133 kinship itself, or 
the realm of divine law, has here ‘not yet entered into the social.’134 
 
While Irigaray indeed regards Antigone as a figure who does not, because of her 
positioning, act in a politically meaningful way, this is not, as Butler claims, because 
Antigone is outside of the realm of the political. On the contrary, Antigone is already 
too embedded in the working of the state. Irigaray observes that Antigone resists but 
yet also submits, for reasons that cannot easily be named, to fidelity towards the male 
gods, to the state and war amongst men. Serving the interest of the state, her actions 
are not pre-political. Rather, according to Irigaray, she serves the wrong political 
interests and is a problematic and interesting figure for that reason. ‘Antigone is no 
longer a goddess.’135 As anti-goddess, she might illustrate the stakes many women 
have, due to their positioning along lines of class, race, sexuality, age, or ability, in 
upholding certain social and political norms, and in promoting the interests of state 
and tradition instead of developing truly liberatory political positions. Because the 
possibility of that latter position is not a given but is itself a continuous political 
struggle, Antigone cannot be the paradigmatic feminist subject. Indeed, we might 
argue that such a subject does not exist per se. However, one possible way to elaborate 
such a position, that is, to write the character of a feminist subject, would be to let 
Antigone talk back to Hegel, for example by means of a speech act, a strategy 
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employed by Butler but also Anne Carson, in her “translation” Antigonick. If Hegel is 
not going to have the last word on these philosophical questions, the questions of the 
law, the state, the family, of thinking in philosophical terms the relation between 
universal and particular, then someone else will have to rise to speak. 
 
Antigone: Hegel says I’m wrong 
Ismene: But right to be wrong 
Antigone: No ethical consciousness 
Ismene: Is that how he puts it 
Antigone: So I wonder, let’s say my unconscious while remaining unconscious 
could also know the laws of consciousness by which I am condemned for 
disobeying them I mean can a person be so completely conscious of being 
unconscious that she is guilty of her own repression, is that what I’m guilty of 
Ismene: We all think you’re a grand girl 
Antigone: Is this an argument136 
 
In Anne Carson’s reading of the play, Antigone speaks back and directly addresses 
Hegel twice, thus challenging his interpretation of her character. Thinking 
philosophically on her own terms, Antigone is, in Carson’s version of the play, no 
longer primarily a figure of fate. Posing a question about the unconscious and its laws, 
she opens up a discussion that transcends her immediate situation. As a philosophical 
counterpart, she is, like Hegel, no longer restricted to the boundaries of her own body, 
historical time and cultural position. Instead it is Kreon who assumes a fateful role, 
since he does not, contrary to Antigone and Ismene, step outside the immediate 
dialogue of the play. Thus, before all the characters are instructed to exit, Kreon 
proclaims that an unbearable fate has loaded itself onto his head. It is with this 
statement that Carson’s play ends. Antigone speaks back, and Kreon assumes his fate. 
 
Butler, too, puts emphasis on what Antigone has to say. Antigone’s speech, more so 
than her act, is, Butler argues, the site of contention. Butler observes that ‘Hegel 
attends to Antigone’s act, but not to her speech, perhaps because that speech would be 
impossible,’ since what Antigone demonstrates ‘is precisely what remains 
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unconscious within public law.’137 Though the law of family and kinship is, according 
to Hegel, essential to public life, it is brought into being by the state only in order to 
be immediately repressed as a hostile principle.138 The community, according to 
Hegel, creates for itself ‘an internal enemy – womankind in general,’ on which it 
depends and which it suppresses.139 And yet, despite repression, Antigone speaks in 
public. What is more, she becomes one for whom the speech act is a fatal crime.140  
 
Not so much her deed but its public proclamation is, Butler observes, the moment 
when Antigone exerts power. This is because in that moment she claims for herself a 
position that seemed, given what she has to say, previously impossible. Once she 
speaks in public, her deed can no longer be repressed or attributed to someone else. 
Moreover, her ability to act has to be publicly acknowledged. Her speech poses a 
danger for that reason. It demonstrates not only that what was deemed unsayable and 
unrepresentable can be heard within the public realm but, moreover, that it makes 
sense according to the rules of public reason. It is this contradiction that interests 
Butler. 
 
What is the importance of Irigaray’s and Butler’s analysis of Antigone, the state and 
the role of kinship for the Logic? The following analysis attempts to demonstrate that 
the philosophical work that seems to be the most far removed from an analysis of 
social relations already works with and relies on political categories. The Logic is a 
case in point in that social and political concepts, including sexual difference, kinship, 
and the state, are not at the margins of philosophical thought. Rather than being absent 
or only empirical, these categories are theorised also at the level of metaphysics. For 
instance, thought thinking thought itself stumbles across the conceptual law of the 
sexual relation. “Chemism” is the category, or structure of thought that addresses this 
form of social relation. Moreover, in the Logic, “mechanism” refers to the relation 
between universal and particular that Antigone stands for in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit. It is with reference to the exemplary role of the sexual relation in the Logic, 
alluded to in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter and directly named in the ‘Chemism’ chapter, 
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that Hegel will be put in conversation with Butler and Irigaray. Through this, the 
definition and need for a philosophical concept of speculation will be rethought. 
 
The role of exemplarity: Or, “it is just an example …” 
 
This second chapter does not analyse the concept of speculation in its own right but 
prepares the ground for an analysis of the political concepts employed in the final 
chapters of the Logic. In these chapters, the examples alluded to or mentioned in 
passing suggest that the Logic is to be read also as a political discourse. It moreover 
prepares the ground for an analysis of the highly politically charged history of 
gynaecology and production of schemas of sexual difference elaborated in the 
following chapter. This chapter then sets up the direct confrontation with speculation, 
now unavoidably politicised. I argue here that political concepts are not just used in 
analogy to logical ones. Rather, through exemplarity, they mark out a more integral 
connection. Indeed, how one reads these categories is crucial for one’s understanding 
of the political stakes of the Logic and of Hegel’s work more generally. I will argue 
this by way of the concept of the sexual relation and its place in the Logic. 
 
The sexual relation is introduced at the end of the Science of Logic, in the ‘Chemism’ 
chapter to illustrate a particular form of relation and of the conceptual law. But what 
exactly is the exemplary role of the sexual relation in the ‘Chemism’ chapter? If 
‘examples do not merely illustrate, but produce knowledge and condition its 
production,’141 then the mentioning of the sexual relation, although only in passing, is 
not irrelevant. As Michèle Lowrie and Susanne Lüdemann outline in their introduction 
to the edited volume Exemplarity and Singularity: Thinking through Particulars in 
Philosophy, Literature, and Law, exemplarity,  
 
[w]hether it comes as […] paradigm, as […] exemplar, or mere instance, […] 
as (role) model or precedent […] mediates between the particular and the 
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general, between a singularity and some larger cognitive framework by way of 
empirical observation and illustration, imagination and narrative.142  
 
While examples and instances are employed throughout, they come to matter 
particularly in those chapters of the Logic where the meaning of central terms is not 
immediately apparent. This is the case in the formulation of the chemical relation, the 
significance of which is not immediately obvious. The sexual relation here comes to 
exemplify the conceptual law of an object which, as will be explained in more detail, 
is in tension with its own lack and which, as such, is neither indifferent to the law that 
governs it nor autonomous. 
 
Distinguishing between an instance (Beispiel), an example (Exempel) and a case 
(Fall), Hans Lipps further explains the role of exemplarity. I am, in the following 
analysis, importing this model into my reading of Hegel. According to Lipps, ‘it is 
precisely insofar as a concept cannot be exemplified – insofar, that is, that its meaning 
must first itself be made clear – that instantiation becomes necessary.’143 The sexual 
relation, it will be argued, as ‘instance of a concept, indicates the manner in which that 
concept is to be revealed and discovered.’144 While Antigone serves as an example, an 
insight is gained from her case that can be put to use; in other words, her fate points 
to something beyond herself, the mentioning of the sexual relation functions to set a 
process of thought in motion that is not yet complete. The exemplarity of the sexual 
relation engages the chemical law in a particular manner. If, as Lipps argues, the goal 
of instantiation is to bring the particular context of a concept to life,145 it might be 
concluded that it is only though the presentation of this particular instance that the 
social and political dimension of the chemical relation comes to the fore. For this 
reason, even if only mentioned in passing, the instance has an effect. It ‘indicates the 
manner in which that concept is to be revealed and discovered,’146 and as such sets 
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into motion a process of thought whose direction determines the very formation of the 
concept in question.147 
 
The role of exemplarity in the Logic raises questions about the relationship between 
the Logic and the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind. Are the examples in the Logic 
taken from the later works? In other words, are these examples and instances just 
signposts for what is to come later, or do they indicate, more in line with the schema 
Lipps proposes, the manner in which a concept is to be revealed? If examples do 
indeed operate as signposts, then the empirical would enter the Logic and shape, 
contrary to Hegel’s claim, the project of thought thinking thought itself. If not taken 
from the Philosophy of Nature and of Mind, then the instance or example would only 
refer to a particular form of logical lawfulness, and in the case of the sexual relation 
what is accordingly exemplified is a mode of relation in its generality, as lawful 
pattern. If this were the case, nothing empirical would enter the Logic. The role of 
examples for illustrating the working of speculative reason was already emphasised in 
the first chapter with reference to Kant and the example of “race.” With these 
expositions of the contested figure of Antigone, of sexual difference and the role of 
exemplarity we will now approach the final chapters of the Logic and the definition of 
speculation therein. 
 
Changing the stakes of speculation: From Kant to Hegel and beyond 
 
Kant, as was outlined in the previous chapter, identifies speculation as being inherent 
to human reason. According to Kant, because human understanding cannot postulate 
its own systematic coherence, reason, and more precisely speculative reason, 
introduces a principle of systematic unity into human cognition and thus allows for an 
examination of all possible relations, of empirical knowledge and of thought. 
Speculation is epistemologically necessary but cannot, according to the first Critique, 
make any empirical claims. Though this argument is complicated by the introduction 
of the power of reflecting judgement, the ambiguity of the a priori necessity of 
speculation on the one hand and its problematic nature on the other hand are not 
entirely resolved in the third Critique. This tension is addressed by Hegel. However, 
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Hegel, purposefully alters the Kantian question as to whether it is possible to derive 
knowledge from speculative reason. Instead, Hegel asks whether reason, in its 
speculative capacity, needs to exercise any violence in order to make the object of 
knowledge conform to its conceptual structures. This change of emphasis allows 
Hegel to remain close to but ultimately outside of the Kantian transcendental frame. 
With Hegel, as we will see, the question of speculation is turned into a discussion of 
power, violence, resistance and freedom. Though, as in Kant, speculation is entirely 
non-empirical, these political categories are, following Hegel, necessary for an 
analysis of conceptual form. It is in the final chapters of the Logic leading up to ‘The 
Idea,’ that is, in the sections from ‘Mechanism’ to ‘Teleology,’ that this conversation 
unfolds. 
 
Initially, the Logic adopts the Kantian definition of speculation. Speculation is 
understood as the systematic but non-empirical positing of relations independent of 
sensibility and understanding. As such it is, Hegel argues, a question of conceptual 
form. The Logic, accordingly, traces the unfolding of conceptual form independently 
of its empirical determinations. However, although Hegel retains the Kantian 
definition, he argues that speculation is not only of epistemological relevance but 
should equally be thought as ontological Thätigkeit (activity). I propose in chapter four 
that the concept as ontological activity is performative. The concluding chapters of the 
Logic accordingly attempt to think the ideas of reason as mode of cognition and mode 
of being alike. 
 
Prior to an analysis of performativity in Hegel, this chapter looks at the use of social 
and political categories as examples, in the Logic, for an analysis of conceptual form. 
As already mentioned, thought thinking thought itself stumbles across the idea of the 
state (the ‘Mechanism’ chapter). In this context, the question of freedom and 
determinism (fate) is analysed, which is explained elsewhere by the example of 
Antigone. Pure reason also stumbles across the sexual relation (the ‘Chemism’ 
chapter). The political dimension of speculation that is opened up in the Science of 
Logic will be explored here, in particular as it relates to questions of sex and gender. 
How does the unfolding of conceptual form lead to social and political thought? We 
saw that in Kant, “race,” among other concepts, was employed to exemplify the 
legitimate use of speculative reason. By demonstrating that certain concepts of reason, 
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such as “race,” are not merely logical, Kant aims to demonstrate that it is possible for 
natural history to ground its categories empirically. But what is Hegel’s motivation for 
including the example of the “sexual relation,” an example which is either ignored 
throughout the vast history of Hegel commentary or deemed to be irrelevant? Since 
Hegel writes his own philosophy of nature (Naturphilosophie), the methodological 
problems that concern natural history are not foregrounded in the Logic. German 
philosophy of nature, however, not unlike the natural history that precedes it, is 
concerned with the concepts of reproduction, generation and sex differentiation. 
Moreover, like Kant, Naturphilosophie is in conversation with the newly founded 
disciplines of anthropology, biology, comparative anatomy and, in the case of Hegel, 
Schelling and Goethe, also gynaecology. The latter conversation will be further 
analysed in the following chapter. 
 
From ‘Objectivity’ to ‘The idea’: The concluding chapters of the Science of Logic 
 
Though subject to multiple interpretations, the concluding chapters of the Logic, 
which formally introduce and develop the concept of the “idea”, or, in Hegelian terms, 
the concept as idea, have not received the same attention as the opening of the book 
or its middle part, the ‘Doctrine of Essence,’ which puts forward a thesis on the 
impossibility of any originary ontological or metaphysical foundation. They also 
receive less attention than the famous and analogous ending to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit on absolute knowing. As such, these sections share the broader fate of the 
‘Doctrine of the Concept’ and more specifically that of the chapters on ‘Objectivity,’ 
that of, on the whole, having not left a lasting impression. The ‘Doctrine of Essence’ 
introduced several concepts which have proved useful to a number of critical 
discourses, and in particular to Marxist analyses, among them the concepts of 
“ground,” “relation,” “appearance” and “actuality.” The ‘Doctrine of the Concept,’ by 
contrast, outlines the positive moment of the Hegelian dialectical movement that is 
sketched out in the Logic, marking for many a return to traditional metaphysics by 
centring such notions as “truth,” the “idea” and the “absolute.” The opening of the 
chapter of ‘The Idea’ is telling in this regard. Hegel writes that ‘[t]he idea is the 
adequate concept, the objectively true, or the true as such. If anything has truth,’ 
Hegel says, ‘it has it by virtue of its idea, or something has truth only in so far as it is 
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idea.’148 Hegel employs repetition and reversal, a chiasmic or quasi-chiasmic sentence 
structure, that is intended to generate a speculative reading of the text. Repetition is 
meant to cause an interruption and to force the reader to read anew what came 
before.149 The well-known claim from the preface to the Philosophy of Right, that ‘the 
real is the rational and the rational is the real,’150 is another example of this type of 
expression. The temporality of the text and its flow are deliberately interrupted. 
However, more often than not, these rhetorical statements, despite their intention, 
seem to present a dictum to the reader. Instead of exemplifying the movement of the 
speculative sentence and the processual nature of thought, as described by Hegel in 
the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, these statements mark the end of thinking. 
Repetition seems to create a sense that thought is self-enclosed. Circulating only 
through its own abstract terms, the Hegelian text seems to create a negative feedback 
loop. Is this the fate of the end of the Logic? 
 
Seemingly less radical than the preceding ‘Doctrine of Essence’ and its illustration of 
the moment of negative dialectics, through the concepts of “ground”, “relation” and 
“appearance” among others, how these last chapters on ‘Objectivity’ and ‘The Idea’ 
are to be understood, is yet to be decided. With what must the Science of Logic end?151 
Does anything actually happen in the end? In other words, what propositions can be 
taken from these last chapters? Hegel’s Logic formally reaches its conclusion with a 
chapter on the ‘Absolute Idea,’ paralleling the ending of other of his works, such as 
the ‘Absolute Knowing’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the ‘Absolute 
Spirit’ chapter of the Encyclopaedia,152 each of which interrupts the linear progression 
of the work that precedes it. Hegel breaks with the sequence in which the forms – of 
consciousness, of the concept, and of spirit – have been immanently generated up until 
this point,153 and thus introduces an order of another kind. It seems that to effectively 
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bring the work to conclusion, a radical discontinuity with the entire preceding 
movement has to be created.154 Generating a moment of gathering and release, the 
whole process is now presented as one. And yet nothing ground-breaking seems to 
happen in the end. What is memorable from the last chapters of the Phenomenology, 
the Logic, and the Encyclopaedia is mainly their name – the reference to the “absolute” 
as point of conclusion. In the case of the Logic the paradox is, as Gillian Rose points 
out, that the end seems to be as abstract as the beginning.155 It is in the main body of 
the Logic, in between the beginning and the end, that the actual work, the labour of 
exposing and working through contradictions, takes place. To understand what is 
specific about the ending to the Logic, its concluding chapters from ‘Objectivity’ to 
the ‘Idea’ must be analysed. Generally speaking, what is being discussed in these 
chapters is the question of the law and the problem of universality/generality 
(Allgemeinheit) that the law opens up.156 The concluding chapter attempts to transform 
this question. Once the concept becomes ‘Idea,’ a notion of the “performative” is 
introduced, replacing the general law as central term. 
 
New logical categories? 
 
With the chapters on ‘Objectivity’ an extreme point is reached in the Logic, where the 
familiar distinctions of subject, object and relation almost lose all their purchase.157 
The aim of these chapters, their place within the Logic, and their subject matter is not 
immediately apparent. Historically too, these chapters have a peculiar status. The 
categories of “mechanism,” “chemism” and “teleology” were the very last concepts to 
be included in the Logic.158 While there were changes in order and arrangement, the 
basic architectonic of Hegel’s philosophical system remained almost identical 
throughout his entire academic career, from his earliest lecture drafts in Jena (1801/02) 
up to his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1817), which served as 
blueprint for his teaching up until his death.159 One of the few visible changes to the 
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system is the introduction of the ‘Objectivity’ chapters into the Logic. The adoption 
of “mechanism,” “chemism” and “teleology” as logical categories is first elaborated 
in a fragment dated by scholars to the year 1808,160 during Hegel’s time in Bamberg. 
The introduction of these categories corresponds to another major modification, the 
condensation of logic and metaphysics into one discipline.161 In his early writings, 
Hegel had distinguished between logic and metaphysics. This separation was based 
on a distinction between the dissolving aspect of dialectics (logic) and the constructive 
aspect of speculation (metaphysics), a distinction that disappears in Hegel’s later 
works.162 It seems, as Nathan Ross argues, that the formulation of these new categories 
is related ‘to an overall revolution in Hegel’s thought, namely the recognition of 
speculative logic as the true form of metaphysics.’163 ‘Objectivity’ accordingly marks 
a moment of change within the system, a point at which the entire project is rethought. 
Departing from Kant’s Critiques, the questions of soul, world and God are no longer 
the primary concerns for a modern, scientific philosophy.164 In their stead, new logical 
categories are being thought to form the basis of metaphysics. 
 
The logical necessity of ‘Objectivity’ is frequently put into question in the secondary 
literature. Can objectivity be taken up as pure thought determination, without 
presupposing a move outside of thought? And what would be the goal of such an 
analysis? These questions, though important, can only be meaningfully addressed 
within the framework of the Logic. In order to make sense of its categories, 
‘Objectivity’ has to be read as a response to what comes before, namely ‘Syllogism’, 
and in view of what comes after, that is, the chapters on ‘Life’ and finally the ‘Absolute 
Idea’. What these chapters have in common is an analysis of the relation of 
particularity to universality. Hegel outlines the various ways in which the particular is 
always already mediated by the universal. The chapters under the heading of 
‘Objectivity’ are no exception in this regard, but they elaborate this relation within the 
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structure of a single object. While the broader philosophical problem is the same, the 
introduction of the terms of power, violence, resistance and freedom into the realm of 
logic makes these chapters stand out. Once introduced, these terms remain part of the 
discourse on logic. Hegel seems to suggest that the question of conceptual 
Allgemeinheit (universality/generality) can only be explained in these terms. Thus, in 
the ‘Mechanism’ chapter, it is argued that the universal, if it is a concept or a category 
that is fully other and external to the particular instance that it refers to, is a source of 
violence.165 The task of the concluding chapters of the Logic is to rethink conceptual 
universality, to propose a new definition, and to transform what was a question of 
violence into one of power. 
 
Contrary to the opening chapters of the Logic, the main concern of the chapters on 
‘Objectivity’ is not whether the object is determined or not. At this point in the Logic 
all objects are determined in multiple aspects. What is still unclear, however, is 
whether their determination is external or whether, in Hegel’s words, ‘the merely 
external determinateness of the objects, has passed over into immanent and objective 
determination.’166 While judgement and syllogism, as the previous chapters of the 
Logic explain, are logical shapes in which the singularity, particularity and 
universality of an object are increasingly mediated, ‘Mechanism’ for the first time 
presents ‘a mediating term of singularity that is utterly mixed with universality in such 
a way that there is no determinate difference between these two moments of the 
concept.’167 From now on the form of a single term, the internal structure of the 
speculative concept, will be analysed.  
 
The chapters on ‘Mechanism,’ ‘Chemism,’ ‘Teleology’ and ‘Life’ have a similar 
structure. These chapters operate under the assumption that the object in question can 
only be thought as a product or result. Each chapter is therefore divided in three 
sections – object, process and result. The argument initially seems straightforward. 
The mechanical object cannot be thought outside of a mechanical process which it 
shares with other mechanical objects. In other words, it cannot be thought on its own 
                                                     
165 Rocío Zambrana, “Logics of Power, Logics of Violence (According to Hegel),” CR: The New 
Centennial Review 14, no.2 (2014): 15. 
166 Hegel, Science of Logic, 643. 
167 Ross, On Mechanism in Hegel’s Social and Political Philosophy, 77. 
 57 
terms. These reciprocal relations are then explained in more depth by looking at the 
chemical and the purposive object. What complicates this account is that all these 
terms are highly mediated. It is unclear what exactly concepts such as “mechanism”, 
“chemism” and the strange reference to “life” refer to. Even the term “object” seems 
to have lost its immediate meaning. According to Hegel, the mechanical object is not 
an immediate “thing” or point of reference but refers already to a universal. However, 
as universal, the mechanical object is, Hegel argues, not to be understood as a thing 
with properties or as substance with accidents, since these would be separable from it. 
It should also not be divided into matter and form. Rather, Hegel writes, the object is 
universal in the sense that it constitutes a totality. Totality is a better term for the kind 
of object described here because it includes, as was explained in the first chapter with 
reference to Leibniz, Kant and Cassirer, the law. This is the concept that will be gained 
at the end of the ‘Mechanism’ chapter. 
 
Mechanism as a discourse of violence, power, resistance and freedom 
 
The following section looks closely at Hegel's argument in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter 
in order to demonstrate that the same structure of the relation of universal to particular 
that is described in the Antigone section of the Phenomenology also applies here. We 
can then, eventually, reintroduce Antigone – this time as a “logical” figure. 
 
Hegel draws on the philosophical thought of both Leibniz and Kant to further illustrate 
the nature of objectivity described in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter. Like the Kantian object 
of the understanding, the mechanical object ‘has in it the determinateness of a manifold 
which, although complete, is otherwise indeterminate, that is relationless […].’168 The 
mechanical object, accordingly, constitutes a totality which is not further determined 
at first.169 It is, Hegel writes, the form of a singularity in general.170 Mechanical 
explanations determine the unity of the object – the problem is not a general 
indeterminateness – but the object does not seem to determine itself. The form that 
constitutes its unity is an external one.171 This, Hegel concludes, ‘is what constitutes 
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the character of mechanism, namely, that whatever the connection that obtains 
between the things combined, the connection remains one that is alien to them, that 
does not affect their nature.’172 Mechanism accounts for the combinations within and 
between objects, but the objects themselves remain in a state of general indifference.  
 
It is in this context that Hegel defines how order, the imposition of an external unity, 
passes over into law, that is, the immanent form of the concept. Violence, which ‘is 
suffered when a thing, person, or process is subjected to an unfolding that is not its 
own,’173 that is, a formation from the outside, is, according to Hegel, to be rethought 
as the power of the law. The law, however, as well as the notion of the performativity 
of conceptual form, which is introduced in the last chapter of the Logic, does not bring 
the question of violence, resistance and freedom to a close, but merely transforms it. 
 
Mechanical explanations, according to Hegel, inflict violence on the object – a blind 
fate that the object cannot recognise as its own.174 Hegel seems to indicate that this is 
the fate of the Kantian objects of the understanding. Because the laws of the 
understanding express what all cognitions have in common, they cannot, as Kant 
himself also recognises, say anything about the particular. The result is a formalism 
of the object,175 which makes it known in its generality but renders it indistinct from 
others of its kind. Yet it is not primarily the Kantian object of the understanding that 
Hegel refers to in his description of the mechanical object, but the Leibnizian monad. 
 
‘Leibniz’s monad would be more of an object’176 because it truly describes a self-
enclosed totality. Mechanical objects, according to Hegel, ‘cannot act on one another’, 
and thus have ‘no influence on each other.’177 Like the monad, each object is a world 
brought to closure as a singularity.178 While there is development internal to each and 
every monad, and while the monad is determinate in this sense, Hegel argues that, as 
a self-enclosed totality, the monad remains indifferent to its environment and thus, to 
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some extent, also to its own determinateness, which therefore is not entirely its own.179 
The ‘Mechanism’ chapter investigates the contradiction of the determinate but isolated 
object, which stands in relation to others but not in a way that would affect its nature. 
Hegel accordingly identifies two forms of indifference. First, an indifference of the 
object that relates to its own nature – the object is generic – a problem that Hegel finds 
exemplified by the Kantian object of the understanding; and, second, an indifference 
towards other objects as is exhibited by the Leibnizian monad. This leads to the 
contradictory conclusion that the object, on the one hand, lacks all determination – as 
object in general, it is indistinguishable from others and thus has no self-subsistence – 
but, on the other hand, a self-subsistence impenetrable to other objects, a Monadology, 
manifests itself.180 It is this contradiction that interests Hegel in the ‘Mechanism’ 
chapter. 
 
As purely logical principle of relation and connection, for Hegel “mechanism” is, 
despite its name, not primarily a physical phenomenon. The ‘Mechanism’ chapter 
touches on a wide range of topics, including questions of desire, subjectivity and 
sociality among others. What all of the examples have in common is that the object 
under consideration remains internally unaffected by its own principle of relation and 
unification. ‘A mechanical mode of representation, a mechanical memory, a habit, a 
mechanical mode of acting, mean that the pervasive presence that is proper to spirit is 
lacking in what spirit grasps or does.’181 With the expression ‘pervasive presence,’ 
Hegel seems to be referring to the possibility of a self-determining principle and to the 
immanence of form. But how does form become internal? And how is the question of 
violence, resistance and freedom related to the problem of logical form? 
 
The law, Hegel proposes, is a principle of relation and connection that regulates the 
object not only from the outside. Law, Hegel writes, is ‘the determination proper to 
pure individuality or to the concept existing for itself.’182 This process, whereby the 
merely external definition of the object passes into an immanent determination, is 
described in the last section of the ‘Mechanism’ chapter.183 Here, the mechanistic 
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process becomes ‘absolute,’ meaning that it is no longer dependent on a moment 
external to the object.184 Instead, the objects themselves become the explanation for 
how they relate to one another.185 Even though this law is not yet one of proper self-
determination, Hegel argues that a certain degree of objective freedom has been 
gained. 
 
Self-determination, as becomes evident in the chapter on ‘Mechanism,’ does not refer 
to the absolute independence of the object. On the contrary, self-determination in the 
Logic means recognizing the relations between objects as they mutually shape each 
other. Hegel does not have a logic of individualism, absolute autonomy or 
independence in mind when he writes that the law is the principle of self-determination 
and the ‘determination proper to pure individuality.’186 On the contrary, individuality, 
according to Hegel, cannot be attributed to entirely autonomous, monad-like 
substances. This is because an individual is itself a totality that embodies a specific 
difference while at the same time holding on to its universality that it shares with 
others.187 Only once a content receives the form of universality is it, according to 
Hegel, communicable.188 Individuality is a question of communication, as will be 
further elaborated in the ‘Chemism’ chapter. In the case of the mechanical object, 
communication happens through interaction with others of its kind. 189 
Communication addresses the fact that the universal law particularises the individual 
object which receives, through this process, a form shared with others. At the same 
time, communication addresses the way in which objects relate. However, Hegel 
argues, communication only becomes possible among objects that do not remain 
indifferent to their own determination: ‘the active object only becomes a universal.’190 
It is at this point, when discussing the active object, that resistance and freedom 
become relevant for the Logic. Reflecting the universal law within itself, the individual 
or singular object, Hegel explains, ‘can oppose itself to its objective universality and 
alienate itself from it.’191 In the negotiation of the universal law lies the possibility of 
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resistance and freedom, but also of a violent reaction as a response on the part of the 
universal. 
 
In the Logic self-determination designates the specific relation of particularity to 
universality that Hegel also describes as immanence of form. In the course of the 
‘Mechanism’ chapter, it is argued that this relation is best understood through the 
concept of “power” (“Macht”).192 Power, according to the Logic, is another name for 
objective universality; however, only in certain contexts does it makes sense to speak 
of universality in this way. The reference to power, Hegel argues, becomes relevant 
only when the object undergoes a process through which it is defined by other objects 
and when the relation of particularity to universality is also negotiated from within. 
This is the case with ‘the real mechanical process’193 which necessitates the 
introduction of the vocabulary of violence, resistance and freedom into logical 
discourse. In the ‘real mechanical process,’ the object exists for the first time in and 
for itself. Freedom, Hegel argues, becomes possible in this context, with Hegel here 
distinguishing freedom from external contingency, both of which can be explained by 
the mechanical principle. Only when the object is no longer entirely indifferent to its 
environment and to the universal law that governs it is freedom possible and objective 
universality to be thought under the aspect of power. By means of this distinction, of 
freedom from external contingency, a purely formal logic can be distinguished from 
an “actual” logic, or logic of the real. However, given that both external contingency 
and freedom appear in the same chapter and under the principle of mechanism, which 
governs them both, their distinction seems gradual and not entirely opposed. 
 
Hegel’s position is thus that, under conditions of external contingency, the particular, 
which does not reflect the universal in itself, gives in to its rule. By contrast, in a 
situation that is free, the particular will reflect the universal and, by way of negotiating 
this relation, individualise itself. In this case several scenarios are possible, since the 
effect of the universal law and reaction to it are not predetermined. The universal 
might not be identical with the particular object, in which case the former has no effect. 
However, if identical, the universal exerts power (Macht). If the determinateness of 
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the universal is not the immanent reflection by means of which the object is singular, 
then universal power turns into violence: Hegel writes that power, ‘as violence against 
the object is what is called fate.’194 In this case, the universal law that governs the 
object is not reflected back into itself. The universal thus remains a negative power 
directed against the object.195 It is not the universal law as such but a lack of internal 
recognition that is, for Hegel, the source of such violence. 
 
Power, however, also becomes violence when the object has given itself some 
determinateness over against the universality that is supposed to govern it. In this case, 
Hegel writes, the object must have committed a deed. According to Hegel, the inability 
to internally reflect the universal law and the self-reflected decision to violate it by 
means of a wilfully resistant act lead to the same result. Hegel offers no further 
reflections on this point. However, the ‘Mechanism’ chapter is not the only place in 
Hegel’s work where this contradiction is analysed. The same problematic is also 
discussed in the ‘Antigone’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. If fate and deed 
are mechanical relations, then does the logic of Antigone belong within the 
‘Mechanism’ chapter? In the following, the possible implications of such a reading for 
the Logic will be further investigated. It will be argued that if the paradox that 
Antigone stands for in Hegel’s work is also addressed in the Logic, then the feminist 
engagement with Hegel on this point is also relevant for the Logic. 
 
Antigone takes the stage – but is it relevant? And who cares? 
 
Since ‘Mechanism’ is the first chapter in the Logic that addresses the relation between 
particularity and universality in terms of power, the use of political examples at this 
point is not surprising. By addressing the problematic of power, resistance and 
freedom as internal to logic, “mechanism” is also, though not exclusively, a political 
category. In fact, the most extensive reference to social and political bodies in the 
Logic is found in this chapter,196 with Hegel explaining here, for example, that the 
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unity of the state and society can be understood in terms of the structure of ‘absolute 
mechanism.’197 
 
‘Mechanism’ is a turning point because it is the first chapter that argues that logic and 
metaphysics are one, and that the relation between universality and particularity has 
to be understood in terms of power. Antigone, moreover, might be the most 
paradigmatic example of Hegel’s new speculative logic. The feminist engagement 
with Hegel’s Antigone, in particular Butler’s and Irigaray’s, could be read anew in 
this light. Such a reading would prove wrong those who think that the feminist 
investment in Hegel’s Antigone is trivial and not relevant to the broader metaphysical, 
epistemological and ontological stakes of Hegel’s work, particularly to the Logic. 
Equally, it would provide a response to Antigone scholars such as Otto Pöggeler who 
believe that the feminist responses to the Sophoclean drama uniformly misinterpret 
and mis-construct the “facts.” In his recent 2004 study of the history of interpretations 
of Antigone since Hegel and Hölderlin, Pöggeler decides not to touch on the multiple 
and diverging feminist interpretations of Antigone, which he refers to as 
‘misinterpretations.’198 The reason for this decision is, according to Pöggeler, that the 
feminist discourse on this topic no longer talks of what Antigone actually did.199 This 
is an interesting remark, especially since Antigone is a literary figure. Interpreting in 
its own right instead of just repeating the Sophoclean drama, feminist philosophy, 
according to Pöggeler, goes astray. Pöggeler fails to see that Hegel, too, productively 
“misreads” Sophocles, as well as every other thinker he chooses to engage with. 
Believing that philosophy is nothing other than the history of thought and its “correct” 
representation, critics like Pöggeler seem to be intimidated by feminists who dare to 
do philosophy, that is, to engage in the risk of thinking instead of merely repeating 
already existing thought. Moreover, they fail to realise the stakes of the Logic, that is, 
the Hegelian insight that the commitment to thinking thought itself involves also 
political categories, such as the state and the sexual relation, and figures like Antigone, 
as becomes evident in the concluding chapters. The Logic, too, demands a 
commitment to political thought. 
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It was argued earlier that the logic of Antigone, though not directly addressed, seems 
to belong within the ‘Mechanism’ chapter. As a logical category that introduces a 
distinction between two simultaneous but distinct laws – determinism and freedom – 
and that addresses the relation between particularity and universality in terms of 
power, violence and resistance, ‘Mechanism’ further elaborates the discourse of the 
Phenomenology and the paradox that Antigone presents in the Phenomenology and 
elsewhere. This reading has broader implications for the Logic. If Antigone expresses 
the particular form of the relation between universal and particular that the principle 
of ‘mechanism’ stands for, then this would mean not only that the problematic of 
universality is immediately political, but also that it implies questions of gender, 
labour and kinship from the start, even if these are not directly addressed. The question 
of conceptual Allgemeinheit (universality/generality), in other words, even in its 
strictly logical elaboration, would have a social and political dimension. While the 
figure of Antigone remains ambiguous, also within feminist philosophy, what is more 
important than a decision regarding her fate is the problematic that enters philosophy 
under her name. It is no secret that the Sophoclean drama introduces the logic of sexual 
difference into the Phenomenology, as it allows Hegel to introduce a gendered division 
of labour and of political roles. If Antigone is the exemplar of the mechanical 
opposition, does the logic of sexual difference also find its way into the Logic? The 
reference to the “sexual relation” in the ‘Chemism’ chapter, following ‘Mechanism,’ 
would suggest so. 
 
Chemism as a category of social relation: The logical foundation of the sexual relation 
 
As we did for Antigone in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter, we find embedded in the 
‘Chemism’ chapter another contested feminine literary figure, Charlotte from 
Goethe’s Wahlverwandthschaften. Goethe’s novella questions the institution of 
marriage and explores themes of sexual difference and heterosexual attraction through 
the use of a chemical metaphor. Even though Goethe’s influence on Hegel is well 
known, the link between Goethe’s concept of elective affinities as conceptual tool to 
address questions of sexual difference and attraction and Hegel’s use of the latter in 
the “Chemism” chapter of the Logic has not been widely analysed. Moreover, Hegel’s 
reference to the sexual relation (Geschlechts-Verhälniß) in the ‘Chemism’ chapter of 
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the Logic200 has been left unexamined in the Hegel literature. Though the “sexual 
relation” is here only mentioned in passing, as one example among others, I will argue 
that this exemplary use is not accidental (given that this concept is explored by Goethe 
under the same heading) and that it shifts the place that sexual difference holds within 
the Encyclopaedia project. Rather than being only or first and foremost a biological 
fact, a discourse that has its proper place in the Philosophy of Nature, it becomes 
evident that the categories of “sex” and the “sexual relation” have a logical foundation 
in Hegel’s work. This claim, of the logical foundation of the sexual relation, will be 
elaborated throughout the remaining sections of this chapter and will be further 
contextualised in the following chapter, where the meaning of Geschlecht in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century Germany will be further analysed. 
 
Given that sexual difference is a recurring topic throughout Hegel’s work, the 
occurrence of the “sexual relation” in the Logic is not by itself surprising. What might 
be surprising is its place within the ‘Chemism’ chapter in the ‘Doctrine of the 
Concept.’ The chapter title does not seem to indicate an analysis of social relations, 
and the reader will associate it with physics, chemistry, and the natural sciences more 
broadly. It might thus be argued that sexual difference, prior to the establishment of 
biology as a single distinct field, finds its proper place precisely in this chapter, and 
that it being mentioned at this point is nothing other than a signpost indicating what is 
to follow, namely the Philosophy of Nature and the unfolding of sexual difference 
therein. However, the definition of the terms of “mechanism” and “chemism,” which 
are defined by Hegel as principles of relation and connection, challenges such a 
reading. These principles, according to Hegel, do not primarily explain physical and 
natural phenomena, but describe relations encountered in a number of fields, 
belonging to both the natural and social sciences.201 Rather than a special type of 
object, mechanical and chemical principles, as well as the concepts of “teleology” and 
“life” that will supersede them, indicate the particular mode in which something exists 
in its relation to itself and others.  
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The terminology of violence, resistance and freedom, implicit in their discussion, 
makes evident that the object in question is not only relational but that its 
determination has to be understood in terms of power (Macht).202 The reference to the 
sexual relation in the Logic has to be understood from within this context, which can 
shed light on Hegel’s employment of this term at other points throughout his work. 
While feminists have rightfully critiqued Hegel's employment and explanation of the 
sexual relation in the Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Mind, and Phenomenology, 
which either naturalise sexual difference or enforce a cultural and gendered division 
of labour, an understanding of its logical foundation can provide clarification, at least 
on the former point. For it becomes evident in the Logic that sexual difference is not 
first and foremost an identity or essence, nor a natural or biological category, though 
it will also be used and presented by Hegel as such. 
 
The aim of this reading is not to uncover a “good” or unproblematic position in Hegel 
that would neatly fit our current understanding of the terms of sex, gender, and sexual 
difference. We are not going to find a radical conception of sexual difference in Hegel 
– at least not if we take him by his word – nor is his philosophy the place to search for 
such a politics. As Kimberly Hutchings remarks in the opening to Hegel and Feminist 
Philosophy:  
 
It is patently obvious from his own remarks on sexual difference that, even in 
the context of his own time, Hegel’s attitude to women was patriarchal and at 
times misogynist. If Hegel’s work is useful to feminist philosophers, it is in 
spite of his own ideological position […].203  
 
If anything, the use of the sexual relation as logical example places Hegel alongside 
Kant and Linnaeus, who employ social and political categories, such as “race” and 
“sex,” to justify an order of nature that is rational but not arbitrary. As we have seen 
with Kant in particular, social and political categories demonstrate that rational and 
logical categories are not just imposed on nature but are empirically grounded. 
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Accordingly, by including the sexual relation in the realm of logic, as an example to 
rethink logic and its purposes, Hegel follows a precedent.  
 
Only six pages long, ‘Chemism,’ the second moment of ‘Objectivity,’ is an often-
overlooked logical category. While the previous chapter posits the necessity for a law 
of self-determination, no such law is introduced in the ‘Chemism’ chapter. It might 
therefore seem that nothing new is said here and that ‘Teleology,’ not ‘Chemism,’ 
marks the next important moment. But what happens in these six pages? Through the 
elaboration of the category of “chemism” the indifferent objectivity of the mechanical 
object is put into question. This prepares the ground for the discussion of teleology 
and purposiveness. Following Hegel, the distinction between “mechanism” and 
“chemism” is fairly straightforward:  
 
The chemical object is distinguished from the mechanical in that the latter is a 
totality indifferent to determinateness, whereas in the chemical object the 
determinateness, and hence the reference to other, and the mode and manner 
of this reference, belong to its nature.204  
 
The chemical object, according to Hegel, is defined through its relationship with other 
objects; ‘the being of one object is the being of another.’205 These relations define the 
object without, however, imposing on it a definition from the outside: Hegel argues 
that otherness is internal to the concept. Its own lack, moreover, is part of the nature 
of the concept.206 
 
Although Hegel’s concept of “chemism” is inspired by the emergence of the science 
of chemistry in the early nineteenth century and the first chemical revolution,207 Hegel 
immediately clarifies ‘that the expression is not to be understood here as though the 
relation were only to be found in that form of elemental nature that strictly goes by 
that name.’208 The chemical relation is not reducible to natural phenomena. Like the 
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‘Mechanism’ chapter, ‘Chemism,’ too, is concerned only with the way we think about 
objects, in this case about those objects that we perceive as both independent and yet 
intrinsically related to each other.209 Even within the natural sciences, Hegel argues, 
examples of this relation are not limited to those belonging to chemistry. The 
meteorological relation, for instance, also comes under this principle.210 ‘In animate 
things, the sex relation [Geschlechts-Verhältniß] falls under this schema, and the 
schema also constitutes the formal basis for the spiritual relations of love, friendship, 
and the like.’211 Though it remains unclear what else could be included in this list and, 
moreover, what exactly it would mean to determine a logical foundation to love, 
friendship and the sexual relation, the emergence of social and cultural phenomena as 
such is, given the preceding chapter on “mechanism”, not surprising. The aim of these 
chapters for Hegel is not to ground certain empirical phenomena logically, but to 
question how we come to think them in the first place, that is, to identify the general 
structures of certain relations rather than the empirical ways in which they manifest. 
 
While the ‘Mechanism’ chapter first introduces the concepts of Gewalt (violence), 
Macht (power), Freiheit (freedom), and Widerstand (resistance), which are also 
central to the discussion of teleology and especially ‘outer purposiveness,’ the 
explanation of “chemism” seems to do without these terms. Even though chemical 
objects are not self-subsistent, the vocabulary of violence seems to be less fitting in 
this case. Neither, however, is it a question of freedom. This is because of the mode 
of relation addressed here, which is that of affinity (Verwandtschaft).212 In a state of 
affinity, Hegel explains, objects are ‘tensed against themselves’ and by that very fact 
are ‘tensed against each other.’213 The reason for this tension, however, is not an 
incompatibility between the objects, but their proximity, the fact that one cannot be 
thought without the other. Tension arises because the concrete existence of each 
individual object, if taken on its own, contradicts its own concept, which includes 
reference to another of its kind.214  
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While the object is not self-determining, not following its own law and consequently 
not free, it is also not entirely determined by another (law) that would be alien to it. 
The affinity between distinct but interdependent objects calls, according to Hegel, for 
a medium, or an ‘element of communication’215 that is external to them both. Hegel 
suggest that language is such a possible medium. While ‘[i]n the realm of bodies water 
fulfils the function of this medium; in that of spirit, inasmuch as there is in it an analog 
of such a relation, the sign in general, and language more specifically, can be regarded 
as fulfilling it.’216 Following Hegel, the outcome of such communication, between 
objects that stand in a relation of affinity, ‘is something neutral’,217 a state into which 
the object is not forced but in which it is not free either. Belonging to the realm of 
spirit, the sexual relation, neither free nor unfree, is, according to Hegel, only possible 
by way of a medium, that is, by way of language. 
 
The ‘Chemism’ chapter, though short, is not without context. It taps into a broader 
intellectual debate. In 1792, in his 426th Athenäumsfragment, Friedrich Schlegel 
characterises his own epoch as a ‘chemical age.’218 Schlegel is referring not just to the 
state of science: the chemical revolution introduced by the theories of Lavoisier is 
taken by Schlegel as a symbol of the Zeitgeist more broadly, alluding also to political 
events, in particular the French Revolution.219 Schelling and Goethe similarly 
integrate the findings of the new science of chemistry into their works. The term 
‘chemism’ (Chemismus), as employed in Hegel’s Logic, was first introduced by 
Schelling to describe relations of affinity and to determine a category of relatedness 
distinct from mechanism.220 According to Schelling, the purpose of chemistry is to 
investigate the qualitative variation of matter against mechanics, which, he argues, is 
altogether formal.221 While the philosophy of chemistry more or less disappears from 
his later work and in his philosophy of nature is replaced by a philosophy of life, it 
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plays a central role in his early writings.222 Goethe, another a philosopher of nature, 
contributes to a cultural understanding of chemical thought with his novel Elective 
Affinities (Die Wahlverwandtschaften). The term Wahlverwandtschaft was a technical 
term of eighteenth century chemistry, the German translation of a term introduced by 
Swedish chemist Torbern Olof Bergman with his book De attractionibus electivis 
(1775) and first put into German by Heinrich Tabor in 1785.223 At the time of the 
publication of Goethe’s novel, Wahlverwandtschaft was a term used solely in 
chemistry – the emotional and romantic connotations which the term subsequently 
acquired derived from the novel to which it was attached.224 
 
Assuming that whatever is said there has most likely been rendered obsolete by 
scientific progress, a close reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and of the 
‘Chemism’ chapter in the Science of Logic is often not prioritised. It is nonetheless 
important to consider that Hegel’s working life coincided with the emergence of 
modern chemistry.225 If, taking Hegel by his word, philosophy is its own time 
apprehended in thought, then the writings on chemistry and “chemism” are key. Rather 
than further advancing the specialised sciences, by integrating concepts of the natural 
sciences into his philosophical system, Hegel, like Schlegel, Schelling and Goethe, 
aims to situate or contextualise the new sciences, most importantly chemistry. This 
means understanding the cultural relevance and the effects that this new science has 
on society and thinking more broadly. Historicizing scientific thought and its changes 
in this way, it becomes possible, these thinkers suggest, to see how a change in 
scientific explanations is reflected elsewhere.226 
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Affinity is the pre-condition of these characters/objects 
 
Thinking alongside the chemical sciences, Goethe writes that ‘[j]ust as each thing has 
an adherence to itself, so it must also have a relationship to other things.’227 This is the 
working premise of Goethe’s novel but also of Hegel’s ‘Chemism’ chapter, which, as 
will be outlined in more detail, further elaborates the project Goethe began, that is, to 
think the findings of the natural sciences in cultural, sociological or political terms. 
The ‘Chemism’ chapter thus attempts to do in theory what Goethe does in literature. 
Both Goethe and Hegel experiment to render scientific changes in thinking about 
causality, relationality and universal lawfulness back to the social. Affinity is 
considered not just as the precondition of chemical objects but equally of logical 
objects and literary characters. While the mechanical law provides the definition of an 
object in general, ‘Chemism,’ according to Hegel, develops the principle for a 
differential relation. 
 
Goethe describes his own book as a social novel, or Zeitroman. The characters ‘are 
not so much individuals as representatives of social groups.’228 As such their 
motivations, desires, emotions and impulses are not generated internally but instead 
are determined by the social situation of their time and their roles in it.229 The 
characters in Goethe’s novel might, on this point, be compared to Sophocles’ Antigone 
and Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone’s fate, since here too the literary characters 
stand in for a more general social law and norm. Their function is to reveal underlying 
social tensions and paradoxes, rather than an individual fate. In the Elective Affinities 
this is expressed by the character of Charlotte, who remarks that  
 
While life is carrying us along with it […] we imagine that we act from our 
own motives and choose what we do and what we enjoy but if we look more 
closely we will find that we are actually compelled to carry out the ideas and 
tendencies of our time.230  
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Also addressed is the antithesis of freedom and necessity discussed by Hegel in the 
‘Mechanism’ chapter of the Logic and in the Phenomenology with reference to 
Antigone. If Hegel’s Antigone represents ‘the irony of the community,’ something 
similar might be said about Goethe's characters. The sarcasm of the narrator of Elective 
Affinities and her ironic tone distances the reader from the characters and their 
individual fate, highlighting instead their representative function of social customs and 
laws more broadly.  
 
In chapter four, the title of the book, Wahlverwandtschaft, is officially introduced and 
discussed by the characters themselves. This discussion is interesting for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, because it addresses the ambiguous relation between the natural 
sciences and political thought and the appropriation of scientific concepts by the latter; 
and, secondly, because of the gender relations that are displayed in this discussion. To 
begin with, Goethe’s dialogue seems to merely reproduce gender stereotypes. It is 
Charlotte, the only woman present, who naïvely remarks that those abstract chemical 
terms appear to her to possess a human character. The character of Charlotte thus 
establishes the necessary link between the natural sciences and society that the novel 
depends on but that remains tenuous throughout. And yet, while Charlotte 
anthropomorphises chemical terms and the language of the scientist, it is also her who, 
once her male counterparts are going along with her, complicates this analogy: 
 
These figures of speech are pretty and amusing, and who does not like to play 
with analogies? But man is so very much elevated above those elements, and 
if he has in this instance been somewhat liberal with the fine words “choice” 
and “elective affinity,” it is well for him to turn and look within himself, and 
then consider truly what validity such expressions possess.231 
 
Goethe discusses gender relations at two different levels. The term “elective affinities” 
is introduced as a model for analysing the “sexual relation.” At the same time, the 
gender dynamics of the novel, particularly when discussing the concept of “affinity,” 
prove to be important. Charlotte presents herself as naïve or uninformed on scientific 
and political matters but at the same time deconstructs her own position. In the end, it 
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is her character that has the last word on these matters. Whether Hegel agrees with 
Goethe’s understanding of sexual difference, and the role of women in society, will 
not be discussed here. What is of interest is their common intent to use concepts from 
the natural sciences for social and political thought, on the one hand to bring the 
sciences back into the sphere of the social and, on the other hand, to utilise these terms 
for their own means and thus to invest them with different meanings. Goethe 
effectively transforms a scientific typology into a sociological model.232 Hegel, in 
similar way and inspired by Goethe, wants to think “chemism” not just as a concept 
for the natural sciences but as pure, that is, non-empirical, social form. The Logic is to 
provide the means to think social and political phenomena without starting from 
empirical examples. The “social novel” or Zeitroman is a useful example in this regard 
since it depicts general social positions rather than an individual fate or character. Even 
if not directly mentioned in the Logic, the exemplarity of the social novel, and of 
literary characters more broadly, allows Hegel to draw on the exemplarity of social 
and political laws without relying on empirical examples. Social and political 
categories can now be logically grounded. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Logic is, among other things, a political discourse, even though Hegel, as Rebecca 
Comay and Frank Ruda remark in their co-written book The Dash: The Other Side of 
Absolute Knowing, ‘divests the first person in all its situatedness and dilation […] of 
its last shred of positive substantiality.’233 Political laws and categories are examined 
as part of the broader project of thinking conceptual form. Thus, even though the Logic 
aims to empty out the notion of subjectivity, social and political questions do not lose 
their relevance. 
 
The examples of Sophocles’ Antigone and Goethe’s characters in the Elective 
Affinities also point to the vanishing of individual subjectivity. Such vanishing 
happens in the presence of the ‘subject,’ and even through its acts, mainly because of 
her non-voluntarist decisions. Even if conscious of their acts, such consciousness 
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proves to be almost irrelevant for these characters. Hegel demonstrates that in the 
conflict of freedom and necessity, at the limits of experience, the coordinates of 
subjectivity are taken apart.234 Subjectivity is here undone, or at least it becomes 
otherwise than thought. While Hegel leaves behind the notion of consciousness that 
grounds the Kantian subject, the Logic, however, does not, in its attempt to divest the 
first person of any positive substantiality, do away with the political nature of the 
Kantian project, but reconfigures it. Akin to a transcendental structure but without 
subject,235 the Logic rethinks social and political relations in proto-structuralist terms. 
 
When Hegel lists the sexual relation, love and friendship as spiritual instances of the 
chemical law, he suggests that the Logic ‘constitutes the formal basis’ of these social 
and political phenomena. Though only mentioned in passing, Hegel’s ‘chemical’ 
instances seem to point beyond themselves. Drawing on a broader intellectual debate, 
in particular the works of Goethe, Schlegel and Schelling, their exemplarity 
deliberately exceeds the discourse of the Logic. This makes the indirect incorporation 
of literary examples possible, which in turn allows Hegel to contextualise his logical 
categories without requiring an “empirical” phenomenon as example. 
 
To conclude, even though the goal of the Logic is ‘not to add stuff but rather to subtract 
– to bring formalization to a pitch […],’236 such formalization spans across a whole 
array of knowledge, including fields of knowledge generally associated with ‘the 
subject’ or questions of subjectivity. It is in this sense that exemplarity matters in the 
Logic. Social and political laws can now be logically grounded. Under the heading of 
‘Objectivity’ Hegel sketches the determination of the object, which is initially 
indifferent to its own law (‘Mechanism’) but is transformed through the development 
of ‘Chemism’, ‘Teleology’ and ‘Life’ into a self-determining concept (‘Absolute 
Idea’). Though “mechanism” is still a principle of outer determination, this chapter, 
by way of introducing the terms of power, violence, resistance and freedom in its 
description of the relation between the universal and particular, calls such indifference 
into question. At the end of the ‘Chemism’ chapter, indifference is finally overcome. 
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Hegel, in the last paragraph of the ‘Chemism’ chapter, introduces a term that is only 
fully elaborated at the very end of the Logic.237 This is the concept of ‘absolute 
activity,’ (absolute Thätigkeit). As absolute activity, everything that so far was 
considered abstract and external becomes, Hegel argues, the concept’s own self-
mediating moment.238 For the first time in the Logic, and as will be explained in 
chapter four, an idea of performativity is introduced. The objective concept is now 
free, and as such, Hegel argues, it is purpose.239 In the absence of the transcendental 
subject, a notion of ‘absolute activity,’ that is, of the self-movement or “performative” 
nature of form takes centre stage. 
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Chapter three 
Geschlecht in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German 
philosophy – One-sex model or two? 
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Introduction 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, Hegel adopts Kant’s definition of speculation as 
non-empirical power of reason, that is, as thought thinking thought itself. As we saw, 
however, in the Science of Logic he also seems to propose that speculation cannot be 
isolated from political concepts and questions. The terms of violence, resistance and 
freedom are central here. Moreover, in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter the idea of the state 
is presented as an example of reason in its speculative mode,240 and in the ‘Chemism’ 
chapter the sexual relation is also considered in this way.241 Elaborating on chapter 
two, this chapter will further develop how the examples of the state and the sexual 
relation determine the discussion of the Logic. In so doing, emphasis will be on the 
latter example. The relation between the concepts of the state and the sexual relation 
will be brought to the fore more explicitly in chapter four, through a discussion of the 
Philosophy of Right. 
 
It will be argued here that the example of the sexual relation is historically conditioned 
and that to understand Hegel’s reference to the sexual relation in the Logic, an analysis 
of Hegel’s work on Naturphilosophie, as well as a broader view of the nuances of 
Naturphilosophie beyond Hegel is required. This is because Hegel’s view on sexual 
difference formed part of a broader attempt to rethink this category, medically, 
philosophically and politically. This attempt has been framed by the historian and 
sexologist Thomas Laqueur as a shift from a one-sex model of sexual difference to a 
two-sex model.  
 
In the following analysis I will critically engage with Laqueur’s model, which is 
widely cited and marks a point of reference in the humanities, in particular for feminist 
philosophers and historians of science. I will moreover outline the extent to which 
Hegel and the Naturphilosophen can be said to conceptually implement this shift in 
their works. While it will be argued that the Naturphilosophen construct and stabilise 
a specifically modern conception of sexual difference and nature, Laqueur’s 
periodisation and rigid distinction between a one-sex and two-sex model, will be put 
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into question. This is because though a shift in thinking sexual difference is under way, 
it is not from a one-sex to a two-sex model, two paradigms that contrary to Laqueur 
historically co-exist, but rather concerns the elaboration of men and women as 
complementary opposites, a conception that will be shown to fall between a one- or 
two-sex paradigm. This elaboration of a complementary theory of sexual difference 
matters politically as well as medically as it comes to justify on the one hand the 
modern sexual division of labour and the exclusion of women from suffrage after the 
French Revolution, and on the other hand constitutes the theoretical basis for a unified 
study of woman in the name of gynaecology. However, not just sexual difference but 
the conceptualisation of a number of concepts, including those of sex, gender, race, 
genus and species took place at the same time and across disciplines. It will be 
suggested here, that what is actually happening is not the move from a one-sex to a 
two-sex model of sexual difference, but, more broadly, the emergence of biopolitics 
and a biopolitical vocabulary. While Hegel’s Naturphilosophie will be analysed, I 
would also like to point to a discussion of Hegel as distinct from Naturphilosophie, as 
will be outlined further in the following chapter. 
 
Conceptual and historical motivation of Hegel’s political examples 
 
According to Hegel, the dynamic nature of the concept is to be understood as the 
activity (Thätigkeit)242 of form. Hegel temporalises the nature of the concept, 
introducing the possibility of a history of the concept, or conceptual history. It is 
argued here that it is the emphasis on temporalisation and on the dynamic nature of 
the concept that allows for the introduction of political terms into a text that presents 
itself as a non-empirical treatise. Concepts like the state and the sexual relation are 
well suited to exemplify the temporal nature of the concept as well as its performative 
nature because they are contested and thus more visibly open to change than others. It 
is the exemplary function of social and political categories that explains their relevance 
to the Logic and, in particular, to its concluding chapters. Although Hegel alludes to 
the empirical, according to his definition these are pure, conceptual examples that lend 
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themselves on logical grounds because they best express the general nature of 
conceptual thought. 
 
However, it is not just by chance that certain political categories like the state and the 
sexual relation, among others, come to matter. These concepts or problems do not lend 
themselves only on purely logical or conceptual grounds, as scholars working on the 
history of modern medicine and on the theorization of race and gender in philosophy 
have pointed out. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, a conceptual 
transformation took place in Europe. According to Thomas Laqueur, Londa 
Schiebinger, Alison Stone, Susanne Lettow and Stella Sandford, this period marks the 
co-emergence of the concepts of race, heredity, species, and sex. While these terms 
are not entirely new, the meaning of these concepts had previously been less stable, 
and the definition of certain terms shifted. In the German-speaking world, for instance, 
the concept of Geschlecht underwent significant change. While before the end of the 
eighteenth century the dominant meaning had been “line of ancestry,” after the late 
eighteenth century the sense of “sex” or “gender” gained prominence.243 At the same 
time, and arguably relatedly, political order – the questions of state, nation and civil 
society – were rethought on political and philosophical grounds. It will be argued in 
the following that what links these two discourses, that of “sex” and “gender” on the 
one and of the nation state on the other hand, is the emergence of a biopolitical 
discourse that focuses on reproductive politics in particular. It is in this context that 
the role and meaning of the concepts of “sex” and “gender” but also that of “nation” 
and “civil society” come to be reconsidered, politically and philosophically. 
Naturphilosophie in particular contributes to this discourse, as it further elaborates the 
notions of sexual difference, genus, species, nature and reproduction and thus offers a 
philosophical foundation to a broader political, cultural as well as medical discourse. 
 
Naturphilosophie and the temporalisation of “nature” 
 
The examples of the state and the sexual relation are not only conceptually but also 
historically motivated. Hegel’s choice of examples is not entirely “functional” but in 
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turn illustrates how the project of the Logic is itself a historical event – its own time 
in thought. Since these examples go beyond the Logic and its immediate discourse, it 
would follow that the Logic complicates the meaning of the “purely theoretical.” Its 
examples primarily illustrate the meaning of logic as Hegel conceives of it. While 
Hegel illustrates the historicity of the concept, which shows that logical categories are 
not entirely self-contained but to some extent indeterminate, the book nonetheless 
attempts to offer a general theory of conceptual form. According to Hegel, the 
distinction between the theoretical and empirical still matters, even if it demands 
further thought. Instead of giving up on this distinction, it becomes – after the Logic – 
a question of how to articulate and to account for this relation in non-determinate 
ways. 
 
Stone and Lettow draw attention to the temporalisation of nature in nineteenth century 
philosophies of nature (Naturphilosophie).244 This, they argue, marks an attempt at the 
level of philosophy to reconfigure genealogy and the belonging to social and natural 
orders, and initiate a rethinking of the concepts of sex, sexual difference, race, ancestry 
and generation. I would like to argue that the project of the Logic, in rethinking 
conceptual form as dynamic or performative, is another site of temporalisation where 
similar political categories appear. In this case too, a re-examination of general 
theoretical stakes involves the consideration of categories such as sexual difference, 
life, and species, as well as the need to place these within an overarching philosophical 
frame. Stone and Lettow rightly emphasise that sexual difference becomes the 
leitmotif of the philosophies of nature.245 However, I would argue that these concepts 
matter theoretically not only in the domain of Naturphilosophie, but that they are 
intrinsic to eighteenth and nineteenth century European philosophy more broadly. 
Hegel’s philosophy is a case in point, not only for Philosophy of Nature but equally 
for Logic, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Right, where he initiates a 
reconfiguration of the concepts of sexual difference and generation. If 
Naturphilosophie is understood to be singular in its emphasis on sexual difference, it 
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becomes harder to explain in what sense definitions of sex, generation and life unfold 
not only from a conception of nature but equally from a reconfiguration of 
metaphysics and the state. When thinking sexual difference, conceptions of nature – 
on which sexual difference is allegedly based – and of the state arguably correlate. 
The elaboration of the state in Hegel alongside that of sexual difference will be 
examined in more detail in the following chapter through an analysis of the marriage 
ceremony in the Philosophy of Right. 
 
Hegel’s Naturphilosophie is often neglected or, as Alison Stone highlights, judged to 
be of no political significance. However, the construction of a dichotomised 
conception of sexual difference, based on and structuring nature, at a time when such 
a concept was relatively new and still in the making, is necessarily of political 
relevance. Moreover, while the Science of Logic is recognised as an important text in 
its own right, it is not necessarily regarded as a text that also thinks social and political 
categories. However, the appearance of the state (‘Mechanism’ chapter) and the sexual 
relation (‘Chemism’ chapter), alongside the categories of violence, resistance and 
freedom, demonstrates that speculative or non-empirical reason already encounters 
political categories and that these might be exemplary of its nature. While Hegel’s 
influence on political theory, especially Marxist thought, has been acknowledged, the 
historical underpinnings of his thought on sexual difference are undertheorised. 
Hegel’s work is rarely placed within the context of the history of gynaecology, 
comparative anatomy and anthropology, as a work that both receives and constructs 
the new philosophical categories of Geschlecht, sexual difference, species, generation, 
alongside those of race and nation. The reason for this can already be found in 
Hegelian philosophy itself, which, as I will argue, resists its own historical 
situatedness in its efforts precisely to render dynamic and to historicise all 
philosophical categories.  
 
Hegel’s text, given its critique of the predicative philosophical proposition and of any 
predetermined method, demands to be read closely and on its own terms. The 
Phenomenology and Logic lay out a theory of reading, proposing a transformation of 
the text through its re-reading.246 While its historical context seems to determine the 
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text from the outside, the speculative strategy as proposed by Hegel opens up the text 
to a future yet unknown. Close reading then comes to stand for the text’s 
transformative potential, whereas its historical context seems to predetermine its 
stakes from the outside. What new could be discovered when stating the facts? 
However, a speculative reading does not exclude the contextualisation of a work, and 
contextualisation offers a transformative potential of another kind. Reading a text 
twice might imply a broader social historical analysis. What becomes visible as a result 
are those details, examples that are mentioned in passing, such as the sexual relation, 
that might no longer appear as random as they seem at first sight (or read). As such, 
Hegel’s methodological points are of value for feminist philosophy, as they outline an 
immanent but critical engagement with a text. While a close textual analysis or 
speculative reading of Hegel will continue in the following chapter, a broader 
discussion of the conceptual transformation of sexual difference in Naturphilosophie 
will be outlined here. 
 
On Thomas Laqueur’s account, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries 
science begins to flesh out the categories of “male” and “female” as opposite and 
incommensurable biological sexes.247 While up to this moment it was accepted as 
common knowledge that both sexed anatomies are organised by the same 
cosmological principle and purpose, now two distinct bodies are mapped out – 
anatomically and culturally. Until this shift, female organs were conceptualised as the 
inner version of the male. Now, ovaries and testicles became linguistically 
distinguished. The uterus is no longer understood in terms of the male anatomy, as an 
inverted penis, and organs that were not distinguished by a name of their own, for 
instance the vagina, are given one. Even structures thought common to both, such as 
the skeleton and nervous system, are differentiated to correspond to the cultural male 
and female: it was not until 1759 that a detailed female skeleton was published in an 
anatomy book to illustrate its difference from the male.248  
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It is no accident that the eighteenth century sees the birth of comparative anatomy.249 
What is more, observable bodily distinctions are taken to refer to a qualitative 
difference in the nature of the sexes that affects every sphere of life. It is in this sense 
that the scientific revolution is alongside political transformation in leading to a 
change of frame and a novel conception of sex difference. Every detail of the two-
sexed human anatomy comes to reflect a fundamental difference in their purposive 
nature.250 This culminates in the idea that the two sexes refer to two compatible but 
distinct organising principles.251 Due to the qualitative difference that they signify, 
gender polarities, Laqueur argues, come to be regarded as fixed in a way not known 
to the Galenic model that preceded the modern construction of sexed difference. 
 
Stone and Lettow propose that nineteenth-century Naturphilosophie manifests this 
transition, which Laqueur frames as a shift from a one-sex to a two-sex model of 
sexual difference. The Naturphilosophen are of interest because they construct and 
stabilise a specifically modern conception of sexual difference and nature, while at the 
same time returning to a cosmological understanding of natural order, characteristic 
of the classical age. Critiquing eighteenth century mechanistic understandings of 
nature,252 these thinkers propose to reconsider a cosmological perspective on nature, 
one that comprehends nature in organicist terms. At the same time, however, they 
contribute to the new epistemological status of nature as the bedrock of social 
distinctions, that is, the distinguishing characteristic of Laqueur’s two-sex model.253 
Serving as the basis for a gendered organisation of society and division of labour, 
nature within Naturphilosophie is, however, not an uncomplicated or straightforward 
concept. Not simply referring to matter, nature rather signifies a dynamic process. As 
product and habitual pattern, nature is not a stable and originary bedrock for social 
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distinctions and is also not outside of social relations. Nature is, according to 
Schelling, product, and, following Hegel, always second nature. And yet, despite their 
non-deterministic conceptions of nature, Schelling and Hegel, in interpreting sexual 
difference as a polar opposition that structures all of nature, re-conceive it in a way 
peculiarly appropriate to their time.254 
 
The shift in paradigm becomes apparent in Schelling’s uptake of Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach’s formative drive. Blumenbach was a physician, physiologist, 
comparative anatomist and anthropologist; and one of the first to explore the nature of 
man as an aspect of natural history, as well as to propose classifications of the races 
of mankind. While Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb is a homogeneous drive active in all 
living beings in the processes of structuring nutrition, generation, and regeneration, 
Schelling assumes that it unfolds in two directions: female and male.255 Schelling then 
adopts Blumenbach’s concept but adds that the drive separates into opposing 
tendencies.256 As Alison Stone notes:  
 
In the Outline, Schelling situates sexual difference as the culminating manifestation 
of the polarity of two basic forces (Kräfte) structuring all of nature – the productive 
force and inhibiting force. Moreover, he tacitly understands these two basic forces in 
sexualised terms, aligning the productive force with the male sex and the inhibiting 
force with the female sex.257 
 
Sexual difference, according to Schelling, is the principle of change and of dynamic 
force that is supposed to structure not only organic nature but every aspect of the 
world.258 Hegel, like Schelling, regards the opposition between the sexes as inherent 
to the idea of generation, more precisely as a prerequisite for the generation of a 
“third,” and thus, in line with Schelling, as part of a dynamics that structures the whole 
of nature and, as outlined in the Philosophy of Right, also structures the distribution of 
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labour within state and civil society.259 I will be showing how this works in more detail 
throughout this chapter and the following. 
 
The inclusion of sexual difference as organizing principle of nature by nineteenth 
century philosophers is not entirely novel, but rather goes back to Carl Linnaeus. In 
his Systema Naturae, first published in 1735, Linnaeus ‘based his botanical taxonomy 
on the sexuality of plants.’260 As Schiebinger notes, ‘[d]espite the number and variety 
of systems, Linnaeus’s sexual system was widely adopted after 1737 and until the first 
decades of the nineteenth century was generally considered the most convenient 
system of classification.’261 Natural history, one of the premier and most popular 
sciences of the eighteenth century, and Linnaeus’s work in particular, acted as a 
precursor to the philosophies of nature. However, though sexual difference was 
already a defining marker and organizing principle prior to its employment by 
Naturphilosophie, it had not yet developed into a biopolitical instrument par 
excellence. The philosophers of nature are significant because their works illustrate 
that a conceptual shift is underway, but not yet fully realised. Hegel and Schelling 
alternate between a cosmological frame of hierarchical gender organisation and a two-
sex model of sexual difference rooted in a nature that structures all of human life. 
Hegel, in his Encyclopaedia, states that female organs are inner versions of the male 
and vice versa, though the male organs are more highly developed,262 thus seemingly 
adopting a one-sex model. Both sexed anatomies are said to be organised by a shared 
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purpose, namely that of realising the genus in material shape.263 These ‘one-sex 
conclusions’ are, however, as Alison Stone observes, drawn from a view much closer 
to the two-sex model of radical difference: ‘Hegel thinks – as on the two-sex model – 
that a radical difference in organising principles manifests itself in every facet of sexed 
anatomy and embodiment.’264 
 
A first biopolitical vocabulary? The constitution of a species-oriented perspective 
The introduction of sexual difference as structuring principle by Schelling and Hegel 
goes hand in hand with the constitution of what Lettow calls a species-oriented 
perspective. Lettow explains that the concept of reproduction, by which the species is 
perpetuated, was, from the early nineteenth century on, enmeshed with ideas of sexual 
difference and complementarity.265 Naturphilosophie, since it formulates these ideas, 
functions as theoretical basis for the political regulation and intervention in processes 
of reproduction, that is the complex arrangement of social relations that impact on the 
generation of children.266 If sexual difference, defined as complementary dualism, is 
a fundamental principle of the universe, then no individual existence could possibly 
escape it; the individual is always already overpowered by the exigencies of nature, 
that is, by the exigencies of the species.267 Building on Laqueur’s conceptual 
paradigm, Lettow explains how concepts of Geschlecht, race, and species intersect in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century German thought. Individuals, Lettow argues, are 
increasingly perceived as belonging to a species, a sex or a race in a biological way. 
Subjugation to these larger categories or entities leads to a new understanding of 
kinship relations and ultimately to the constitution of a biopolitical gaze.268 Sexual 
difference in the two-sex model is not just “natural;” or rather, nature is seen to 
function as a structuring principle in every other domain of life. Thus, in his 1821 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel appeals to his Philosophy of Nature in order to support his 
claims about the proper social roles of men and women.269 According to Hegel, 
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difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has political 
consequences.270 It is through the division between roles in the family and civil society 
that ‘[t]he natural determinacy of the two sexes acquires an intellectual and ethical 
significance.’271 This expression, ‘natural determinacy,’ refers to the conception of life 
as genus/species, elaborated in the Logic and Philosophy of Nature. In the latter, 
modes of reproduction that lack sexual difference are at the lowest stage of the 
development of nature. As Lettow states, ‘[r]eal reproduction for Hegel, as for 
Schelling, presupposes two sexes.’272 
While the Logic and the Philosophy of Nature introduce the concepts of the sexual 
relation, genus and species, the Philosophy of Right explains that these logical and 
naturphilosophische concepts also entail broader social transformations. The 
Philosophy of Right, as will be further explained in the following chapter, is a text that 
justifies at a theoretical level the transformation of reproduction and kinship. Instead 
of the vast bonds of the family as clan, the reproductive couple and its offspring, that 
is the modern nuclear family, takes centre stage – a model that still shapes the political 
contemporary reproductive technologies and global bio-economics.273 The focus on 
state, family and species manifests that reproduction is seen as a contingent, and thus 
manageable, process, one that can be regulated through political strategies.274 
Although the arrangement of the two sexes is hierarchical in Hegel and Schelling, 
there is at the same time a sense of complementarity and mutual desire.275 Both Hegel 
and Schelling advocate the idea of sexual complementarity, the theory that men and 
women are not physical and moral equals but complementary opposites, which 
triumphed in the revolution in European life and manners between the 1760s and the 
1820s.276 Women were thought to have their own part to play in the new democracies 
as mothers and nurturers, a role that was championed by many middle-class women.277 
According to Hegel, family ethic, or divine law, is the law of woman, while public 
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ethic is distinctively male. The former, following Hegel, is based in subjectivity and 
feeling, which is opposed to the universal character of the public law of state and civil 
society.278 In this way, ‘[t]he private, caring woman emerged as a foil to the public, 
rational man.’279 A continued sexual division of labour is based on the idea that 
inequalities are “natural.” Nature assigns women a specific biological role, and, 
correspondingly, a specific place in society. Disenfranchisement seems to be the 
product neither of prejudice nor malice but of nature.280 According to Londa 
Schiebinger, because the theory of sexual complementarity succeeded in justifying the 
continued exclusion of women from the political sphere and from science by making 
inequalities seem natural, complementarians had a special relation to the medical 
community.281 
 
What kind of conceptual transformation? 
 
The question remains, however, of whether the conceptual transformation of the terms 
of sex and gender in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries really led, as 
Thomas Laqueur claims, to an epistemological break? If we are dealing with an 
epistemological break, a term coined by Gaston Bachelard, for whom the history of 
science is constituted of a series of epistemological obstacles and breaks,282 then this 
period would constitute a rupture with previous political and scientific ideological 
conceptions of sex and gender. Laqueur’s distinction between a one-sex and a two-sex 
model of sexual difference is widely cited and marks a point of reference for feminist 
philosophers and historians of science. But was there really a ruptural moment? 
Following Laqueur, the shift away from a metaphysical or cosmological configuration 
of sexual difference towards a biological, medical and “natural” grounding points to 
the redefinition of the category of sex from a sociological category (“gender”) to 
ontological category (“sex”). Taking issue with Laqueur’s paradigm, Elsa Dorlin, in 
La matrice de la race: Généalogie sexuelle et colonial de la Nation française, attempts 
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to demonstrate that the discourse of sexual difference was always already medical, 
complicating Laqueur’s claim for the invention of sex as we know it taking place in 
the late eighteenth century.  
 
According to Dorlin, the concept of temperament is the blind spot of Laqueur's 
research.283 Dorlin shows that the notion of temperament, which refers to the internal 
conformation of the body, remains a central concept of medicine and philosophy since 
antiquity.284 The body, according to the theory of temperaments, is composed of 
several moods that each have different qualities (cold, hot, wet and dry) and that are 
of varying perfection.285 By way of the notion of temperament a medical factor is 
already at play in the construction of the notion of sex difference, since this concept 
allows for the hierarchical ordering of bodies and the definition of certain bodies as 
healthier than others.286 While the ideal health is the balance and perfect mix of all 
moods, certain bodies, those read to be in excess or defect of one of the moods, are 
deemed unhealthy. In this way, Dorlin argues, the notion of temperament functions as 
an operator of sexuation. Since women are afflicted with a cold and wet temperament, 
they are tendentially excluded from health, meaning that their temperament 
predisposes them to disease, while men are predisposed to health.287 The female body, 
according to this paradigm, comes to signify a sick body. Moreover, every sick body 
comes to be, by definition, an effeminate body.288 If the conceptualization of sexual 
difference in the classical age goes through the categories of healthy and unhealthy, 
which are just as much medical as political categories,289 then Laqueur’s claim that 
definitions of gender historically precede differentiations of sex does not seem to hold. 
Medical discourse would have already provided the dominant and normative 
definition of sex difference before the eighteenth century. 
 
Dorlin convincingly questions Laqueur’s periodisation and neat distinction between a 
one sex and a two-sex model of sexual difference. A medical discourse of nature as 
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ontological ground for social differences is, through the conceptualization of the 
healthy and the unhealthy by means of the notion of temperament, already a 
structuring principle before the eighteenth century. But even though the discourse of 
sexual difference was medical, political and philosophical all along, it nonetheless 
seems that the category of sex underwent substantial change in the period identified 
by Laqueur. It is, however, not the absence of an ontological criterion of difference – 
the absence of a claim to nature or biology – that distinguishes the one-sex model from 
the two-sex model. If there was not a transition from gender, or a sociologically 
determined hierarchy, to a hierarchy based on natural, biological or medical sex 
difference – three terms that Laqueur seems to employ analogously – then what 
exactly constitutes this shift?  
 
Londa Schiebinger, Susanne Lettow and Carole Pateman’s work also accounts for a 
conceptual shift, thus seemingly endorsing Laqueur’s paradigm. However, since 
Laqueur’s claim in fact consists of a number of connected arguments – with several 
factors of change that on his account correlate, each in their own right exemplifying 
the transition from a one sex to a two-sex model – it is not surprising that there would 
be an overlap. All four authors observe a tendency towards a more dichotomised 
conception of sexual difference and the emerging discourse of sexual complementarity 
in the medical, political and philosophical writings of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries. The idea that men and women are complementary opposites, 
justifying the modern sexual division of labour, constitutes a new and differently 
organised social order. This new political order is grounded not in the divine right of 
kings but in nature and natural law as defined by taxonomists, anatomists, and natural 
philosophers.290 This conception of nature moreover is, strictly speaking, no longer 
cosmological. 
 
The problem with Laqueur’s analysis, as we will see, is not his assertion of a 
significant change in meaning of the concept of sex, but that he seems unable to 
recognise any medical concept of sexual difference prior to this period.291 This leads 
him to overemphasise the sociological dimension of sexual difference – sex as gender 
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– in the classical age. Dorlin’s analysis, by contrast, demonstrates how 
accommodating “nature” has been, throughout the ages, to confirming social 
differences.292 At the same time, ‘[t]he current idea of nature and that of former times 
are not exactly the same.’293 In this sense, Laqueur’s analysis, which points to several 
interlocking conceptual changes, seems accurate. Not only was there a shift in 
understanding sex difference, the concepts of nature and medicine also changed 
significantly at the same time. As French sociologist Colette Guillaumin, among 
others, points out, the modern idea of nature took form in approximately the eighteenth 
century, developing concurrently with the natural sciences;294 that is, following 
Laqueur, at the same time as the invention of the modern conception of sex. 
 
What has been modified in the modern configuration of the “natural” is, Guillaumin 
points out, the idea of a determinism internal to the thing itself295 – the idea of a 
dynamic nature as addressed by Schelling and Hegel. The “old” or Aristotelian idea 
of nature, by contrast, is more or less identical with the idea of a “function,” meaning 
that the nature of a thing is the place in actual fact that a thing has in the world.296 But 
as Guillaumin says, ‘[t]he finalistic aim of the first naturalism became in our 
naturalism a proclamation of a scientific aspect.’297 Human beings are now considered 
to be physiologically organised for a certain place in social relationships that they 
belong to as part of a group. This relates back to Lettow’s claim that individuals are 
increasingly subjugated to larger categories, that they are perceived as belonging to a 
species, a sex or a race in a biological way.298 According to Lettow, in this new 
conceptualisation of nature, ‘the individual is always already overpowered by the 
exigencies of the species and of Nature.’299  
 
Individuals, accordingly, are no longer in a certain social place as the result of divine 
decision or cosmological mechanisms that are in some sense exterior to them, but as 
the result of an internal organization that expresses in each individual the essence of 
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the group in its totality.300 Central to the modern conception of nature is, as 
Guillaumin, Lettow and also Stone point out, the capacity to reproduce, self-generate 
and organise, as well as the emphasis on species. The temporalization of nature 
(Naturphilosophie) is based on these categories. Processes of procreation and 
generation that take into account temporal change and the emergence of something 
new are foregrounded in an attempt to move away from preformationism.301 A new 
conception of nature takes shape. With the critique of a mechanistic conception of 
nature in the course of the eighteenth century, the idea of “a new” (Pierre-Louis 
Moreau de Maupertuis) or “living” nature, a realm where mechanic laws do not 
sufficiently apply, comes into view.302 
 
While Dorlin is right to emphasise that the discourse of sexual difference was always 
also medical, and that medical distinctions had political consequences, medicine is 
constituted as a science only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is this 
scientised nature that speaks loudly as philosophers attempt to set social conventions 
on a natural basis.303 As Schiebinger says, ‘Enlightenment enthusiasm for nature and 
its laws privileged the voice of medical doctors as those best able to understand human 
nature.’304 Science and medicine acted as mediators of ideas of nature,305 and it is in 
this sense that both nature and medicine figured differently in the new European 
democracies. Modern industrial society with its gendered division of labour, with 
plantation slavery, and the proletarianization of peasants developed a natural scientific 
framework that would uncover the differences imagined as natural on the body, 
providing the necessary proof that human nature is not uniform but differs according 
to age, race and sex.306 Thus, while ‘[f]rom Aristotle through Darwin to Freud and 
beyond, nature has been infused with sexuality and gender,’307 nature arguably 
functions differently within a cosmological as compared to a biocentric frame.  
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However, even though conceptions of nature, biology and medicine have changed, 
there is a continuity, as Dorlin points out, in understanding women’s bodies as 
unhealthy and pathological. The task is thus to think both the transformation in 
meaning of the concepts of sex and gender based on and alongside those of species, 
ancestry, generation and race, while also highlighting what remains contingent in their 
conceptualisation throughout. In other words, even if a break in thought happens, it 
must still be possible to acknowledge certain continuities in how sex difference has 
played out and come to matter historically. While the break, following Bachelard, 
marks a real rupture, that which is continuous or stable in the construction of sex 
difference will be the most difficult to deconstruct. 
 
The one-sex body on trial 
 
In the following, I will further investigate the claims set out in the section above. This 
will require a return to Laqueur. While Laqueur’s paradigm has been critiqued in a 
number of disciplines, most importantly Classics Studies, it remains of appeal 
especially to scholars in disciplines, among them philosophy, that do not primarily 
focus on conducting their own historical research and thus rely on other scholars for 
this work. As Helen King observes, 
 
[t]hose coming to Making Sex from the many disciplines of the arts and humanities 
are unaware not only of the work on the history of medicine and of the body that has 
happened subsequent to its publication, but also of the sources Laqueur omits, and the 
lack of care with which he uses those sources which he does bring into play.308 
 
According to King, Laqueur’s model reduces complexity to simplicity:309 the one-sex 
model downplays ‘the historical and geographical variety of pre-modern Europe into 
a single image, imposing on it a misleading uniformity.’310 There is, she writes, no 
period in which the one-sex model dominated. 
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Helen King’s work is of interest because she discusses conceptualisations of sexual 
difference in the classical world in the context of the history of midwifery and 
gynaecology. This is important because these are the sites of pre-eighteenth century 
medical concepts of sexual difference. While Laqueur dismisses debates about 
midwifery as unimportant,311 for King, just as for Dorlin, these medical discourses are 
crucial to understanding the extent of the difference between men and women as 
conceived throughout history. While Laqueur focuses on the work of Galen, as prime 
example of the one-sex model of sexual difference, King suggests a close reading of 
the Hippocratic corpus, specifically the treatises on Diseases of Women, the Greek title 
being Gynaikeia, from the fourth century BC. Here it is suggested that the bodies of 
men and women ought to be treated in different ways when ill. According to 
Hippocrates, ‘the healing of women differs greatly from that of men.’312 King shows 
that ‘in the Gyneikeia treatises, the Hippocratic woman cannot be understood by 
reference to the organs of the male body,’313 and thus puts into question the validity 
of Laqueur’s one-sex model.  
 
Though not yet institutionalised, gynaecology already plays a central role for 
conceptualizations of sexual difference in Ancient Greece. As will also be shown in 
the following chapters, it is helpful to trace changes in understandings of sexual 
difference alongside changes in the meaning and practice of gynaecology. This is 
because the necessity of gynaecology, as King also emphasises, is built on the belief 
that the difference between men and women is so great that women require their own 
medical field.314 King proposes that the origin of gynaecology should not be 
understood only in a narrowly institutional sense, 315 arguing against scholars such as 
Ornella Moscucci, whose book Science of Woman: Gynaecology and Gender in 
England, 1800-1929 has shown that the institutionalisation of gynaecology through 
specialist hospital departments did not occur until the second half of the nineteenth 
century alongside the development of the scientific study of humankind, that is, of 
anthropology.316 In King’s alternative timeline, beginning with the Hippocratic 
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corpus, there is an important resurgence of Hippocrates’ work in the sixteenth 
century.317 Even though there were no gynaecologists, there was already a medical 
approach focused on female difference.318 
 
If not understood as a given historic fact, Laqueur’s distinction between two different 
models of understanding sexual difference can still, as was also indicated above, be 
helpful as an analytic tool. As King remarks, ‘[i]f we were to take them as ideal types, 
the two stages of Laqueur’s model would have some value; but this is not how they 
have been read.’319 The problem is that by attaching each stage to a specific period, 
other real changes in those periods are omitted.320 While the idea of a one-sex model 
was explored throughout history, and while, in the mid-nineteenth century, the sexes 
were in general seen as having a greater difference from each other than a century 
earlier, the Hippocratic corpus and its resurgence in the sixteenth century show that a 
two-sex model existed at least since the classical period and often alongside one-sex 
ideas.321 
 
There is value in Laqueur’s work, which has opened up transdisciplinary 
conversations and, moreover, has normalised across disciplines two positions central 
to feminist theory, namely that science constructs rather than discovers and that claims 
about sex will inevitably contain claims about gender.322 However, while Laqueur’s 
work offers important critical conceptual tools, as a historical analysis it has been 
proven incorrect. His paradigm should therefore not be employed uncritically as a 
historical frame for other disciplines, for instance as a historical proof and source of 
authority for philosophical claims and conceptual history. Thus, while Alison Stone’s 
work on Schelling, Hegel and Naturphilosophie demonstrates the importance of these 
thinkers for modern and contemporary understandings of sexual difference, 
illustrating that their claims on gender outlived these authors, she relies uncritically on 
Laqueur to validate her claims. According to Stone, as was outlined above, by 
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interpreting sexual difference as a polar opposition, Schelling and Hegel re-conceived 
it in a way peculiarly appropriate to their time, that is, to quote Stone,  
 
a time when, as Thomas Laqueur has shown, the “one-sex” model of sexual difference 
that had prevailed in the West ever since the classical period was becoming supplanted 
by a new “two-sex” model, a biological model on which the sexes were radically and 
completely different.323 
 
It was already shown, with reference to Elsa Dorlin, that though biology as a distinct 
academic discipline did not emerge until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
medical discourse and theories of nature were nonetheless central in understanding 
sexual difference prior to this. Laqueur’s claim that there was a shift from a 
sociological to an ontological conceptualisation of sex difference thus does not hold. 
Sexual difference before the eighteenth century was not, as Laqueur claims, entirely 
sociological and cultural, that is, based on social rank and cultural roles only rather 
than being an organic bodily expression. While certain biological terms, such as that 
of organism, were not in use, the body was nonetheless understood in natural and 
medical terms. A medical discourse of nature as ontological ground for social 
difference was already a structuring principle for Hippocrates and a broader 
Hippocratic tradition, and thus existed before the eighteenth century. If Laqueur’s 
model cannot be proven historically, then it is not helpful to frame the 
Naturphilosophen as representing the paradigm change from a one-sex to a two-sex 
model. Rather, it seems, their work illustrates King’s point, namely that both models 
circulated and were at play at the same time throughout history. Yet, as King and 
scholars throughout the history of medicine highlight, a change or conceptual shift, 
which requires conceptualisation, did indeed take place in the eighteenth century. If 
not Laqueur’s one-sex/two-sex model, then what kind of paradigm change manifested 
in the eighteenth century? And how is this expressed by the Naturphilosophen? 
 
What can be witnessed in the work of the Naturphilosophen is, as Lettow argues, a 
first introduction and development of a biopolitical vocabulary from within 
philosophy. This takes place alongside the institutionalisation of anthropology, 
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comparative anatomy and gynaecology as distinct academic disciplines. These new 
academic endeavours, as they are in part inspired by or come out of philosophical 
discourses, lead to the invention of a new vocabulary and to a rethinking of old terms. 
One of these is the concept of nature, which is now conceived as the capacity to 
reproduce, self-generate and organise. At the same time, this period marks, as was 
argued above, the co-emergence of the concepts of race, heredity, species, sex and 
generation. The subordination of the individual to a group or species and the 
stabilization of sexual difference, as well as race, as a general and universal organizing 
principle manifests in the work of the Naturphilosophen. 
 
Furthermore, even though a two-sex model of sexual difference can be documented 
throughout history, the emerging discourse of sexual complementarity in the medical, 
political, and philosophical writings of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries is nonetheless distinct in many regards. Both Hegel and Schelling, as was 
argued earlier, advocate the idea that men and women are not physical and moral 
equals but complementary opposites, a theory that is to justify the modern sexual 
division of labour and, more broadly, the new, post-revolutionary social order of 
European industrial societies. We can therefore still conclude, without reference to 
Making Sex as a historical source, that the Naturphilosophen constructed and 
stabilised a specifically modern conception of sexual difference and nature. This is 
because in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century sexual difference cannot 
be understood firstly without reference to the political context of the French 
Revolution, as well as the ongoing industrialisation of Europe and Europe’s imperial 
expansions, and, secondly, without reference to a broader complex of terms that were 
developed at the same time and in an interdisciplinary context that encompassed 
philosophy, medicine, anthropology, gynaecology and comparative anatomy among 
others. 
 
Gynaecology: Between philosophy and modern medicine – Hegel, Carus and the first 
German textbook on gynaecology 
 
Since a complementary conception of sexual difference was still relatively new and 
unstable in the period between 1750 and 1830, I would like to argue, in line with 
Susanne Lettow, that philosophical discourse had an important influence in shaping 
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the emerging field of the life sciences.324 This becomes apparent, for example, in the 
work of the physician-philosopher Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869), whose work offers 
insights into how concepts travel and cross disciplinary boundaries. Carus, influenced 
by Goethe, Schelling, and Hegel, translates the philosophical ideas of 
Naturphilosophie into a medical and anthropological discourse. This is how the 
definition of sexual difference as organising principle, forged among others by 
Schelling and Hegel, came to be inscribed in the new biology of the nineteenth 
century. Even though the project of Naturphilosophie was ultimately abandoned by 
philosophers of science and medical practitioners, something of Naturphilosophie 
remained.325  
 
Carus, a romanticist and Naturphilosoph, was the author of the first systematic 
presentation of gynaecology in Germany.326 Gynaecology, Carus writes, is the 
doctrine of the peculiarity of the female body, its structure, its life, its diseases, and its 
proper dietary and medical treatment.327 Since for Carus scientific research and the 
search for philosophical meaning merge into an immediate unity,328 the terms 
operative in Naturphilosophie, such as the idea of an organic whole, sexual difference 
and complementarity, purposiveness, and a systematic understanding of life, find their 
way into Carus’ medical writings. 
 
Carus opens his textbook on gynaecology with a rhetorical question: ‘and how finally 
can all these strange processes of female life be understood without obtaining a clear 
idea of the nature and character of femininity in general?’329 Preceding Freud’s theory 
of femininity, Carus already attempts to construct a general science of woman, 
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emphasizing throughout his work that only an integrated science, one that takes all 
aspects of a woman’s life into account, can further scientific – by which Carus always 
means medical and philosophical – research. The purpose of his book, Carus argues, 
is to compile an overview of all the objects related to the female body as far as they 
touch the medical sphere and to unify such a study in the name of gynaecology.330 Not 
unlike Schelling and Hegel, Carus’ concern is with a total philosophy, one that opens 
up and grasps reality and life as such.331 As a study of the whole of woman, 
gynaecology was to fuse the physical, the psychological and the moral aspects of 
femininity.332 The differentiation of an independent science of women began in 
Germany with the handbooks on women’s diseases written by the obstetricians Adam 
Elias von Siebold and J.C.G. Jörg, who was Carus’ teacher, and in 1820 Carus gave 
this science the name of gynaecology.333 It was by coining a new “subject area” of 
scientific research that Carus made a long-lasting impact. 
 
If one was to observe the general idea of sexual difference in all its particular moments, 
then, according to Carus, one will consistently recognise that there is a qualitatively 
different organization in men compared to women.334 Carus comments both on the 
physical features of the female body, remarking that women are in general smaller 
than men due to their limited individual development,335 and their mental capacities, 
which he thinks correlate. Because of their smaller body size, the head, trunk, and 
limbs differ from the male, who, according to Caurs, grows to greater maturity.336 
Even women’s organs are, Carus claims, qualitatively different.337 Their limited 
bodily development means that women have a childish bodily form,338 which seems 
to explain their different motor functions and nervous life. Because sensory perception 
in women is subtler than in the male body, Carus argues that female life is 
characterised by ‘higher’ nervous activity.339 This iterability, however, does not 
translate into a greater sharpness or accuracy of perception, which has not developed 
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to the same extent as in the male.340 Both these observations – comparative anatomy 
of the male and female and anthropological observations of their social roles and 
capacities – are crucial, according to Carus, for understanding and treating women’s 
diseases. 
 
Though he primarily compiles and records sex difference, and in this way provides an 
empirical foundation to Hegel’s and Schelling’s systems, Carus yet argues that no one 
sex can be deemed higher than the other. Emphasising throughout his book the 
inferiority of the female body and mind – Carus states early on that the real field of 
science and speculation, namely the sharpness of judgement and the depth of male 
reason, are inaccessible to the female soul341 – he argues at the same time that each 
has developed purpose in its own realm.342 Following Schelling and Hegel, Carus 
adopts the theory of sexual complementarity according to which men and women are 
not physical and moral equals but complementary opposites. This exemplifies how the 
one-sex and two-sex models co-exist. Each sex, following Carus, achieves a high 
degree of perfection in a specific sphere of life, meaning that only both sexes together 
constitute the true human being.343 This contradiction also underlines Hegel’s and 
Schelling’s work. Although the genus character is common to them both, women are, 
in their purposive lives, inferior. Like Hegel, Carus aligns women with plant life344 – 
woman is the plant principle, whereas in man a higher principle, the spiritual or 
animal, prevails.345 Carus aligns woman with matter, arguing that in reproduction 
women are merely receptive, shaping the physical, whereas men contribute the 
spiritual dimension of life.346 The same claim can also be found in Hegel.347 This 
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relation, Carus and Hegel argue, translates into all spheres of life. Species life is 
purposive, but purposiveness is at all levels gendered.  
 
There are many subtle and important differences between Carus, Schelling and Hegel, 
which cannot be taken into account at this point. Rather than a complete exegesis of 
German Naturphilosophie, this project aims to point to a specific site where the works 
of Hegel and Schelling made an influence outside of the immediate realm of 
philosophy, namely on the founding of the field of gynaecology in early nineteenth 
century Germany. Philosophy, as was already argued with reference to Kant, played a 
role in establishing a conceptual foundation for modern anthropology and for the 
medical discourses of gynaecology and comparative anatomy. However, these new 
university disciplines influenced philosophy in turn. The nature of these trans-
disciplinary conversations was not always straightforward or explicit. Emphasis on 
the history of gynaecology for the development of the philosophical concepts of sex 
and gender will remain a guiding thread throughout the following chapters. This is 
because the emergence of scientific medicine – with obstetrics and gynaecology at the 
forefront of the professionalisation of modern medicine – arguably coincides with the 
redefinition of the categories of sex and gender. What becomes evident is that the 
discourse of sexual difference was at the same time medical, determined by 
conceptualisations of nature, philosophical and political.  
 
Thus, by the late eighteenth century, for the first time in Europe “woman” comes to 
be understood as a universal category in a double sense. With emphasis on concepts 
of species and generation, many natural historians and practicing physicians postulate 
a universal reproductive woman. This conception is also politically motivated. In 
modern medicine, childbirth and women’s medicine come to be proving grounds for 
a general shift in cosmology in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. 
Reproductive politics animate both government legislation and medical inquiry. With 
the need to produce greater populations in both Europe and the colonies, reproductive 
policies become a central government concern.348 “Woman,” moreover, is not only a 
medical universal, but also comes to be a universal category in the eyes of European 
law, which defines all women, regardless of age, class, or race, as disenfranchised. For 
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men, by contrast, representation in government is determined by distinctions in 
physical characteristics, such as physical strength, skin colour, or intelligence.349 
 
It was argued in the previous chapter that speculative reason in its non-empirical mode 
already encounters political categories and that these are essential to an explanation of 
its nature. This chapter further elaborates this claim. By looking at Hegel’s 
contribution to Naturphilosophie, the example of the sexual relation, as it appears in 
the ‘Chemism’ chapter of the Logic to illustrate conceptual universality and 
speculative reason, is further contextualised. This chapter also looks at the influence 
of Naturphilosophie’s discourse more broadly on the emerging discipline of 
gynaecology, which, as was argued, incorporates Naturphilosophie’s complementary 
theory of sexual difference. It thus becomes evident that sexual difference is in the 
process of being constructed as a scientific concept at the time Hegel is writing. The 
discourse of the sexual relation, as elaborated in Naturphilosophie and elsewhere, 
comes to matter not just philosophically but also culturally and medically. 
 
As the example of Carus illustrates, there is a close connection between scientific, 
political and philosophical discourse in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
However, the nature of these conversations is not always straightforward or explicit. 
Moreover, even the discourse internal to philosophy is contradictory. The Logic, for 
instance, slightly displaces the legacy of Naturphilosophie. This is because the sexual 
relation as introduced in the ‘Chemism’ chapter of the Logic is not immediately linked 
to the “genus-process” (Gattungsprozess) and the temporalization of nature, even 
though this process will be addressed in the Logic, in the chapter on “Life” that will 
follow. For this reason, the Logic’s contribution to social and political thought, 
including to an understanding of the sexual relation, should still be analysed 
separately. An attempt to do so, will continue in the following chapter. 
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Chapter four 
A performative concept? Speculation in Hegel’s Science of Logic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 106 
Opening 
 
This chapter continues the close reading of the final chapters in Hegel’s Science of 
Logic with an analysis of speculative reason in the sections on ‘Objectivity’ and ‘The 
Idea’. While chapter two looked at the appearance of social and political categories 
and examples in these sections and argued that they are central to defining speculative 
reason, an attempt was made in chapter three to ground one of Hegel’s examples, that 
of the sexual relation, historically. The work of the previous chapters; to demonstrate 
the political dimension of Hegel’s logical categories will be continued here. However, 
in this chapter, the emphasis will slightly shift in order to uncover a concept of 
performativity in Hegel’s Logic. It will be argued that Hegel ends his Logic by 
proposing an ontological concept of speculation. While the Logic opens with an empty 
and undetermined concept of being, ‘(b)eing pure being – without further 
determination’350, Hegel introduces a new, speculative concept of being in the final 
chapter. This is an attempt to determine being conceptually – as dynamic activity 
(Thätigkeit) of form – without determining it empirically. 
 
The concept of ‘performativity’ understood today as a theory of speech act (J. L. 
Austin, John Searle, Jacques Derrida), of gender- (Judith Butler) and queer (Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgewick) performativity and of visual and performance art (Peggy 
Phelan), was not available to Hegel. However, even today ‘the German language has 
no one term to cover all the possibilities and connotations of the English word 
[“performativity”]’.351 Thus, while the concept of performativity has, over the past 
fifteen years, been increasingly used as a key concept of critical theory,352 its 
translation into other languages is not straightforward. Despite these difficulties, I 
argue here that this concept best describes the definition of being as activity of form 
proposed at the end of the Science of Logic. While performativity does not appear in 
Hegel as such, I argue that one can read the Logic well with this term as it opens up 
new ways of reading and using this text (in translation). I therefore introduce this 
anachronistic term to the reading of Hegel because, first of all the definition of 
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conceptual form in the Logic happens performatively, and second because, even if not 
named as such, Hegel defines a concept of the performative at the end of the Science 
of Logic. 
 
While there are difficulties in introducing a new concept into Hegel, it will be shown 
that this term is not superimposed and that it is already internal to the text. What 
performativity names today is already addressed by Hegel, who can be read alongside 
Austin, Derrida and Butler. Hegel is in conversation with these thinkers as he talks 
about speech acts (Elements of the Philosophy of Right), language (Phenomenology, 
Science of Logic) and a dynamic and temporal concept of being (Science of Logic). A 
reading of Hegel and Butler is particularly compelling since both propose an 
ontological notion of performativity which will be further explored in chapter six. In 
order to enable this new reading of Hegel and the encounter of Hegel with Butler on 
the question of (social) ontology, I purposefully “mistranslate” Hegel’s Thätigkeit 
(activity), which appears in the concluding chapters of the Logic, and introduce the 
concept of performativity instead. 
 
In order to approach the question of performativity in Hegel, this chapter begins not 
with the Logic but with an analysis of the marriage ceremony and its description as 
speech act in the Philosophy of Right. This will allow us to introduce the origin of the 
concept of performativity in speech act theory. It will also allow us to link chapters 
two, three and four together by looking once more at Hegel’s thought in context, in 
particular through the elaboration of the sexual relation, as a key moment in the 
definition of civil society. The analysis of the role and function of the marriage 
ceremony in the Philosophy of Right, which will bring the political stakes of 
performativity to the fore, will be followed by a close reading of the final sections of 
the Logic where a philosophical definition of this same concept is developed. 
 
The marriage ceremony – pronouncing Sittlichkeit in the Philosophy of Right 
 
The exemplary function of the state and the sexual relation first introduced in the 
Science of Logic plays a central role in the Philosophy of Right. Here, these two 
examples that are only mentioned in passing in the Logic are discussed in detail in the 
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chapters on the ‘The Family’ and the ‘The State’.353 These two chapters outline the 
transformation of kinship relations happening at the time. The Philosophy of Right 
theorises the formation of the modern nuclear family, which dissolves the vast bonds 
of the family as clan. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the binary and 
complementary understanding of sexual difference and of the couple unit, on which 
the modern understanding of the family relies, are formulated by Hegel with reference 
to “reproduction.”354 According to Hegel, civil society depends on the nuclear family 
as a private sphere, separated from both the economic sphere and the state.355 But how 
is the formation of the family, understood in terms of the couple and its offspring, 
legitimised by state and civil society? It is here that the speech act becomes central. 
 
The Philosophy of Right resumes a discussion first introduced in the ‘Mechanism’ 
chapter of the Logic, where Hegel intends first to introduce a notion of the law and 
thereafter critiques it by developing a performative universal concept, that is a 
lawfulness that is not superimposed on the particular from above but is internal to it. 
A similar way of thinking can be observed in the Logic, suggesting that these two 
works have a parallel structure; first there is a formal law (Logic) or contract 
(Philosophy of Right), which is then suspended by a notion of the performative, either 
through the performativity of conceptual form (Logic) or through a performative 
utterance or speech act (Philosophy of Right). 
 
The Philosophy of Right inaugurates this distinction between two different forms of 
lawfulness within the realm of the political, as the opposition of contract and law on 
the one and an idea of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) on the other hand. According to Hegel, 
marriage, as the adequate social expression of the sexual relation, and the state mark 
a departure from law understood as contract. Both cannot be adequately accounted for 
by social contract theory. While the critique of law and contract in the Philosophy of 
Right requires, as will be shown, a notion of the performative, Hegel does not 
straightforwardly oppose the two. The form of the contract is ambiguous in that it is 
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already a performative force, though it is still lacking a certain performative 
dimension, as Hegel seems to suggest. The state and the marriage ceremony exemplify 
this point as they both rely on the standpoint of contract in order to transcend it. 
 
Following Hegel, the state is of a different and higher dimension than that regulated 
by contract, which is the sphere of private property. This sphere, however, is key to 
its functioning. Contract, according to Hegel, takes place once an agreement is 
uttered.356 The contract is a legal promise, namely the promise of the future fulfilment 
of its conditions. While the fulfilment of an agreement is, in Hegel’s words, its 
performance,357 the crucial moment in the exchange of property has already taken 
place beforehand. The real moment of exchange is the agreement and not its 
performance, which follows merely mechanically. Thus, while both performance and 
contract have a temporal dimension, contract presupposes the individual and her 
property. ‘From the standpoint of contract, two individuals who contract together 
recognise each other as property owners and mutually will that they should use each 
other’s property.’358 This assumption and the anticipated outcome of the contractual 
activity is, following Hegel, ultimately limiting: ‘The owner is related externally to 
his property and so, as it were, stands outside the contract and is unchanged by it.’359 
The performance of the contract has no performative force. No party to the contract is 
transformed in its execution, which is, as predetermined consequence of the 
stipulation, a performance only in technical terms. This is what distinguishes the 
process (Prozess) of contract360 from speculative or performative activity (Thätigkeit), 
two terms that according to Hegel correlate. Change is not to be thought as exchange 
but in terms of a doing that has an effect on the world and that is embodied: 
performance properly so called has an ontological effect. The marriage ceremony 
exemplifies this point. 
 
Marriage is not the end of contract, but brings the performative power of contract, its 
own going beyond itself, into view. As Carole Pateman writes, the marriage contract 
                                                     
356 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlagen der Philosophie des Rechts (Hamburg: Meiner, Verlag, 
2015), §79; Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §79. 
357 Ibid., §78. 
358 Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 174. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Hegel, Grundlagen der Philosophie des Rechts/Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §12. 
 110 
‘is precisely a contract to transcend the standpoint of contract.’361 Marriage, according 
to Hegel, transforms the consciousness and standing of the man and woman in 
question.362 The property-owning individual is no longer the primary point of 
reference. As husband and wife, they cease to be self-sufficient individuals and instead 
become members of a little association which is so closely unified that they are ‘one 
person.’363 Marriage is an ‘ethical bond which unites them internally in their 
association and not externally as property owners.’364 This transformation, however, 
is possible only if marriage is a public event. For Hegel in the Philosophy of Right, a 
duly authorised wedding ceremony is essential to marriage.365 Public speech in 
particular is the medium of substantial change.366 The ceremony enacts the formal 
pronouncement of the marriage as well as its “actuality” (Wirklichkeit).367 Hegel then 
is the first philosopher to describe the marriage ceremony as speech act, and to link 
both to the idea of performativity. 
 
The concept of performativity was formulated by the English philosopher J. L. Austin 
in a lecture series delivered at Harvard University in 1955. While the series of twelve 
lectures was not too popular, Austin’s lecture notes, which were published in book 
form after his death under the title How To Do Things With Words (1962), proved 
influential.368 The statement ‘I do take you as my lawfully wedded husband/wife’ is 
the first example used by Austin to distinguish the performative utterance from the 
constative (descriptive/statement of facts) utterance.369 These sentences, according to 
Austin, do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ an action and can also not be categorised as either 
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‘true’ or ‘false’ statements.370 In a performative statement “to say” is “to do.” The 
utterance, in other words, is the doing.371  
 
While Austin’s use of the marriage ceremony as example for how speech act functions 
was criticised, his more general proposition, namely that speaking is a matter of 
operating within a normative framework, was taken up372 and further developed by 
Derrida, Sedgewick, Felman and Butler among others. Austin explains that the success 
of a performative utterance is dependent on a number of circumstances. At the outset 
of his lectures, Austin provides a list of criteria for the smooth or “happy” functioning 
of a performative, the first one being that ‘[t]here must exist an accepted conventional 
procedure (…)’373 to support the speech act. Only in this way can a speech act be 
effective. By elaborating the concept of the performative, Austin introduces the 
question of social norms and conventions into ordinary language philosophy. Yet, 
while convention is a key word for Austin, missing from his account is a more 
substantial and critical analysis of what is meant by that term.374 
 
While both Butler and Sedgewick borrow from Austin to formulate their accounts of 
gender and queer performativity, they also trouble his account of the role of social and 
political norms and institutions by questioning whose speech and actions are 
recognised and supported by the state and society and can, therefore, be described as 
“happy”.375 This brings us back to the role of exemplarity on which the critique of 
Austin turns. Shoshana Felman points to a repeated tropism within speech act theory, 
a fascination with a particular class of examples, most importantly the marriage 
ceremony.376 The repetition of the exemplarity of the marriage promise by Austin and 
his commentators suggests that marriage is exemplary for this type of speech act. As 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes, ‘[t]he marriage ceremony is, indeed, so central to the 
origins of “performativity” (given the strange, disavowed but unattenuated persistence 
of the exemplary in this work) that a more accurate name for How to Do Things with 
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Words might have been How to say (or write) “I do” about twenty million times 
without winding up any more married than you started out.’377 
 
In Hegel, too, the use of the marriage ceremony and of the functioning of the state as 
examples is not incidental to an elaboration of performative force. But what “takes 
place” in the usage of examples?378 As was discussed in chapter two and as Alexander 
Gelley asks, ‘[i]s the example merely one – a singular, a fruit of circumstance – or the 
One – a paradigm, a paragon?’379 Judith Butler suggests that ‘[t]he centrality of the 
marriage ceremony in J.L. Austin’s examples of performativity suggests that the 
heterosexualization of the social bond is the paradigmatic form for those speech acts 
which bring about what they name.’380 In the Philosophy of Right, the institution of 
marriage also fulfils a particular function. According to Hegel, the sexual division of 
labour, institutionalised in the marriage ceremony, constitutes a historically mediated 
appropriation of natural sexuality.381 A difference, already inherent in the nature and 
biology of the sexes, is now realised in ethical or cultural form. This conscious 
realization, according to Hegel, allows for a reinterpretation of the ‘natural.’ While 
humans, according to Hegel, are at first subordinate to the natural species process 
(Gattungsprozess), that is, to biological generation and reproduction, and in this sense 
are unfree, a cultural and political reinterpretation of these relations introduces a 
dimension of freedom previously impossible.382 The sexual relation, as it is embedded 
in the institution of marriage and the family, accordingly allows for the appropriation 
of what was thought to be merely “natural,” and thus a deterministic relation, and 
instead implements a second nature as realm of freedom. 
 
As Butler and Sedgwick point out, the self-identity of persons who identify as queer 
or are read by others as queer stands in contrast or rejection to the logic of a 
heterosexual second nature. Their attachment and association with state authority is 
not straightforward and they stand in a more ambiguous and complicated relation to 
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the witness of others. The marriage example thus raises questions about the apparently 
natural way the first-person speaking, acting, and pointing subject gets constituted in 
marriage through a confident appeal to state authority, and through the calm 
interpellation of others present as witnesses.383 Following Hegel, the speech act is 
possible only from within a particular institutional framework. The family – the 
heterosexualization of the social bond – is embedded in civil society and the state, 
which are to form an organic whole. As Butler points out, most performatives are 
forms of authoritative speech. They are statements which, in uttering, exercise a 
binding power in the form of legal sentences, baptisms, inaugurations, or declarations 
of ownership.384 Performatives, such as the marriage ceremony, succeed not because 
an intention successfully governs the action of speech, but because that action echoes 
a prior action and because it accumulates the forces of authority through the repetition 
or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices.385 The marriage ceremony as 
speech act has a history and, in this instance, saying something is doing something 
because the right preconditions are in place. However, in Sedgwick’s words, the 
presuppositions for a successful speech act – ‘[t]he emergence of the first person, of 
the singular, of the present, of the active, and of the indicative’ – are ‘all questions, 
rather than presumptions, for queer performativity.’386 
 
Sedgwick further contemplates what it would mean to put the exemplarity of the 
marriage ceremony into question. If, as outlined in chapter two, the adoption of a 
particular case as example sets a process of thought in motion that determines the very 
formation of the concept or theory in question,387 then, by placing different kinds of 
utterances in the position of the exemplary, are other versions of performativity 
possible?388 Can the first person, singular, active, that is, the self-sufficient property-
owning individual recognised by the state and presupposed at the outset of the 
marriage ceremony, be suspended? If the marriage ceremony operates as the sanction 
that performs the heterosexualization of the social bond, then it inaugurates not 
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primarily a realm of freedom but rather is to be understood as one domain in which 
power acts as discourse.389 The freedom from natural determinacy within the realm of 
civil society gained through marriage is in this sense limited. Can we really celebrate 
that the determinism of the sexual relation, previously presumed to be biological, is 
“only” cultural, and that the cultural is to offer a realm of freedom?390 
 
Before further elaborating the political stakes of performativity, brought to light by 
speech act theory through the exemplary function of the marriage ceremony – which 
also constitutes a central moment in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right – this chapter will 
return to the Science of Logic and a close reading of its final chapters with the aim of 
uncovering a philosophical definition of performativity therein. This analysis will 
centre on the chapters ‘Teleology’, ‘Life’ and ‘The Idea’. While the chapters on 
‘Objectivity’ (this includes the section on ‘Teleology’) introduce the concept of the 
law, the final chapter (‘The idea’) proposes to understand the law as “performative.” 
Emphasis is no longer on the ability of the concept as law to subsume the particular 
from above, but on its own activity or doing. Hegel proposes that the law itself is 
Thätigkeit (activity). As such, the concept has become idea: it is speculative. It will be 
proposed in the following that Hegel concludes the Science of Logic with the 
introduction of a concept of performativity as speculative law and ontological concept, 
that is, as definition of determinate being. While the concepts of teleology and life 
already complicate the notion of an external law and negotiate the relation between 
internal and external, they are yet, as Hegel demonstrate, insufficient. 
 
Teleology: Thinking form as activity 
 
The Logic defines purposiveness as that principle that transforms, though not without 
violence, all outer objective relations and their unity into an inner principle of object 
determination. As such, it is the concept of a self-reflexive totality. And yet, even 
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though the principle of purposiveness ‘may be regarded as the cunning of reason,’391 
it remains insufficient and is, in the Logic, superseded by the language of “life.” This 
is because even though purposiveness is the inner determination of form itself, the 
question of externality remains. Purpose, according to Hegel, ‘is the subjective 
concept as an essential striving and impulse to posit itself externally.’392 Purposiveness 
accordingly demands that something be turned into a means, even if this means will 
eventually also become purpose. Only in this way can the distance between the internal 
and exterior, the subjective intentionality of the purpose and the objective exteriority 
of the world, be negotiated. Having, at the end of the ‘Chemism’ chapter, formulated 
a principle of inner determination, or form as the activity of form itself, ‘Teleology’ 
still has to negotiate the exteriority of the world. This is why the cunning of reason is 
immediately identified as an insufficient mode of determination. Everything becomes 
a question of how best to negotiate exteriority, that is, how to translate between 
conceptual interiority and its external existence. In-forming its world, conceptual form 
is still a constant moving back and forth between the two. 
 
The concept as purpose, Hegel argues, ‘is neither a force expressing itself, nor a 
substance or a cause manifesting itself in its accidents or effects.’393 Rather, Hegel 
suggests, the teleological process is to be understood as translation.394 What gets 
translated is the subjective concept, the internal law ascribed to the object, into 
objectivity as such, also referred to in this chapter as exteriority. Hegel plays with the 
double meaning of Übersetzung/übersetzen which signifies both to translate and to 
cross over or transition into. This translation or transition does not yet illustrate the 
identity of the subjective laws of knowledge with their object, a coincidence referred 
to as ‘Idea,’ but the possibility of translation demonstrates that such a passage is 
intelligible. Concepts describing a state of transition, like Übersetzung/übersetzen, 
Übergang, and so on, play an important role in the Logic where they are used, often 
instead of sublation, as mediating terms. In The Post Card, comparing Freud and 
Hegel on the question of speculation, Derrida suggests that it is here, in the trans- or 
the Über, that speculation finds its possibility and its interest.395 Mediation is not 
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restricted to sublation, as the universal mechanism of the dialectic, but is dependent 
on its context. According to the authors of the ‘To Translate’ entry in the Dictionary 
of Untranslatables, the movement of translation can also be considered as a 
‘transplantation.’ To translate, accordingly, is to transplant (verpflanzen) to a foreign 
soil the products of a language from one domain into another.396 What is transplanted 
in the teleological process is the inner purpose, which becomes through translation 
outer. Since what is at stake in translation is a change of context, and thus an alteration, 
if ever so slightly, translation requires interpretation; more concretely, Hegel writes, 
‘a speculative interpretation’.397 
 
Because it still determines its object from the outside, purposiveness necessitates 
translation. Any form of external determination, according to Hegel, requires, though 
to varying degrees, the use of violence and force against the object. If, however – and 
this is the speculative premise of the ‘Teleology’ chapter – the independence of the 
world is revealed as the concept’s own negative projection, that is, as nothing but a 
‘reflective shine of externality,’398 then a concept of activity (Thätigkeit) that does not 
require any unnecessary recourse to violence could be conceived. It would become 
possible, Hegel writes, to conceive of a ‘truthful’ or a ‘transparent’ transition.399 A 
different economy of the ‘trans-,’ that of transparency, would, Hegel argues, manifest 
itself. In this scenario, there would only be one activity – form as transformed. Once 
the relationship under discussion is no longer between form and matter, but between 
form and form, the question of violence, power, resistance and freedom, though it does 
not lose its relevance or purchase, is reformulated. Hegel’s definition of violence, 
according to which violence is exercised when the determination of a subject or an 
object is imposed on it from the outside, would no longer hold. How does an inner 
principle shape, first, the exterior world and, secondly, the inner form of form itself? 
At first, it seems as if the ‘Teleology’ chapter fails to answer this question. As a means-
end relation, the purposive process is at first ‘none other than the mechanical or 
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chemical one.’400 Moreover, its content, the externally given manifoldness of the 
objective world, is the same as that of “mechanism” or “chemism.”401 Purposiveness, 
Hegel writes, is only the form of teleology, but not its content.402  
 
What needs to be thought, according to Hegel, is a concept of inner purposiveness. 
While Hegel credits Kant with introducing this concept into philosophy, it is in Kant 
only considered as a form of reflective judgement but not as a characteristic of the 
object itself. Purposiveness thus resides outside of the object, yet the object somehow 
conforms to the purposive structure of cognition. What Kant cannot offer, then, is an 
explanation of how the harmonious relation between the structure of reflective 
judgement and its object comes about. This harmonious relation, as Hegel observes, 
can only be considered a happy coincidence, ‘as though an intelligence had given them 
to us for the convenience of our faculty of cognition.’403 
 
Hegel claims towards the end of the ‘Teleology’ chapter that externality, though a 
moment of purposiveness, is nothing that stands independently over and against it.404 
There is no need ‘for the subjective purpose to exercise any violence to make the object 
into a means’ because the externality of the object is only posited. Hegel’s resolution 
of the question of violence is that externality as posited is ‘immediately subjected 
(unterworfen) to purpose.’405 There is no need of violence because teleology is no 
longer just form (law) but is equally content, which is thought not in terms of a 
specific, pre-given matter, but as activity (Thätigkeit) of form. Non-violent teleology, 
as Rocío Zambrana writes, follows the power of the concept.406 
 
In the Logic, Thätigkeit, as activity of form, is at first thought as purely formal, as the 
external determination of the object by a general law. As purposiveness, form becomes 
conceptualised as absolute activity, that is, as self-determination of form. The prefix 
‘trans-’ in transplantation, translation and transition, which refers to a state of motion, 
signifies the moment of mediation in formation. The question of violence, since 
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violence is equated with externality and defined as imposition of form from the 
outside, seems to lose its immediate relevance once form is no longer discussed as 
universal law and as subsumption under law, but rather as ‘activity’ of form or ‘self-
formation’. And yet, subjugation and power remain in effect, even though violence is 
suspended. The tension between self-determination or dynamic form on the one hand, 
which is supposedly transparent, and power and subjugation on the other hand, is an 
unresolved tension in the Logic. 
 
Life-form as new speculative law 
 
Logical life, that is, life in its purely conceptual form, is defined as inner 
purposiveness. Introducing the final sub-section of the Logic, ‘Life’ is the moment of 
the most mediated immediacy. Hegel uses this moment to reflect on the concept of 
“logic.” In what sense can “life” be called a logical category? The paradoxical nature 
of the Logic, in its attempt to describe by purely conceptual means that which is the 
most concrete, becomes at once apparent. 
 
Lawlike in its absolute generality/universality and as such ‘objective,’ Hegel argues 
that “life” is at the same time a subjective principle. As such, it is, according to Hegel, 
the only law or law-like principle that is not superimposed on its object. The 
distinction between subjective and objective, between the law and the subject of law, 
is however, still maintained throughout this chapter. The vocabulary of Macht 
(power), Widerstand (resistance) and Freiheit (freedom) therefore still applies. The 
living individual, although it embodies the principle of “life,” is still opposed to an 
objective world ‘that stands indifferent over against it.’407 Only once inner 
purposiveness is considered at the level of the life process, by which Hegel means 
species reproduction and generation, is the individual no longer distinct from a world 
opposed to it. Only now, Hegel argues, does inner purposiveness become a concrete 
law.408 
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In the chapter on ‘Life,’ as in the chapters on ‘Objectivity,’ the term ‘transition’ or 
‘transition into an other’409 is employed to describe the movement from one conceptual 
form to a new, more clearly defined one. However, in the last section of the chapter 
on ‘Life’ the term ‘sublation,’ which occurs much less frequently in the Logic than 
that of ‘transition,’ is introduced as the key mediating term. The introduction of this 
term, as will be argued, announces a change in narrative. In the last pages of the 
chapter on ‘Life,’ the move from concept to idea occurs. By way of reflecting on the 
concepts of genus and species, it becomes possible, Hegel argues, to think ‘the 
individuality of life itself, no longer generated out of its concept but out of the actual 
idea.’410 Whereas in the case of the living individual the concept was only posited, 
here the individuality of life is generated (erzeugt), not only reflectively but 
determinately, as idea. For Hegel the idea is, contrary to Kant, no longer an 
unjustifiable term and speculative for that reason. Rather, a positive definition of 
speculation is introduced. By way of redefining the Kantian ideas of reason, and thus 
the concept of speculation, ‘[t]he subjective logic seeks to present a different law 
which is not posited but which has determinate existence.’411 A new definition of 
Allgemeinheit as the universality/generality of the idea, and a new conceptual form, 
that of performativity, is being gained. 
 
Inner purposiveness, when reflected upon by thinking life as genus/species, expresses 
the concept of universality as dynamic principle, not simply as law. The distinction 
between the law and the subject of law is blurred, for subsumption under law is for the 
first time understood to be the subjects own doing. According to Hegel, this universal 
‘is free power [Macht]; it is itself and takes its other within its embrace, but without 
doing violence to it.’412 Like ‘Objectivity,’ which precedes it, ‘The Idea’ is a relational 
form. But whereas ‘Objectivity’ explains the concept as relational totality, ‘The Idea’ 
describes the relational form of the system, maintaining the Kantian definition of the 
idea as system of relations, as was explained in chapter one. The definition of the idea 
here does not change dramatically from Kant’s: as Béatrice Longuenesse argues, 
‘Hegel recognizes Kant’s merit for having shown that Ideas have no other content than 
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the systematic unity [that] reason brings […],’413 independent of experience. 
Moreover, Hegel agrees with Kant that the idea of reason is the concept of the 
nonconditional. However, Hegel argues that the nonconditional has to be thought in 
positive terms. Reason necessarily has to go beyond experience because experience in 
its conditioning is, according to Hegel, unfree, and as such should not be made the 
standard by means of which the truth is judged. According to Hegel, ‘only that has 
conditions which essentially refers to an objectivity that it does not determine itself 
but which still stands over against it in the form of indifference and externality […].’414 
Moreover, something actually existing might not be “true,” in the sense that it might 
not live up to or be in accordance with its concept. Hegel writes, for instance, that ‘the 
state and the church cease to exist in concreto when the unity of their concept and their 
reality is dissolved.’415 In these instances, the empirical objects under consideration 
do not ‘have their concept concretely existing in them in its own free form.’416 
Objective validity therefore needs to be determined differently, not only by reference 
to empirical experience. 
 
By referring to the unity of the concept and its reality, conceptual freedom is being 
gained. Yet, at the same time, precisely ‘because of the freedom which the concept 
has attained in it, [the idea] also has the most stubborn opposition within it.’417 Hegel 
argues that ‘its repose consists in the assurance and the certainty with which it eternally 
generates that opposition and eternally overcomes it, and in it rejoins itself.’418 While 
Hegel does not explain the source of this assurance and certainty, it can arguably only 
lie in its pure, logical nature. Since the conceptual law only is what it does (Thätigkeit), 
all opposition at the level of logic comes only from within itself. As idea, the concept 
is ‘active principle’419 and thus plays a determining role. The universal exists here not 
as law, but is, what I would like to call, performative. Performative because the law 
itself is defined as activity (of form). This will be further defined in the following. 
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The universal does not pre-exist its own doing and is nothing other than its “act” 
(Thätigkeit). This law, Hegel argues, is not imposed on the particular from above, but 
is internal to it. For this reason, the idea is the concept in its free shape. It still 
determines its object, but without thereby enforcing a universal form from the outside. 
Rather than being subsumed under it, the object performs the universal law and in so 
doing can’t be distinguished from it. And yet, despite the freedom that is apparently 
gained, in the last chapter of the Logic Hegel still draws on the vocabulary of 
resistance, subjection and force in his definition of the idea as absolute method. 
 
Thinking the concept as method: performativity as conceptual form 
 
According to Hegel, to truly think the idea, ‘[w]hat is left to be considered here, 
therefore, is thus not a content as such, but the universal character of its form – that is, 
method.’420 While what came before was already a consideration of form, since logic, 
according to Hegel, addresses the concept only in its “pure essence” without 
considering its empirical determinations, meaning that it considers it in its form, the 
Logic until now had not explicitly addressed itself as such, that is, as a discourse on 
conceptual form, which Hegel also names “method”. In his discourse on absolute 
method, Hegel conceptualises a relation between concept and reality, which can only 
be called performative. 
 
Method, Hegel writes, ‘may appear at first to be just the manner in which cognition 
proceeds, and this is in fact its nature.’421 Hegel ends his Science of Logic as did Kant 
his Critique of Pure Reason: with a Methodenlehre, a doctrine of method. Kant defines 
the transcendental doctrine of method as ‘the determination of the formal conditions 
of a complete system of pure reason,’422 a definition that the Science of Logic 
reinterprets in its own right. Despite this reference to Kant and the acknowledgement 
that it is Kant who recognises dialectics as necessary and internal to reason itself,423 
Hegel does not further orient this chapter by the first Critique. Only the demand to 
think pure reason as system, that is, to think the concept as idea, is taken on. The 
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Kantian demarcation of the ‘Doctrine of Method’ into discipline, canon, architectonic 
and history,424 however, becomes obsolete in the Logic. While it might be argued that 
the entire Hegelian project is a reflection on the historicity of reason and thus a re-
elaboration of the final Kantian subdivision of the Methodenlehre, the function of the 
concluding chapter of the Logic is not primarily to develop an account of the history 
of conceptual thought. Rather than elaborating a concept of history as internal to 
reason, what is produced is a concept of the performative as a new definition of being. 
 
Method, according to Hegel, is not just a question of cognition, but equally designates 
a concept of being. While as a mode of knowing the concept as idea allows, following 
Kant, for the systematic determination of relations, an equivalent definition of method 
as mode of being is developed in the Logic. For this reason, the introduction of a new 
term becomes necessary. It will be argued here that the concept as idea, as it relates to 
being, is performative. While Hegel himself does not employ the notion of the 
performative or of performativity in this last chapter, there are concepts with an 
analogous purpose and meaning. The concept of “activity” (Thätigkeit), for instance, 
fulfils a similar function, as well as the notion of “actuality” (Wirklichkeit) that is 
employed by Hegel throughout the Logic as well as the Phenomenology. In the 
Phenomenology, moreover, the concept of expression (Ausdruck/ausdrücken), a key 
term in the chapter on ‘Force and the Understanding,’ seems to designate a 
“performative” term.  
 
While the verb ‘to perform’ is employed several times in the English translation of the 
Logic, no conception of performativity is developed at these points. As Martin 
Donougho argues, if we are to speak of a “performative” element in Hegel’s text, ‘it 
must be reconstructed, found between or behind the lines.’425 It is thus not the exact 
word but the thought of performativity that is – tentatively – introduced at the end of 
the Logic. By announcing this new concept that seems to aptly summarise a whole 
range of Hegelian claims and terms into one, is the text being reduced, distorted, 
undone? There is arguably a danger in inserting a new term into the Hegelian system 
– of suggesting that a term is present but is not being named as such. Does the 
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introduction of a new term mean that we move out of the Hegelian system? If so, how 
and in what way are we moving out? To answer this question, Hegel’s concept of 
method demands further reflection. 
Method, according to the Logic, is primarily a question of form, and more precisely 
of the form of the concept: ‘If the content is again assumed as given to the method and 
of a nature of its own, then method, so understood, is just like the logical realm in 
general a merely external form.’426 What is left to be considered in the last chapter ‘is 
thus not a content as such, but the universal character of its [the concept’s] form – that 
is, method.’427 Conceptual universality has no content so to speak. What is defined as 
method ‘here is only the movement of the concept itself,’428 that is, nothing but the 
manner of its own proceeding. Method, Hegel writes, is to be thought as 
universal/general “activity” (Thätigkeit).429 Thinking the concept as method, 
Thätigkeit (activity) is introduced as conceptual form. It is ‘the universal, internal and 
external mode,’ the manner of things and of cognition alike.430 Defined as 
“Thätigkeit,” conceptual form, Hegel argues, truly is ‘the soul of all objectivity.’431 
Instead of a table of categories (pure concepts) and of judgement which would, from 
the outside, establish the rules of generality/universality, and outline the form of an 
object in general and the forms of thought as they relate to all general objects, the 
emphasis is here instead on a general activity. This is the Hegelian rewriting of the 
universal law. According to Hegel, only when the concept is defined as the activity of 
form is the true meaning of conceptual universality being thought, for we can finally 
– and only at this point – draw the conclusion that ‘the concept is all.’432 Despite the 
discovery of a new universal law in the realm of logic, a tension manifests itself. This 
is because the language of resistance and force reappears in the final chapter of the 
Logic. 
The language of ‘Objectivity’ seems to be in tension with the general/universal 
(allgemein) and absolute (absolut) nature of the method here defined. Nothing can 
                                                     
426 Hegel, Science of Logic, 736. 
427 Ibid. 
428 Ibid., 737. 
429 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik: Zweiter Band, 238; Hegel, Science of Logic, 737. 
430 Hegel, Sscience of Logic, 737. 
431 Ibid., 736. 
432 Ibid., 737. 
 124 
‘offer resistance.’433 Everything is to be ‘completely subjugated to the method’ for 
otherwise it cannot be ‘conceived and known in its truth.’434 Even though it is the 
concept that is now thought as the forceful power which cannot be resisted,435 these 
formulations call into question the transparent nature of the concept and its alleged 
generality/universality. It becomes evident that the universal law is a question of 
power, even in its final definition as absolute method. The end is both a moment of 
force but equally of non-foundation, which then allows, as will become evident 
throughout the text, for the moment of force to arise.  
What has been demonstrated so far, according to Hegel, is ‘that no given object is 
capable of being the foundation to which the absolute form would relate as only an 
external and accidental determination.’436 All objects or shapes of a given content 
which have come up for consideration have shown their transitoriness and untruth.437 
The object of knowledge, Hegel concludes, has no ultimate independence and thus no 
foundation that would be entirely distinct from the structures of cognition. Equally, 
however, there has been, in the course of the Logic, no a priori independence of the 
forms of cognition that could be sustained distinct from their object. No foundation of 
the object of knowledge and no ground of cognition is gained. Transition and untruth 
– Übergang und Unwahrheit438 – mark every fixed object and form of thought. In the 
end, only performativity is ground. It is only the idea as method, in other words, 
‘absolute form,’ ‘that has proved itself to be the absolute foundation and the ultimate 
truth.’439 This, Hegel suggests, is to be considered as the truer meaning of 
universality.440 
What remains in tension is on the one hand the definition of generality/universality as 
the ‘method proper to each and every fact,’441 a definition that suggests that the self-
performance of every thing and thought is to come to the fore, and, on the other hand, 
statements proclaiming that there is nothing that ‘could not be penetrated’442 by the 
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absolute method. The latter statements introduce a notion of external force and even 
threat. In tension, in other words, is the supposedly free performativity of the object 
of thought and of thought itself, the repeated assurance that all that is considered under 
the heading of method is the self-movement of form and, by contrast, the vocabulary 
of subjection. What exactly is, at this point, ‘free of restrictions’?443 This remains 
unclear.  
Reason, analogous to method, names the truthful determination of both being and 
thought, and thus is one of these terms that does not indicate or decide which power – 
to perform or to subjugate – is really at stake. It remains undecided whether 
performativity or subjection comes to be the determination of universality itself. Or 
maybe it is this ambivalence that is ‘the pure correspondence of the concept and its 
reality,’444 and thus is what the universal law, if defined as activity (Thätigkeit) of 
form, really looks like. Reintroducing in the final chapter the concept of force, Hegel 
assures us that all force (Kraft) is now in the right place. And yet, a feeling of unease 
remains. 
Nothing is decided at this point. What follows in the Logic is a treatise on the history 
and notion of dialectics that unfolds over several pages. Hegel outlines that ‘all 
oppositions that are assumed as fixed, as for example the finite and the infinite, the 
singular and the universal,’445 are in fact, on closer examination, dialectical by nature. 
They are, Hegel writes, ‘transitions in and for themselves.’446 Transition 
(Uebergang/Uebergehen), which signifies the movement of negative dialectics 
throughout the Logic, is up until this point the central mediating term. The problem 
with previous critiques of dialectics is, Hegel argues, the ‘fundamental prejudice […] 
that dialectic has only a negative result.’447 While contradiction is thought in 
philosophy, it is not recognised as ‘the essential moment,’448 and thus negativity, 
which according to Hegel constitutes a ‘turning point’,449 remains here abstract 
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negation. Transitions are, according to Hegel, ‘the innermost source of all activity 
[Thätigkeit].’450  
Yet, since negative dialectics has to become positive, transition as a term will have to 
be replaced or substituted for another, more speculative word. This negative of the 
negative is the sublating of contradiction which constitutes ‘the innermost, objective 
moment of the life of spirit by virtue of which a subject is a person, is free’.451 The 
German does not use the word ‘is’ twice but simply reads wodurch ein Subject, 
Person, Freyes ist;452 literally translated as ‘whereby a subject, person, free(dom) is.’ 
Transition, the innermost source, reaches its innermost objective moment in sublation, 
where – somehow – the possibility of freedom, which remained in question up until 
this point, is finally achieved. An enumeration that is also a forward movement, and 
that proceeds from one term to another without the interruption of a verb, is a 
reiteration of the opening to the Logic that starts with ‘being, pure being, without any 
further determination.’453 What is announced here is a new immediacy where what is, 
is now – almost – all at once. Further enumerations will follow, instantiating in 
language the new immediacy that is to be achieved in the last chapter. It is only at this 
point that sublation is explained outside of a passing remark. 
With reference to the speculative sentence,454 which was first introduced in the preface 
to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel explains that sublation is to be understood as a 
speculative term. The speculative sentence, the performative nature of which will be 
further explained in chapter six, links the very beginning and the conclusion of Hegel’s 
two published books. That which is sublated, Hegel argues, is, as result, ‘not a dormant 
third but […] self-mediating movement and activity [Thätigkeit].’455 Only as such a 
result can pure form have content and become method properly so called. Following 
Hegel, ‘method itself expands with this moment into a system.’456 System is proposed 
by Hegel as the determinate result of the movement of form. It is the content of form, 
or form-content, that is purely logical and yet is not abstract but concrete. Thinking 
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the concept as method is thinking form as performativity (form) and thinking 
performativity as system (form-content). This, however, is not the final conclusion to 
absolute method. The determination of form, its performance as self-mediating 
Thätigkeit is, Hegel immediately interjects, ‘equally the sublated determinateness, and 
hence also the restoration of the first immediacy in which it began. This it 
accomplishes as a system of totality. We now have to consider it in this 
determination,’457 which means a return to the chapters on ‘Objectivity’. 
The determination of totality as system does not yet, Hegel argues, take into account 
that every determination is also a reflection into itself; that each new stage of 
exteriorization, that is, of further determination, is also a withdrawing into itself. The 
greater the extension, Hegel writes, just as dense is the intensity.458 This double 
perspective of the micro and macro is reminiscent of the Leibnizian Monadology, 
where the wealth of the entire world finds itself represented in the unity of the one. 
For Hegel, as for Leibniz, ‘[t]he richest is […] the most concrete.’459 What still has to 
be thought is the return from system to totality, the return to a beginning that is result, 
where the determination of method not just as system but as a system of totality (ein 
System der Totalität) is considered. 
Hegelian performance(s) and dramatic speech acts: From law to speculation 
 
Hegel has already been interpreted as a thinker of performance and performativity, 
two concepts that have been read as internal to and not superimposed onto Hegelian 
philosophy. The Phenomenology in particular has been understood as a book that 
presents itself as, in the words of Bo Earle, ‘a dramatic conflict.’460 In the 
Phenomenology, says Earle, ‘philosophy, in Hegel’s words, “tritt auf,” it literally takes 
to the stage. Hegel evokes philosophy itself as a dramatic character in strife, at odds 
with itself, not yet having achieved what it wants for itself (truth).’461 Its own taking 
to the stage has an effect on philosophy, in that it undergoes a transformation in its 
presentation and argumentation. Instead of simply giving a formal definition of the 
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philosophical problem, the Phenomenology performs it.462 The Logic too, though less 
dramatic, has a performative element as just described. But if the Logic is strictly 
speaking “beyond experience,” at least beyond the experience of consciousness, then 
what kind of performance can we expect to find in this book?  
 
Staging the development of the concept and of conceptual forms which is, following 
Hegel, dramatic in its own right, the Logic moreover elaborates a conceptual account 
of performativity. Already nascent in the Phenomenology, specifically in its rendering 
of language, such an account is now properly developed. By pointing to shifters such 
as “I” or “now,” or indeed to the use of examples, the Phenomenology lets language 
perform the philosophical problematic in question.463 The speculative proposition in 
the preface to the Phenomenology introduces, moreover, a treatise on the performative 
character of philosophical reading and writing. There is, Hegel suggests, a 
performance characteristic of philosophy, which operates on propositions. As a 
complex event type which involves the performance of certain basic acts, the 
philosophical proposition always makes things with words.464 If, by producing a 
logical determination, the philosophical proposition doubles the natural existence of a 
thing, then the power of philosophy resides in the power of such a doubling.465 The 
Logic, drawing attention again to the performative element of language, further 
develops this thought. Hegel elaborates how language explicitly performs the 
philosophical claims that are being put forward. Particularly interesting is Hegel’s 
remark on speculative words, which hold together multiple, even opposite meanings 
in one single term. The problematic of contradiction, Hegel argues, comes already to 
the fore in language which generates a moment of happy surprise. Hegel accordingly 
is alert to the performative functions of language, and an explicit use of language as 
performance466 is what links the two Hegelian acts – Phenomenology and Logic. 
 
In what follows, we will return again to the last chapter of Hegel’s Logic and to the 
particular expression of the performativity of language therein. The chapter on 
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absolute method, it will be argued, should not only be read as a logical demonstration, 
“philosophy properly so called,” nor as dramatic performance in the sense of the 
Phenomenology. Rather, parts of this chapter are presented to the reader in the form 
of a speech act, that is, as an utterance with a performative function. As speech act, 
the last chapter is not merely descriptive but attempts to instantiate some of its claims 
through the very means of their communication. In this way, the immediacy of being, 
the return to the opening of the book, is actualised. ‘Being, pure being’ manifests itself, 
this time determinately, through an act of speech that initiates the Philosophy of 
Nature. It becomes clear in this chapter that immediacy, in order not to be formal or 
abstract, can only be as act (Thätigkeit). The relation between concept and reality, 
which was already at stake in the Phenomenology and which had been posited as actual 
in the chapter on ‘Life,’ is now finally defined as performative. 
 
While Kant defined theoretical reason as speculative, he only thought the ideas of 
reason as a mode of cognition, as the a priori necessary but objectively unjustifiable 
systematic determination of all relations. Hegel’s claim in the Logic is that the Kantian 
limitation of speculative reason fail to think the idea in its mode of being. As mode of 
being, Hegel argues, the idea is ‘active principle.’ The Logic then proposes 
performativity as ontological conceptual form, more concretely, as the conceptual 
form of the speculative ontological Thätigkeit – the idea of reason as mode being. This 
will be explained in more detail in the following through an analysis of Gillian Rose’s 
reading of the concept of the universal law. 
 
Gillian Rose on the law and (abstract) ends in Hegel’s Logic 
 
In the last chapter of the Logic, the ‘Doctrine of the Concept’ is also referred to as 
doctrine of ‘universality.’467 Hegel writes that it is by virtue of sublated mediation 
‘that being, essence, and universality, are differentiated.’468 At the point when 
conceptual form is thought as speculative idea, concept and universality truly become 
one. Under the name of ‘absolute method,’ a new speculative law of the universal is 
proposed. Gillian Rose too, in her reading of the Logic in Hegel Contra Sociology, 
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focuses on the concept of the universal law as it is elaborated in the subjective logic. 
‘The subjective logic,’ she argues ‘seeks to present a different law [of the universal] 
which is not posited but which has determinate existence.’469 Rose’s argument unfolds 
around a reading of the unity of theoretical and practical reason, as proposed by Hegel 
in the final chapters. While her work centres primarily on the ‘Idea of Cognition,’ in 
particular on the section ‘The Idea of the Good’ within this chapter, and thus has a 
different focus from the reading of the Logic as presented here, Rose’s focus on the 
notion of the law in Hegel is of interest here.  
Rose thinks the concept of the law, and the concept as law in the Logic, as a question 
of relation. According to her, the good is the law that includes all relations and as such 
is speculative. In the chapter on ‘The Idea,’ this universal and actual law will finally 
be free power (Macht). As idea, Hegel argues, the law is itself and takes its other 
within its embrace, but without doing violence to it.470 According to Rose, however, 
this law that is both universal and individual has never existed. ‘For, historically, the 
law is either bourgeois law, the universal (concept) which dominates the particular 
(intuition), or the law of Athens, which is individual law, Athena, the goddess of the 
polis, but not universal.’471 Despite its promise, the good might in the end not be 
attained, and if not attained, Rose argues, then it must be concluded that the ‘end’ of 
the Logic, just like its ‘beginning,’ is still abstract.472 What this means is that ‘Being, 
pure being’ is not reconstructed as determinate beginning. The end, in other words, 
does not introduce a new notion of being, since the law of the concept as idea can only 
be thought in the Logic but can, according to Rose, not be instantiated.473 Absolute 
method, on this account, remains abstract. Real actuality, Rose writes, would mean 
real possibility. It would not be unconditioned and inexplicable, but a recognition of 
the totality of conditions, a dispersed actuality that reappears, more or less, in our 
subjective acts and productions.474 
Following Rose, the real possibility of being is only thought abstractly, but as such 
twice. The end, according to her, is just like the beginning. It is undetermined. This, 
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Rose argues, is not a flaw on Hegel’s part: quite the opposite, since it means that 
‘Hegel has not imposed a concept on intuition, but has recognised the abstraction, the 
reality of unfreedom. This recognition itself [then] commends a different way of 
transforming that unfreedom.’475 The last chapter of the Logic, Rose writes, ‘admits 
and justifies this abstraction in the exposition of absolute method.’476 What remains to 
be thought, according to her, is absolute ethical life, the unjustifiable and unstable 
alternative, which is neither the legitimation of ‘something actual’, but not visible, nor 
a new imposed Sollen, ‘a concept which commands.’477  
 
Rose’s reading of the law in Hegel is compelling in that the Logic indeed seems to 
think the concept as law and, doing so, attempts the search for a new universal, thought 
specifically in its logical determination. The conclusion that ‘absolute method’ 
presents nothing but an abstract statement seems, however, unconvincing. Rose reads 
the Logic as the untroubled continuation of the Phenomenology. Both are said to be of 
the same genre and to build towards the same aim, namely a transformation and 
rethinking of ethical life. But what if there is no such common ground between Hegel’s 
two books? If the passage from the Phenomenology to the Logic exposes experience 
to its own impossibility,478 as Rebecca Comay and Frank Ruda observe, and as Rose 
also remarks, then does it not instantiate a radically new beginning? Disorientation is 
characteristic of the Logic, where we do not even know what the precise subject matter 
of the science really is:479 in the words of Comay and Ruda, ‘[n]ot only have the 
established forms of objectivity been systematically dismantled but the form of 
subjectivity itself has been undone.’480 The latter point remains unthought in Rose’s 
account of the Logic. Hegel Contra Sociology does not reflect on the peculiar genre 
of the Logic qua logic, which is why Rose is not interested in the notion of ‘absolute 
method’ as a strictly logical category, that is, as the final determination of conceptual 
form. 
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How does the beginning differ from the end? ‘[I]n the beginning there is no 
relation.’481 While the Logic opens with ‘Being, pure being,’ with the absence of 
relation,482 the last two sections (‘Objectivity’ and ‘The Idea’), by contrast, offer an 
analysis of different forms of relation. The chapter on absolute method is no exception 
in this regard: ‘Relation implies that there is already determination.’483 For this reason 
it is in the last chapters that the thought of relation is really brought to the fore. It is 
also for this reason that the vocabulary of force, violence, resistance and freedom 
becomes crucial at this point. While these terms are more or less absent from the 
chapter on ‘The Idea of Cognition’ that is Rose’s primary point of engagement, they 
reappear, as we have seen in the final section. Absolute method is neither an indifferent 
concept nor abstract, but a re-elaboration of the previous chapters. As such, 
performativity as conceptual form also thinks relation. Hegel takes up the Kantian 
definition of the idea as mode of cognition that allows for the systematic determination 
of all relations.  
 
The determination of form as absolute method has to be understood, Hegel argues, ‘as 
a system of totality’,484 that is, as relational form. For Hegel, however, as we have 
seen, the speculative Thätigkeit of the concept is equally a mode of being. Absolute 
method, accordingly, in defining the law as performative, introduces a new, relational 
concept of being at the very end. As such, the definition of absolute method is not 
primarily, and contrary to Rose, an ethical imperative, but the universal law in its 
logical formulation. While Rose correctly emphasises the political nature of the Logic, 
this aspect of the text is initially to be understood as a question for logic, that is, as a 
question of form. Hegel’s announcement that subjection, resistance, force, and drive 
are at the heart of logical form and characteristic of determinate being needs to be 
discussed in this regard. Maybe Rose, however, just like Hegel, transgresses the Logic 
because there is no other way to understand its propositions and philosophical 
implications. The Logic, quite clearly, demands transgression. It requires a disavowed 
before, the Phenomenology, and a never fully formulated after-life, the 
Encyclopaedia. 
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Concepts that name the relation between the actual and the real 
 
Two concepts in particular, “actuality” (Wirklichkeit) and “activity” (Thätigkeit), 
determine the relation between the concept and reality in the final chapter of the Logic. 
Do these terms coincide with the notion of performativity? And do all three terms, in 
the same way, refer to the idea as determinate being? While, as it was argued here, 
performativity as a term delineates best the speculative Thätigkeit of the concept as 
idea, bringing to the fore its ontological effects and determined immediacy, the 
concept of actuality fulfils a slightly different function. Actuality, as Rose explains, is 
‘[t]he totality or determinateness which is related to others and to itself.’485 If the 
concept is activity (Thätigkeit), and performativity further qualifies the speculative 
Thätigkeit of the concept as idea (form), then actuality more specifically thinks this 
Thätigkeit as system of totality (form-content). Thus, while all three concepts refer to 
the determinateness of form, that is, to its being, actuality explicitly defines such 
determinateness to be relational. Actuality, therefore, is the concept of being, 
announced by Hegel at the end, which as new immediacy ‘is in this form as totality – 
nature.’486 As totality, nature is inherently relational. But the conception of nature and 
thus of actuality already belongs no longer to the realm of Logic. The transition from 
a logical concept of determinate being to the Philosophy of Nature is, Hegel writes in 
the last paragraph of the Logic, ‘to be grasped […] in the sense that the idea freely 
discharges itself.’487 
The Logic ends with the free discharge of determinate being as nature. Hegel claims 
that this simple being to which the idea has in the end determined itself is perfectly 
transparent to itself.488 The transparency of the idea and its free release have to be 
thought together: since all opposition at the level of logic comes only from within 
itself, the idea ‘remains with itself’,489 and in doing so, Hegel argues, is free. Two 
questions arise at this point. First, to what extent is performativity, the Thätigkeit of 
the logical concept as idea, transparent? And second, is this transparency not brought 
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into question by the continuous reference to subjugation, resistance, force and drive 
that are characteristic also of the last chapter? 
According to Hegel, in the absolute Befreiung (liberation/release) arguably no 
transition could take place. In their co-written book The Dash Rebecca Comay and 
Frank Ruda interpret this moment as the definition of a non-voluntarist decision.490 
Catherine Malabou, in The Future of Hegel, makes a similar claim. The free release 
of the absolute idea is, according to Malabou, the work of no-one.491 This is not the 
end of all activity (Thätigkeit) but its most formal or plain instantiation, a declarative 
definition or speech act of some sort. Hegel seems to argue that while the law 
subjugates, performativity is transparent free release. At the same time, however, the 
idea is a “machthabender Begriff,” a powerful concept or one that rules. There is, as 
was noted earlier, a tension or contradiction inherent to the presentation of the 
Hegelian idea. Since the form of the universal law, if understood as performative, is 
no longer external to the content that it refers to, there is no mention of “violence” 
(Gewalt) in the last chapter, only the absence of violence. However, the question of 
“power” (Macht) is still present, which leads to the question of whether the conceptual 
form of being pure being in all its determinacy can really simply be an expression of 
free activity. Though the claim that being only is what it performs illustrates a certain 
transparency, the Thätigkeit of method is at the same time, as the recurring references 
to force, subjection, resistance and drive reveal, not an indifferent “doing”. 
Conclusion: Now we have got a concept of performativity – where to go from here? 
 
Hegel remarks that ‘getting away from the indeterminate beginning, is also a getting 
back closer to it.’492 Since the end is to retroactively construct and to formulate once 
more the opening of the book, a new notion of being will have to be introduced at the 
end. According to Hegel, to understand the immediate also as result is only possible 
when considering the activity of form, which is speculative by nature. Being, 
accordingly, is a question of conceptual form, while form is, in the Logic, essentially 
and fundamentally related to eidos or idea.493 The discourse on absolute method 
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describes the speculative Thätigkeit of the concept as idea which, as mode of 
cognition, allows for the systematic determination of relations and as mode of being 
is performative. The latter definition, which cannot be found in Kant, is retroactively 
constructed as the opening of the book, meaning that ‘the logic also has returned in 
the absolute idea to this simple unity which is its beginning.’494 This, in other words, 
is the positive result of speculation. The pure concept, ‘the simple self-reference which 
is being,’ is now, at the end, also the ‘fulfilled concept, the concept that comprehends 
itself conceptually.’495  
Only as performative can pure being, in the realm of logic, be erfülltes Sein (fulfilled 
being). As pure concept the idea ‘is still logical; it is shut up in pure thought.’496 All 
that has been gained is a conceptual form, that of performativity, as new speculative 
law of the universal. But what to do with this speculative concept of form as elaborated 
in the Logic which is supposed to lay the foundation for the entire Encyclopaedia of 
the Sciences, of a philosophy of nature and of mind? What to make of the Hegelian 
proposition of performativity which, as such, is not a political theory or proposition? 
In the end, Hegel writes, there remains only this to be said of the idea, namely that in 
it, in the first place, the science of logic has apprehended its own concept.497 Nothing 
more and nothing less. 
The concept of the performative, tentatively introduced in the concluding chapters of 
the Logic, gains further meaning in the Philosophy of Right. Operative within the 
confines of the state and civil society, which mutually legitimate each other, the 
meaning of performativity as ontological Thätigkeit (activity) raises further questions. 
While Hegel had already drawn attention to the performativity of language in the 
Phenomenology and Logic, where he demonstrates that individual words and the 
grammar of the sentence explicitly perform the philosophical claims that they are 
supposed to express, the performative power of the speech act has, furthermore, a 
distinctly social and political dimension. Instead of drawing on the exemplarity of 
semantics and syntax, the Philosophy of Right allows for the social manifestations of 
language to come into view. Language becomes discourse. The speech act draws 
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attention to the fact that language is a social and communal practice. The vocabulary 
of violence, resistance and freedom, central to the concluding chapters of the Logic 
and to its definition of speculation and of a performative Thätigkeit, is for this reason 
equally of relevance in the Philosophy of Right.  
 
Here the examples of the state and the sexual relation take on a more central role, for 
they form the two main instances that demonstrate the limits of social contract theory. 
It is these two examples that demand a concept other than that of the contract in order 
to be adequately understood. Hegel confirms in the Philosophy of Right that these 
concepts are central to the definition of both speculation and performativity. In a 
certain sense, the Philosophy of Right situates the theory of performativity developed 
in the Logic. Here, performativity was proposed as the speculative law in its 
ontological dimension. However, as Thätigkeit (activity) of the idea, performativity 
appears to be transparent. At the same time, this transparency is already brought into 
question in the Logic through the continuous references to subjugation, resistance, 
force and drive in the final chapters. By contrast, the performative power of the speech 
act, as introduced in the Philosophy of Right, is not a doing or power that seems to 
come from nowhere. The idea is here no longer purely transparent Thätigkeit (activity) 
or free release but the speech act is localizable. Being historically situated, it requires 
for its possibility a particular set of institutions. With the Philosophy of Right, it now 
becomes understandable why questions of violence, resistance and freedom are crucial 
to the theory of the performative. The question of whether a feminist and queer 
reinterpretation of the theory of performativity is possible, by subjecting the latter to 
new examples, will be resumed in the last chapter. 
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Chapter five 
From speculum to specula(riza)tion: Thought thinking thought 
itself, but through the history of gynaecology and female mysticism 
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Introduction 
 
In the last chapters it has been argued that the appearance of the state and the sexual 
relation, alongside the categories of violence, resistance and freedom, demonstrates 
that speculative or non-empirical reason already encounters political categories and 
that these might be exemplary of its nature. This possibility is addressed more closely 
by Luce Irigaray. In Speculum of the Other Woman, Irigaray demonstrates that 
speculation is empirical, already as power of reason, but also and importantly as 
symbol of power over women’s bodies. Referring to the etymological history of the 
term, Irigaray draws a link between speculation, meaning to reflect, to view, and to 
observe from a vantage point or watchtower, and the speculum as gynaecological 
instrument, which is also derived from the Latin speculum meaning mirror, and 
specere to look at or to view.  
 
While she mentions the speculum, Irigaray does not refer to any particular site of its 
use. In Irigaray’s work the speculum functions as a generalizable trope, but the history 
of the speculum, and of gynaecology more broadly, is immensely complex. If not 
historically grounded, the link posited between the philosophical concept and the 
gynaecological instrument risks losing its analytical and critical power. Having, in 
chapter three, looked at the founding moment of gynaecology in Germany and the 
influence of the concepts of Naturphilosophie on the new human sciences, including 
gynaecology, comparative anatomy and anthropology more broadly, a second moment 
within this history will be analysed in the context of Irigaray’s work. Now the 
reinvention of the speculum by James Marion Sims, the “father” of American 
gynaecology and key figure within American medical history, will be examined more 
closely. 
 
Sims is of interest because his practice and his own self-reflection on his work as 
outlined in his autobiography are, as will be seen, exemplary for what Irigaray wants 
to explain. The speculum represents for Irigaray a masculine philosophical and 
medical gaze and mode of inquiry that claims for itself the name of science. Mapping 
the history of Western philosophy and its power structures, Irigaray demonstrates that 
philosophical observation is a situated knowledge and that the vantage point of the 
detached universal subject of philosophy requires for its possibility a support structure. 
 139 
Speculation is not just an epistemological problem, but, following Irigaray, is 
ontological, though not primarily in the sense outlined by Hegel, that is, as name for 
a generic ontological or dynamic form.  
 
Hegel, as was outlined in the previous chapter, proposes a concept of performativity 
as the definition of determinate being. This concept is to demonstrate that speculative 
reason has ontological effects. Speculation is to be conceptualised not just 
epistemologically (Kant) but also as a concept of a general activity or doing. However, 
according to Hegel, speculation, even when performative, remains at first a strictly 
non-empirical concept or idea. While Irigaray’s work challenges this assumption, her 
claims themselves often remain idealist. By looking closely at the history of 
gynaecology, the following analysis will bring to light the element of material reliance 
of speculative thought, emphasised by Irigaray. This history makes apparent that 
knowledge is situated, that it is always already empirical, as it actively relies on certain 
bodies to carry its truths. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Sims’ work. His 
surgical methods and tools, including the speculum for which he was to become 
famous, were “discovered” through experimentation on enslaved women. Slavery 
provided Sims with subjects for experimentation,498 while his discoveries, allowing 
for the innovation of reproductive medicine, were essential to the maintenance and 
success of southern slavery.499 
 
In the American context to which Sims contributes, medical science is remade 
specifically as a means of population control. Here a biopolitical view comes into 
focus, as will be shown in the following analysis. It will be demonstrated that Sims’ 
innovations, though they transform gynaecology and women’s health, at the same time 
contribute to the maintenance of slavery and to conceptions of sex, gender, and sexual 
difference as inseparable from race. Visibility and ownership, the themes addressed 
by Irigaray on philosophical grounds with reference to the speculum, also meet at the 
site of Sims’ speculum exams. Initially performed on enslaved women, these 
experimental surgeries were continued on poor immigrant women, most of them Irish 
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women at the first women’s hospital found by Sims in New York in 1855. While these 
surgeries were responsible for much of the field’s rapid advancement in caesarean 
sections, obstetrical fistulae repair, and ovariotomies,500 the only women at the time 
who were “helped” by the newly invented gynaecological tools and surgeries – in 
exchange for high fees – rather than “controlled” or experimented on were a small 
group of bourgeois white European and American women. Sims’ work illustrates that 
scientific progress and discoveries rely on bodies and lives that have been othered and 
that the effects and distribution of medical research are profoundly uneven, shaped by 
race, class, and citizenship. It is in this sense that medical science as performed by 
Sims is a biopolitical practice. Reproduction and reproductive care, moreover, as 
Michelle Murphy notes in her book Seizing the Means of Reproduction, are an 
important historical locus for the establishment of biomedicalization and bio-
capital.501 
 
With the end of Naturphilosophie, which, as previously argued, had introduced a 
biopolitical vocabulary, a change in the understanding of science and medical practice 
takes place. Gynaecology, as we will see, is at the forefront of this change. While 
European medicine had previously dominated global Western medicine, by pioneering 
gynaecological surgical procedures American medicine was moving from the 
periphery to the centre.502 This geographical displacement manifests as a shift both in 
thought and in global political power relations. In the course of the following 
philosophical analysis, we will attempt to situate Irigaray’s Speculum within the 
context of this broader historical, political and theoretical shift. 
 
While Irigaray grounds her own philosophical work in part in the German idealist 
tradition, Speculum arguably requires another context. The following analysis 
therefore begins by juxtaposing two key moments in the history of gynaecology – its 
emergence as a scientific discipline in Germany in the context of philosophy of nature, 
and its biopolitical role in the nineteenth century American South. Against this 
background, a more detailed analysis of the middle part of Irigaray's Speculum, her 
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critique of Kantian and Hegelian speculation, will unfold. The chapter will end with 
an analysis of the role that (female) mysticism plays in Irigaray’s critique of Kantian 
and Hegelian speculation. While female mysticism is employed by Irigaray as an 
example for an alternative form of speculation that is neither Kantian nor Hegelian, it 
will be shown that the figure of the female mystic also historically precedes – and sets 
the scene for – the emergence of modern gynaecology. The persecution of female 
mystical practices and writings acts as a precursor to the witch hunts and thus to the 
demonization of both religious and medical lay practitioners, who were mainly female 
mystics and midwives. The professionalisation of medical and especially reproductive 
care that followed and, later, the emergence of first obstetrics and then gynaecology 
cannot be disassociated from this historical moment. 
 
Two histories of gynaecology: From philosophy of nature to biomedicine 
 
As was outlined in chapter three, Susanne Lettow has demonstrated that the emergence 
of a biopolitical gaze can be traced back to Schelling, Hegel and Carus. By centring 
the concepts of life, species, and generation, the Naturphilosophen introduce a number 
of key conceptual tools for thinking the emergence of a biopolitical rationality. 
However, even if a conceptual foundation is developed at this point, Naturphilosophie 
still operates from within a different political and institutional context. Gynaecology 
in the United States differs in significant ways from the naturphilosophische 
elaboration of a general science of woman referred to in the previous chapters. Most 
importantly, the idea of both science and nature is not the same.  
 
For Schelling, Hegel and Carus, nature is understood philosophically as a self-
organising whole, while science refers to the systematic presentation and 
understanding of all knowledge. Even though Carus relies, for the justification of his 
claims about sexual difference, on findings from comparative anatomy, the practice of 
which, according to Foucault, leads to the emergence of a bio-political medical 
discourse,503 Carus still understands science as above all a means of uncovering truth 
about nature and not its governance within a political field. The idea of nature as active 
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principle, as elaborated by Schelling and Hegel, provides the general basis for Carus’ 
theoretical writings, together with the belief that the particular can only be understood 
through the idea of the whole. In this sense, the attempt to provide a systematic outline 
of woman’s nature forms part of a broader project to comprehend – in philosophical 
terms – the working of nature for medical and scientific purposes. 
 
Sims, by contrast, seems to understand science primarily in biomedical terms, that is, 
as ‘the manipulation of life as a means of both understanding it, and remaking it.’504 
Though Carus’ “gynaecology” is not without political agenda, his understanding of 
his own work and of his role as both philosopher and medical practitioner differs 
substantially from Sims’. For Carus medical and philosophical discourses are 
intrinsically related, and his writings address both audiences. Sims’ writings also 
address two audiences. However, these are at the same time more specialised and less 
knowledgeable: medical professionals on the one hand, and the slave-owning 
population on the other hand, that is, a lay audience that has a specific investment in 
medical care. Since health problems proved to be an economic burden to slave-owning 
southerners, as well as to those who had a stake in maintaining a healthy slave labour 
force, the availability of professionalised medical advice via medical journals was 
welcomed.505  
 
It is therefore not surprising that one of the first specialised American medical journals 
would be an obstetrical journal.506 In the south of the United States, ‘[s]lavery, 
medicine, and medical publishing formed a synergistic partnership in which southern 
medicine could emerge as regionally distinctive, at least through its representation in 
medical literature, and especially with regard to gynaecology.’507 Moreover, after 
Sims’ pioneering 1852 article on vesico-vaginal fistulae appeared in the American 
Journal of the Medical Sciences, the number of medical articles on sexual surgeries 
on women published by the journal increased by more than a hundred percent.508 The 
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emergence of specialised medical journals marks a break from the mode of 
presentation and publication of the works of the Naturphilosophen. 
 
Already thinking in terms of the concepts of life, generation, species, and so on, 
Schelling, Carus and Hegel introduce a specific vocabulary and with it a new gaze or 
point of focus for thought. However, biopolitics, as defined by Foucault in terms of 
the politics of the control and production of life, does not just refer to a set of concepts 
that serve as analytic tools.509 As a practice, biopolitics as much involves the 
regulation of and experimentation on bodies. What matters is not so much its “starting 
point,” but that biopolitics is always already enacted. For this reason, to understand 
biopolitics we cannot only think with Hegel, Schelling and Carus. The example of 
Sims illustrates how gynaecology is transformed into such a practice.  
 
Rather than the search for truth or the attempt of systematic knowledge production, 
gynaecology after Sims performs an openly strategic aim, namely that of population 
control. The epistemic virtue of letting “nature speak” is, in the American South, 
opposed to the ethic of making useful, applicable and instrumental.510 It is in this sense 
that Sims’ work displaces the first – idealistic – moment of gynaecology referred to in 
chapter three. In the words of Michelle Murphy:  
 
Instrumentality – what could be done – increasingly trumped abstract truth 
claims as a virtue. Science was remade as a ‘technoscience’ that explicitly 
intervened in the world – treated it, engineered it, built it, experimented with 
it.511 
 
Visualizing Kantian and Hegelian speculation: Speculation as specula(riza)tion 
 
It was argued that the new academic discipline of gynaecology, in the context of 
German philosophy of nature, contributed to the development of the concepts of 
reproduction, generation, sexual difference, race and species. These concepts emerged 
simultaneously across a number of disciplines, including philosophy, anthropology, 
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comparative anatomy and gynaecology. It could be argued that a first elaboration of a 
biopolitical vocabulary within philosophy takes place at this point.512 Moreover, it is 
also at this time that the newly established anatomical research finds its way into 
philosophy,513 specifically philosophy of nature and German idealism more broadly, 
but also Kant’s critical philosophy, as outlined in chapter one. Thus, while these 
disciplines were separating from each other and while the newly established sciences 
were displacing philosophy, certain concepts were developed simultaneously across 
disciplinary lines. In other words, emphasis on these concepts, which are to constitute 
new fields of knowledge, leads to the displacing of philosophy and to the specialisation 
of academic knowledges, while at the same time building cross-disciplinary 
conversations. 
 
According to Foucault, the new sciences of man are ‘under the dominant sign of the 
visible’.514 The anatomical dissection, in particular, treats the body according to the 
demands of a science that is ordered in line with the exercise and decision of the 
gaze.515 By re-inventing a tool for visualisation, gynaecology and the speculum in 
particular have ‘a unique relationship to the art of making visible.’516 The speculum’s 
use and function reveal a broader tendency, namely the logic of visual identification 
and recognition of bodily organisation as described by Foucault. Though her mode of 
inquiry differs from Foucault’s, in her analysis of speculation Irigaray too intends to 
understand the relation of science and visibility. According to Irigaray, the question 
after the conditions of possibility for scientific discourse is a question of speculation 
and the speculum. For Irigaray, this means analysing the role played in science, 
including philosophy, by perspective, vision, and the gaze. 
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As Martin Jay observes in Vision in Context, ‘[p]erhaps nowhere have the problematic 
implications of certain scopic regimes been as rigorously probed as in the area of 
gender, where the notion of the objectifying “male gaze” emerged,’517 for instance in 
the works of Luce Irigaray, Laura Mulvey and Griselda Pollock. Irigaray was arguably 
one of the first scholars in the field of philosophy to investigate its past and present 
commitments by unveiling the effects of visual metaphors and practices on its most 
essential claims. From a different perspective and with different intent than Foucault, 
Irigaray analyses the problematic methodological primacy of the visible. The interplay 
of vision, visibility and mastery functions as a guiding thread in Speculum of the Other 
Woman and is summarised under the concept of “specula(riza)tion.” With this term, 
Irigaray emphasises the visual element in the question of speculation as addressed by 
Kant and Hegel.  
 
On the one hand, Irigaray points out that these philosophers rely on specular effects, 
that is, on vision, perspective and mirroring, in their argumentation. On the other hand, 
she puts forward the concept of “specula(riza)tion” as a critical analytic and, arguably, 
feminist tool, which allows her to render visible the social and political dimensions of 
philosophical discourse. Both aspects will be looked at in more detail. It will be argued 
that Irigaray retains, despite her critique, the concept of speculation; not, however, to 
either secure the unity of knowledge and thus the stability of the (transcendental) 
subject (Kant), nor to allow for the transparent sublation of subject and object (Hegel), 
but methodologically, as a means to visualise what is deemed purely conceptual and 
in this way to open up the possibility of a critical philosophical knowing. In this 
chapter the history of the gynaecological speculum is recounted alongside an analysis 
of Irigaray’s engagement with the philosophical canon, particularly the Kantian and 
Hegelian concepts of speculation. The aim is not to force these two conceptual 
histories to neatly overlap, but to encounter their points of convergence. In doing so, 
we will attempt to carry Irigaray’s analysis further, to do what she suggests but 
ultimately does not do, that is, to visualise and historicise her claims. 
 
                                                     
517 Martin Jay, “Vision in Context: Reflections and Refractions,” in Vision in Context: Historical and 
Contemporary Perspective on Sight, eds. Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay (New York: Routledge, 1996), 
4. 
 146 
Speculum of the Other Woman (Speculum de l’autre femme) is divided into three parts 
of unequal length. Reversing historical chronology, the book opens with ‘A Blind Spot 
of an Old Dream of Symmetry,’ a critique of Freud and psychoanalysis that sets the 
scene for Irigaray’s broader deconstructive project that aims to expose the dependence 
of Western philosophical thought on the construction of an abstract concept of 
“woman.” Systematically analysing key thinkers of the Western philosophical 
tradition, in both a philosophical and psychoanalytic sense, Speculum ends with a 
reading of Plato’s myth of the cave. While the first and third sections are of equal 
length and constitute the main body of the book, the middle section is less known. 
Even on the contents page, this section is easily overlooked. In contrast to the other 
two, the sub-headings for this part contain no further annotations and, taking up less 
space in this way, this part of the book appears to be much shorter.  
 
At the same time, however, carrying the title of the book, this section fulfils a curious 
mediating function. Irigaray here elaborates a theory of the subject and addresses the 
limits of strategic mimicry, that is, the very strategy employed throughout the rest of 
the book to deconstruct the philosophical canon. Thus, it is the only place where her 
own mode of engaging philosophy is not primarily to mime the discourse of different 
male philosophers.518 In ‘La Mysterique’ in particular, by looking at the role of female 
mysticism, a positive account of speculation is developed. 
 
While much of Irigaray’s work is influenced on the one hand by psychoanalysis, 
particularly Lacan, and on the other hand by Nietzsche and Heidegger, and is rightly 
read from within this context, her starting point in the middle section of Speculum of 
the Other Woman is Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and more precisely its 
emphasis on the produced nature of both subject and object. Kant, as was outlined in 
chapter one, inherits this philosophical problem from Leibniz, who in the seventeenth 
century claimed that even the unity of the simplest substance or monad cannot simply 
be assumed but needs to be accounted for. What is constant, according to Leibniz, is 
not substance as such, but the principle that secures its unity. With this claim, as was 
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argued in the first chapter, Leibniz initiated a broader philosophical shift away from 
the assumed immediacy and constancy of being towards an analysis of the 
organization of simple substances and their composites.519 While with Leibniz it 
became necessary to determine those forces that can account for unity, both material 
and metaphysical, the categories of subject and object were, however, not central to 
his thought. Only with Kant, and with the transfiguration of metaphysics into 
epistemology, did the question of the production of unity become primarily about the 
conditions of possibility of the subject and object, which for Kant are always the 
subject and object of knowledge. 
 
The middle section of Speculum of the Other Woman introduces the concept of 
speculation with reference to Kant and the transcendental subject. The question of 
perspective and visuality that ties speculation to the speculum and links philosophy to 
the birth of modern gynaecology unfolds from this context. While the conceptual 
history of the subject in philosophy seems to be somewhat separate from the question 
of speculation, visuality and perspective, for Irigaray these two histories are tightly 
connected. The real meaning of the Kantian Copernican revolution, Irigaray suggests, 
is not the decentring of the subject, but the subject’s attempt at becoming the sun, so 
that ‘it is around him that things turn, a pole of attraction stronger than the “earth”.’520 
This perspective requires cutting off from empirical relationships.521 It is, Irigaray 
writes, an attempt at ‘[r]ising to a perspective that would dominate the totality,’ a 
striving ‘to the vantage point of greatest power.’522 In order to occupy this perspective 
which is dependent on but at the same time also removed from empirical matter, or 
from “the earth,” the transcendental subject has to ‘specularize and to speculate.’523 
Speculation, following Irigaray, is what holds the subject-object complex together, in 
Kant as well as in Hegel. Because it is a necessary requirement or condition of 
possibility of the subject, speculation and its specific mode of operation have to be 
analysed. 
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Irigaray observes that the production of the object of knowledge in the Critique of 
Pure Reason is highly complex, depending on numerous faculties, operations and 
conditions of possibility. Yet, though complex, these operations are generalizable and 
follow universal rules. According to Irigaray, the origin of these rules is the desire of 
the transcendental subject to know and to fix its world. Irigaray proposes that the 
object of knowledge guarantees the auto-sufficiency and autonomy of the 
transcendental subject. Based on this reading, Irigaray wonders what would happen if 
the object would start to speak. What disaggregation of the subject would that 
entail?524 While it could be argued that Irigaray underplays the Kantian reliance on the 
external by reading Kant as an empirical idealist, such criticisms, even if justified, 
should not lose sight of her broader philosophical project. Challenging her solely on 
the ground of “misreading” the philosophical canon would mean overlooking the 
rhetorical force of her analysis. The peculiar genre of Irigaray’s writing will be 
explained further throughout the following analysis. It will become apparent that 
Speculum is not a standard philosophical interpretation.  
 
According to Irigaray, the concept of nature that Kant equates with the unity of 
experience always already fragments man’s project of representation: ‘The “object” is 
not as massive, as resistant as one might wish to believe and her possession by a 
“subject,” a subject’s desire to appropriate her, is yet another of his [the subject’s] 
vertiginous failures.’525 Following Irigaray, the equation of nature and experience is 
constantly under threat of dissolving. This is because this equation is in truth a 
reflection.526 Since the transcendental subject is not immediately given, it is under 
constant pressure to reaffirm itself. According to Irigaray, in order to remain ever and 
again the same, the production of an object as screen of reflection or mirror is required. 
However, because the object is never a neutral projection screen, the reflection that it 
enables is not without risk. The subject always depends on its conditions of possibility, 
which it also needs to reproduce. 
Irigaray, not unlike Kant, proposes that numerous operations sustain the subject and 
make it appear. Moreover, she recognises the deconstructive moment in the Kantian 
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project. Since the transcendental subject cannot be conceptualised in isolation and 
independent of its object of knowledge, the unity of the transcendental subject is not 
pre-given but is generated or produced. Though this complicates previous accounts of 
the subject, Kantian philosophy nonetheless privileges a very specific subject, as 
feminist and postcolonial critics have repeatedly pointed out.527 Irigaray’s critique of 
the conceptual history of the subject does not deny that there have already been 
attempts from within the philosophical tradition to complicate and deconstruct ideas 
of subjectivity. Rather, Irigaray sets out to explore why deconstruction remains 
ineffective and how it still centres a certain type of subject as universal. 
Irigaray demonstrates, as we will see, that the philosophical subject will in the end 
reassume its stable and familiar place, regardless of how complicated or laborious its 
construction. She thus demonstrates that a simple critique of the philosophical subject 
as male and of the philosophical universal as excluding women might ultimately miss 
the point, for such a critique does not address the actual problem, namely the question 
of how an attempt at decentring ends up consolidating an already known position. The 
task of the feminist philosopher is not to downplay or to deny philosophy’s 
deconstructive moments, but to inquire into where exactly in thinkers like Kant the 
displacement of the subject takes place and when an attempt at decentring has the 
opposite effect, one of reaffirming the stability of the already known. What other 
mechanisms are at work to produce the status quo? As soon as the subject is no longer 
given, speculation becomes, according to Irigaray, crucial. Irigaray writes that 
speculation is, alongside the positing of ideas of reason, the pedestal for the subject. 
In order to understand speculation, a return to Kant, says Irigaray, is required. 
Subject of speculation / Subject to speculation 
 
As outlined in the first chapter, speculation, according to Kant, goes beyond the 
bounds of experience to establish a “focus imaginarius.” For Kant such a perspective 
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is necessary because it allows the understanding, and thus experience, to achieve the 
greatest possible unity and extension.528 Because the systematic coherence of the 
understanding cannot be achieved by the understanding itself, reason projects an 
imaginary point of reference that will bring unity into cognitions. Irigaray interprets 
this to be saying that the transcendental subject, by means of the ideas of reason as 
“focus imaginarius,” continuously approximates its own closure and self-identity. 
This is a strong interpretation of Kant and the following descriptions of the Kantian 
project should be read as Irigaray’s interpretation of the latter. Irigaray, herself, does 
not always make her reader aware – arguably on purpose – when she is summarizing 
and when she is, at times violently, interpreting Kant. 
 
Irigaray acknowledges that the concept of the subject truly changes with Kant. 
According to her, the subject in Kant is fragile because it has to speculate on its own 
closure, which means speculating on the closure of its world. According to this 
account, the subject is never simply one but is ‘multiple, plural, sometimes di-
formed.’529 And yet, Irigaray observes, ‘it will still postulate itself as the cause of all 
the mirages […].’530 The Kantian critical turn, Irigaray argues, announces a 
‘destruc(tura)tion in which the “subject” is shattered, scuttled, while still claiming 
surreptitiously that he is the reason for it all.’531 Destruc(tura)tion alongside 
specula(riza)tion, or cause and effect. As soon as the unity of the subject is no longer 
a given, Irigaray suggests, speculation becomes central. This is why, despite its 
destruct(tura)tion, the logic of the Kantian subject is still the logic of the same, that is, 
Irigaray writes, the logic whereby ‘everything outside remains forever a condition 
making possible the image and the reproduction of the self.’532 
 
According to Irigaray, the following questions arise: What does it mean to bring unity 
into cognition, to speculate on the closure of one’s self and one’s world? What social 
and political consequences does speculation entail and who or what makes such 
speculation possible? Irigaray suggests that the ideas of reason, though not empirical 
in themselves, need to be projected upon some empirical surface. What is needed, 
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according to her, is a ‘faithful, polished mirror, empty of altering reflections.’533 
Women, she argues, come to take this place; they are ‘the matter used for the imprint 
of form.’534 This, however, only works if women do not project or speculate 
themselves in search of another closure or of non-closure. By closure, Irigaray means 
the attempt of the transcendental subject to produce and maintain its unity by reference 
to something external to it. Women, Irigaray writes, must not speculate on the unity 
of their subjectivity, for that would be to challenge the coherence of the philosopher’s 
world. To prevent the mirror from turning into an obstacle of knowledge, the 
philosopher ‘must challenge her for power, for productivity. He must resurface the 
earth with his floor of the ideal.’535 
 
While this Kant, as presented in the previous paragraphs, might be unrecognizable to 
a Kantian, this is precisely the aim of Irigaray’s analysis. Though she offers a careful 
and rigorous analysis, Irigaray does not leave the primary text untouched. For her, a 
close reading does not mean a “correct” reading of the text, one that would leave it 
intact. But what is Irigaray’s genre of interpretation? While Irigaray, in Speculum and 
elsewhere, defines her approach as strategic mimicry, something else seems to be at 
work here. Irigaray seems to write a hyperbolic commentary of the philosophical 
canon. 
 
Irigaray’s interpretation seems implausible at first. Why women? Why would the 
(male) subject not choose a less resistant, less difficult, less hysteric object? Surely 
there are other, better projection screens? Attempting to address these questions, 
Irigaray turns to Hegel. In the famous chapter on lordship and bondage in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel writes that ‘[s]elf-consciousness exists in and for 
itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged’536 or recognised. Mutual recognition, according to Hegel, is 
constitutive. Irigaray similarly suggests that only resistance by another can ensure 
recognition of the self. His determination, she writes, is assured ‘only if she now seeks 
to reclaim his property from him […].’537 According to Irigaray, the economy of this 
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struggle for recognition is what constitutes history.538 The ideas of reason, of which 
“woman” is one, are truly formative. By constituting the unity of experience and thus 
the determination of the world as we know it, the possibility of a concept of history is 
introduced. However, since these ideas come to matter empirically, as they are 
projected on living beings, the struggle for recognition forms a crucial moment. Yet, 
contrary to Hegel, recognition, for Irigaray, is by definition limited. This is because, 
on Irigaray’s account, recognition only works in favour of what is already recognised 
as worthy of recognition. The mirror only reflects back the image that we already 
invested in. Out of a failed process of recognition then develops, according to Irigaray, 
a failed history. 
 
How do we get to the struggle of recognition? From the point of view of traditional 
commentary, the move from Kant to Hegel is too quick. Irigaray, it seems, is 
inconsiderate of their differences and of the intricacies of their argument. However, if 
we think more closely about the genre and style that she develops throughout 
Speculum, it become possible to see what her analysis does. Insistence from within the 
history of philosophy to write and comment on philosophy in a particular way and 
style – that is to say and do philosophy in always the same way – is not simply an 
insistence on rigorous work, but the shutting down of a problem. This is what the 
reception of Irigaray’s work also demonstrates. 
 
On the one hand her analysis is extremely rigorous and produces a close textual 
reading, while on the other hand it is not overly interested or invested in producing a 
“correct” interpretation of the texts at hand. Rather, Irigaray aims to uncover what is 
symptomatic about a certain philosophy, for instance Kantian transcendental 
philosophy, and to analyse whether this is symptomatic for the discipline as a whole. 
Once such a point is uncovered, her analysis starts to accelerate. The individual 
instance, so carefully uncovered, brings to light other instances, which in turn reveal 
an ever broader and interconnected picture. As a psychoanalyst, Irigaray knows that 
an analysis can fail if the interpretation by the analyst is put forward too early or too 
forcefully. Even if an analyst thinks they understand and see through a complex 
problem, analysis has to unfold in all its entanglement and confusion. Similarly, in 
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Speculum, the reader has to follow patiently the workings of philosophy, get caught in 
its abstractions and deconstructions, and experience Irigaray’s attempts at subversion 
through mimicry. While taking her time to analyse Freud and Plato, Irigaray in this 
chapter moves from one thinker to another without warning or introduction. The pace 
is slow until it accelerates, as in the move from Kant to Hegel and back to Kant. 
 
An empirical idea of reason? 
 
There is an intrinsic relation in Kant’s thought between the subject of knowledge and 
the category of totality, since it is only through speculation, that is, by means of the 
construction of a non-subjective, total, or God-like point of view, that the unity of 
cognition can be achieved. Irigaray attempts to empirically ground these terms – the 
transcendental subject, the ideas of reason, as well as the category of totality. She sets 
out to demonstrate that speculation is, contrary to Kant, already empirical. For 
Irigaray, an abstract concept of “woman,” and thus a social and political category, 
functions akin to an idea of reason, which in turn is projected onto women’s bodies. 
This idea of reason is not static. “History” is an empirical and dynamic concept of 
totality; or rather displaces totality as abstract, logical term. In line with Hegel, Irigaray 
argues that epistemological questions necessitate an ontological examination. 
However, in Speculum, epistemology and ontology do not correspond as neatly as 
proposed by Hegel. 
 
In the Science of Logic, political categories already appear and exemplify the nature 
of speculative reason; however, the material element that speculative reason relies on 
is never acknowledged. Irigaray, by calling on the gynaecological speculum in her 
analysis of theoretical speculation, opens up the possibility of a closer analysis of the 
material dependence of speculative thought. In doing so she reintroduces questions of 
vision and perspective, foreclosed by Hegel in the Science of Logic. For Hegel, once 
the ontological dimension of speculation is established, speculation as a question of 
standpoint or point of view becomes irrelevant. The visual element introduced by Kant 
when he refers to the ideas as “focus imaginarius” is deliberately lost in Hegel. The 
thought of speculation dissolves into the question of performativity, the doing and 
undoing of conceptual form. Speculation, Hegel argues, does not require a standpoint 
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or focus imaginarius for its unfolding. This is challenged by Irigaray, who suggests 
returning to Kant after Hegel. 
 
The question after the conditions of possibility for knowledge is central to Irigaray’s 
work. For Irigaray, thought thinking thought itself cannot entirely break away from its 
own conditions of possibility, nor are these, as Hegel argues, entirely internal. For 
Irigaray, specula(riza)tion refers to the support structure that makes thought possible 
and that creates the vantage points of science, both medical and philosophical. The 
gynaecological speculum illustrates this point. Sims’ work, as mentioned earlier, 
exemplifies both the dependence of thought on a support structure and the centring of 
a male scientific gaze. Whether his reliance is the same as Kant and Hegel’s or whether 
it is more specific to the way in which scientific thought postulates requires further 
thought. What Irigaray emphasises, and here science and philosophy are similar, is 
that the eye looking through the speculum sees ‘with speculative intent.’539 Neither 
the philosophical nor scientific views are neutral. As will be demonstrated in the 
following, they each only make visible a very specific subject, while actively making 
invisible others. 
 
Like Kantian philosophical speculation, the speculum, ‘a funnel- or tube-shaped 
instrument that is introduced into a body orifice to allow visualization of the cavity 
beyond,’540 enables a perspective of what was previously hidden or unseen. As James 
Marion Sims, inventor of the modern speculum and father of American gynaecology 
puts it: ‘Introducing the bent handle of the spoon I saw everything, as no man had ever 
seen before.’541 This is precisely the point that Irigaray aims to address. According to 
her, ‘man’s use of the speculum signifies the “masculine” usurpation of the right to 
look at everything.’542 Both the speculum and speculation allow for the creation of a 
vantage point, one that makes visible – primarily to a male gaze – what had previously 
been closed off to human eyes, thus creating a new field of knowledge.543 
                                                     
539 Ibid., 144-45. 
540 Michael J. O’Dowd and Elliot E. Philipp, The History of Obstetrics & Gynaecology (Carnforth: 
Parthenon, 2000), 397. 
541 James Marion Sims, The Story of My Life (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1885), 234-45. 
542 Lynne Tatlock, “Speculum Feminarum: Gendered Perspectives on Obstetrics and Gynecology in 
Early Modern Germany,” Signs 17, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 759. 
543 Speculation, Irigaray writes, is the attempt at ‘[r]ising to a perspective that would dominate the 
totality.’ This perspective requires cutting off from empirical relationships. It is a striving ‘to the vantage 
point of greatest power.’ Irigaray, Speculum, 134. 
 155 
Unlike Kantian speculation, which only creates an imagined point of unity, the 
speculum as gynaecological instrument allows enlightened science to enter women’s 
bodies, making the internal structures of the live woman visible to medical eyes.544 As 
such, the speculum helps to organise and establish the female body as a scientific 
object, particularly the female reproductive organs.545 By contrast, philosophy does 
not want to have to deal with any particular body, especially not the female body. For 
this reason, gynaecology is, as Irigaray observes, ‘no longer by right a part of 
metaphysics – that supposedly unsexed anthropos-logos whose actual sex is admitted 
only by its omission and exclusion from consciousness.’546 And yet, there are striking 
similarities between philosophy and gynaecology. This similarity resides in the fact 
that both have “woman” and sexual difference as their object. There is, in both 
disciplines, a “body” that is ‘specularized through and through.’547 Gynaecology, 
arguably, does not only study women’s bodies, but to an extent it makes female bodies, 
defines and constitutes them.548 Philosophy, in turn, does not simply observe the 
world, but by defining the philosophical subject as male actively constructs it. 
According to Irigaray, philosophy only lets a very particular subject come into view, 
while others are foreclosed. This, moreover, leads to the further foreclosure of all 
questions deemed unimportant by the male philosopher. 
 
However, rather than “making,” philosophy undoes certain bodies, including female 
bodies, which become invisible and, in Irigaray’s words, are turned into a support 
structure or tool for philosophy’s own purposes. In this sense, modern gynaecology 
offers a shift of perspective. This is the shift away from a disembodied concept of 
woman to a biopolitical mode of inquiry. And yet, even though women’s bodies are 
now foregrounded as scientific objects of analysis, the concept of “woman” remains 
abstract and static. Irigaray suggests that while the concept of “woman” had often in 
the past been traced back to some divinity or other transcendence invisible as such, in 
the future its ultimate meaning will perhaps be discovered by tracking down what there 
is to be seen of female sexuality.549 
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Despite these remarks, the ways in which the speculum has historically made female 
sexual organs visible and thus allowed medical practitioners to speculate on her 
sexuality are not documented in Irigaray’s work.  
Irigaray offers a psychoanalytic reading of the philosophical canon but does not track 
down the historical changes of the “ways of seeing” female sexuality and reproductive 
organs and the political and philosophical consequences that such seeing entails. Thus, 
while Irigaray historicises ‘past metaphysics,’ which according to her covers an epoch 
from Greek philosophy to the twentieth century,550 she does not ground her own claims 
historically. Her feminist critique risks being idealist since her claims remain detached 
from their social, historical conditions, and it will not be possible to find a place for 
women to speak if this place is again entirely idealist. The aim of this analysis is to 
confront Irigaray with a historical analysis of those concepts central to her work, such 
as “woman” and the speculum. The following sections offer a first, even if broad, 
attempt at giving an account of the history of the speculum, showing how its invention 
and reinvention within the history of gynaecology has altered previous understandings 
of sex and gender, medically as well as culturally. 
Gynaecology and the “science of woman” 
 
Gynaecology, as elaborated in earlier discussions of Carus and German 
Naturphilosophie, was not an independent subject area prior to the nineteenth century. 
Until then, the care of women’s health was not the specialised concern of any one 
group of medical practitioners551 but was part of surgical practice, midwifery and later 
obstetrics.552 The speculum, moreover, did not belong to the standard practice of either 
of these groups. While the first speculum can be traced to as early as A.D. 97, it only 
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finds its way into modern medical practices with its reinvention first by Joseph 
Récamier and later by James Marion Sims.553 As will be shown, while the speculum 
is an ancient instrument and many different specula were designed and used 
throughout the ages – according to a list published by Ricci 614 different models were 
devised during the years A.D. 79 to 1940554 – its modern material and symbolic value 
is specific.555 
 
The speculum, however, is not the only instrument that made the emergence of a 
“science of woman” possible. The invention of the forceps, which led to the success 
and establishment of obstetrics and to the decline of midwifery, was another 
significant moment. In the seventeenth century, women midwives in Europe were 
losing their monopoly over assisting at childbirth to male doctors.556 Midwifery until 
now had not been considered to be a medical responsibility, but was a lay craft.557 
Obstetrics meant the medicalization of childbirth, marking a first step towards a 
scientific gaze on reproductive care and the female sex that would eventually 
culminate in a “science of woman,” that is, in gynaecology. 
 
The introduction of forceps was significant because forceps were cast as surgical 
instruments which women were disallowed from using. While a scholarly gaze on the 
female sex had begun to emerge,558 it was midwives who were at the centre of the 
struggle over control of reproductive care and knowledge, as well as over definitions 
of “woman’s nature.” Doctors stressed that practitioners of child birth should be 
trained in the new principles of anatomy; midwives, however, were unable to receive 
such training, since as women they were barred from universities and scientific 
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academies.559 As a consequence, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is male 
physicians who have exclusive access to the female body.560 
 
The speculum and the medical knowledge of female reproductive organs that it 
facilitates does not simply amount to a neutral search for knowledge, but serves, as 
Irigaray emphasises, to enhance capitalist profit production. According to Irigaray, 
‘man’s eye understood as substitute for the penis will be able to prospect woman’s 
sexual parts, [and] seek there new sources of profit.’561 These sources of profit are not 
just material but ‘are equally theoretical.’562 Bringing to light these theoretical 
“profits” is what Irigaray considers her contribution. Theoretical profit, it seems, is 
what is gained at the expanse of women as material support. ‘[I]f not only the woman 
but the mother can be unveiled to his sight, what will he make of the exploration of 
this mine?’563 Irigaray sets this question aside. She returns to it in her essay ‘Women 
on the Market,’ published in This Sex which is not One,564 where she turns to Karl 
Marx and Claude Lévi-Strauss to analyse the commodification of women in Western 
European societies. However, here as elsewhere Irigaray’s analysis abstracts from the 
historical conditions that render women commodities. In this essay Irigaray rewrites 
Lévi-Strauss’ description of the circulation of women as gifts and instead refers to the 
circulation of women as commodities. However, as in Lévi-Strauss, “woman” remains 
a universal and undifferentiated category. The many ways in which women are 
rendered into commodities, as well as the fact that some women exploit and thus 
commodify others, remains invisible. 
 
In the case of Sims, theoretical and financial knowledge correlate. The financial profit 
of slavery and, more specifically, the contribution of female slaves to American 
medicine is immediately visible. What is less visible is the role philosophy played in 
this profit-making game. In Speculum, the question after speculative profit production 
remains a strictly theoretical question, to which Irigaray provides a psychoanalytic 
                                                     
559 Schiebinger, The Mind Has No Sex?, 267. 
560 Marita Metz-Becker, Der Verwaltete Körper: Die Medikalisierung Schwangerer Frauen in den 
Gebärhäusern des Frühen 19. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1997), 59. 
561 Irigaray, Speculum, 145. 
562 Ibid. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Luce Irigaray, This Sex which is not One, trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1985), 170. 
 159 
answer. According to her, in philosophy as well as in medical science, man is looking 
for ‘the place of origin, the original dwelling.’565 And yet, Irigaray writes, no matter 
how clear his vision, ultimately ‘the mystery remains,’566 that is to say, ‘the right to 
look at everything, at the whole thing’567 will not be satisfied. However, there is 
arguably more at stake than an underlying search for origin. The example of Sims 
shows what else was made ‘of the exploration of this mine.’ Motherhood and 
population control were central to maintaining slavery in the American South and were 
a key motivating force for the reinvention of the speculum and the experimental 
surgeries that revolutionised the field of gynaecology. ‘What will he, what will they 
[medical practitioners and philosophers], have seen as a result of that dilation?’568 If 
read as a political question, and in the context of Sims’ gynaecological practice, 
another picture emerges.  
 
With the need to produce greater populations in both Europe and the colonies, 
reproductive policies become a central government concern.569 While this concern 
remains, today the containment and limitation of specific populations has gained 
political priority. Throughout the United States, family planning and birth control are 
used to limit the population size of African Americans and other minority groups.570 
For instance, the government funded the first birth control clinics in the 1930s as a 
way of lowering the Black birth rate.571 While it might seem that this policy is 
contradictory with the fact that some states have outlawed abortion, this is in fact not 
the case.572 The necropolitical573 management of black lives continues as the state 
refuses to care how children from minority backgrounds live. Quite clearly the 
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question of population control, of profit production through reproductive policies and 
the construction of a political and theoretical concept of motherhood, is not just 
psychoanalytic. 
 
Reproductive technologies to foster pregnancy are marketed at wealthy, 
predominantly white women, while new technologies aimed at limiting reproduction 
are most often used experimentally on poor women of colour and subsequently aimed 
at them through accessibility and legislative incentives.574 ‘What we witness, then, are 
the twin development of policies directed at desisting fertility in poor women in the 
Third World and medicotechnical at assisting the fertility of privileged, mostly white 
women, in the First World.’575 
 
As in Sims’ times, it is predominantly women of colour and/or poor women who are 
being medically experimented on. In the Unites States, for example, it is mainly 
women of colour who have been sterilised without their informed consent so that 
medical practitioners could gain additional experience in performing tubal ligations 
and hysterectomies.576 At the same time, as Terri Kapsalis notes, ‘[p]oor women of 
color in developing countries are used consistently as experimental subjects in order 
to test new hormonal contraceptive technologies before they are used on North 
American women.’577 
 
Against this background, Gayatri Spivak's question of who the “other woman” in 
Irigaray's work is can be asked anew. In ‘French Feminism in an International Frame,’ 
Spivak looks at the works of Irigaray, Kristeva and Cixous to address their Western-
centric focus in their analysis of phallogocentrism. Spivak argues that  
 
[i]n spite of their [French feminism’s] occasional interest in touching the other 
of the West, of metaphysics, of capitalism, their repeated question is 
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obsessively self-centered: if we are not what official history and philosophy 
say we are, who then are we (not), how are we (not)?578 
 
There has to be, Spivak argues, ‘a simultaneous other focus: not merely who am I? but 
who is the other woman? How am I naming her? How does she name me? Is this part 
of the problematic I discuss?’579  
 
This conversation is arguably missing from Irigaray’s work. It could, however, be 
addressed with reference to the history of the speculum that Irigaray mentions but does 
not properly engage with. Though drawn to morphology, that is, the form and structure 
of bodies, Irigaray is not interested in documenting the social and historic conditions 
under which the body has been constructed and become a central element in the 
constitution of femininity and masculinity. Thus, while she outlines the invention of a 
universal woman that serves as condition of possibility for science, including 
philosophy, Irigaray does not inquire into the historical roots that led women to 
become the object of scientific observation and study. Was this process the same for 
all social classes and strata?580 
 
The history of the speculum and of gynaecology more broadly is immensely complex, 
not only in Germany and the United States, as analysed above, but also in France, 
where Irigaray is writing. In nineteenth century France it was registered sex workers 
who were forced by law to have regular gynaecological examinations with a speculum, 
and who had to undergo compulsory treatment if any irregularities were found.581 This 
law was later established in other countries too. In the United Kingdom, for instance, 
it was introduced in the form of the Contagious Diseases Act, which passed in 1864 
and allowed police officers to arrest and examine women suspected of being sex 
workers. As mentioned earlier, the only women who, at the time, were “helped,” rather 
than “controlled,” by the newly invented gynaecological tools and practices was a 
small group of bourgeois white European and American women. Irigaray’s analysis, 
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despite its philosophical wit and rigor, does not allow for these complexities to come 
into view. 
 
Irigaray’s analysis universalises women’s experiences and thus does not elaborate 
which women are most affected by patriarchal control. This knowledge, however, is 
crucial for understanding how gender operates and for effectively challenging 
gendered oppression and violence. While Irigaray rightly points to the symbolic 
function of the speculum as one of the main symbols of power of male doctors over 
women’s bodies and of male philosophers over the definitions of the meaning of 
justice, ethics, language, and subjectivity, I argue that her own ahistorical analysis 
reiterates what she critiques about philosophy, namely that it makes invisible its own 
conditions of possibility. Irigaray, as was demonstrated, erases the racialised history 
of the speculum that is also a history of class relations, an erasure that is reflected in 
her conceptualization of sexual difference. 
 
At the time of Kant and Hegel, when gynaecology first emerged as a distinct field 
alongside comparative anatomy and anthropology, it formed part of a broader 
discourse on species, gender and reproduction. Now again, in the context of nineteenth 
century American medical history, questions of reproduction and race are intrinsic to 
the development of gynaecology and women’s medicine. The surgical treatment of 
Anarcha, Betsey and Lucy, among other unnamed enslaved Black women, “othered” 
their skin based upon a construction of race but at the same time “samed” their bodies 
for purposes of extracting reproductive knowledge and surgical innovations that could 
benefit all women.582 When looking at Sims’ experimental surgeries it becomes 
evident, as Donna Haraway puts it, that ‘[s]cience projects are civic projects; they 
remake citizens.’583 As in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Europe, now 
again, though in a different context, ‘[r]acial formation theories were being created 
and debated just as women’s professional medicine was developing.’584 
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While relying on the symbolic function of the gynaecological speculum to support her 
argument, Irigaray does not address that gynaecology, which was only fully 
established as a formal branch of medicine from the 1870s, relied during its nascent 
period on slavery and enslaved patients, who were crucial to the work that physicians 
performed to cure female ailments.585 Even on psychoanalytic grounds, Sims’ 
biography would offer a perfect case study for Irigaray, as the following statements 
show. When first employing the speculum, Sims remarks: ‘If there was anything I 
hated, it was investigating the organs of the female pelvis. But this poor woman was 
in such a condition that I was obliged to find out what was the matter with her.’586 
Revulsion with the female body quickly leads to the desire to master it: ‘Introducing 
the bent handle of the spoon I saw everything, as no man had ever seen before.’587 
 
Despite the repeated failure of his experiments and suffering of his patients, Sims does 
not stop operating. 
 
But my operations all failed, so far as a positive cure was concerned. This went 
on, not for one year, but for two and three, and even four years. I kept all these 
negroes at my own expense all the time. As a matter of course this was an 
enormous tax for a young doctor in country practice.588 
 
Instead of acknowledging the extreme suffering of his patients, who were operated on 
without anaesthesia and made addicted to opium by Sims in order to be able to endure 
their post-surgery pain, Sims emphasises his economic expenses and the damage done 
to his social and professional esteem. Sims dehumanises his patients. Anarcha, Betsey 
and Lucy are not always referred to by name but as the “three cases,” while others 
remain entirely unnamed. Their existence is only mentioned in passing: ‘I got three or 
four more to experiment on.’589 When Sims finally discovers a cure to treat vesico-
vaginal fistulas, he remarks that he ‘made, perhaps, one of the most important 
discoveries of the age for the relief of suffering humanity.’590 The racialization of 
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bodies is the condition of possibility for experimental surgeries. While black female 
bodies are othered for the duration of surgical experimentation, once a cure is found it 
applies not only to all women but to the entirety of humanity. 
 
Health care struggles: The re-appropriation of the speculum by the Women’s 
Liberation Movement 
 
To summarise, it seems that Irigaray borrows from Hegel when she suggests that the 
ideas of reason are not to be understood as static ahistorical facts. For Irigaray, as for 
Hegel, the idea is not merely a cognitive necessity but a general condition of both 
being and thought. Irigaray, however, challenges Hegel’s onto-logic. 
Specula(riza)tion is an attempt to visualise speculation and, in doing so, to render its 
social dimensions visible. By centring the question of perspective and visibility, 
Irigaray’s interpretation differs from preceding critiques of Hegel, such as those of 
Marx, Adorno, or Derrida,591 that also question the coherence of the Hegelian system 
and its apparent closure. Irigaray, moreover, asks the Kantian question: under what 
legitimacy does speculation proceed? Is this reason gone mad? 
Since the ideas of reason, though abstract, manifest historically, speculation is not just 
hypothetical but also, according to Irigaray, lived and experienced. For this reason, 
speculation has to be made visible or visualised. Visualizing speculation, Irigaray 
suggests, offers a way to question the foundations of philosophy. The strength of 
Irigaray’s analysis in Speculum is that she points towards the empirical manifestations 
of speculative reason. However, she does not, in her attempt to make philosophy’s 
(material) support structures visible, ground her own claims socially and historically. 
For this reason, her analysis risks being idealist. By using Irigaray’s tools and by 
looking more closely at the history of gynaecology, it was shown that speculation itself 
has conditions that manifest materially. It thus became possible to explain what seems 
to be merely accidental in Hegel, namely the appearance of social and political 
categories in a study of non-empirical reason. 
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The sexual relation that features prominently in Hegel’s work and already appears in 
the Logic is for Irigaray intrinsic to philosophical thought. The weakness of her 
analysis is her unwillingness to locate these conditions historically. Irigaray is not 
wrong to point out that both philosophy and modern medicine construct an abstract 
and universal category of woman, in the case of philosophy as its outside and condition 
of possibility and in medicine as object of gynaecological surgery and reproductive 
health care. However, in both cases the categories of woman, femininity and 
embodiment are more complex, for they do not stop at the creation of a universal 
woman but also, as the history of American gynaecology demonstrates, call for a 
differential notion of womanhood and sexuality, wherein a white female body and 
sexuality is imagined as fragile, frigid and glorified as the norm, and a black female 
body and sexuality imagined to be lascivious, excessive, strong and ultimately 
pathological.592 Irigaray’s unwillingness to account for the many ways in which 
particular women are othered based on class and based on constructions of race and 
sexuality arguably limits her analysis and understanding of sexual difference and of 
the speculative nature of political categories that are inherent to philosophical thought. 
Thus, despite her attempt at thinking the social and historical foundations of the 
Kantian transcendental subject, there remains something static in Irigaray’s response. 
Though “la femme” in French has grammatical consequences and thus introduces an 
important change, the encounter with “woman” in Speculum, which is a conceptual 
one, seems to remain caught within the Kantian frame that Irigaray critiques. 
“Woman,” as we come across her in quotation marks throughout Speculum, seems to 
be an idea of reason in the Kantian sense, and not the Hegelian sense. She, in the 
singular, is the transcendental idea of the philosopher who speculates on the closure 
of his own self-identity and the closure of his world.593 An idea in the Kantian sense, 
“woman” is a static and ahistorical term, a focus imaginarius. Through challenging 
Kant, it is questionable whether Irigaray breaks with the use of the concept of 
“woman” as ahistorical idea. This is not due to her mimetic strategy but rather because 
no new concept of “woman” emerges out of her mime. Irigaray, in this sense, misses 
her chance. In the end, she does not challenge the concept of woman where she 
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demands change, that is, at a conceptual level. “Woman” remains a non-empirical 
concept in Speculum, regardless of how many references there are to “nature,” “the 
earth” or to “matter.” 
However, her attempt to reclaim speculation as a feminist methodology remains 
important and part of a broader feminist project. I therefore suggest reading Irigaray 
alongside Donna Haraway and Michelle Murphy, among others, who also attempt 
reclaiming both philosophical speculation and the gynaecological speculum for 
feminist purposes. It is striking that, in rethinking speculation, Haraway and Irigaray 
raise similar questions. For instance, Haraway asks: ‘How is visibility possible? For 
whom, by whom, and of whom? What remains invisible, to who, and why?’594 These 
are also Irigaray’s concerns. ‘Whose story is this? Who cares?’595 Haraway 
emphasises, as becomes evident when reading Irigaray’s Speculum, that speculation 
is not innocent, even when reimagined within a feminist context. This, however, does 
not mean that speculation cannot function as a critical analytic tool. The task of 
feminist technoscience studies, Haraway writes, ‘is to construct the analytic languages 
– to design the speculums – for representing and intervening in our spliced, cyborg 
worlds.’596 Though she does not consider herself a cyborg, or technoscience feminist, 
Irigaray, it might be argued, puts forward a similar proposal. Specula(riza)tion, 
arguably, is a critical analytic tool – not innocent – but one possible means to intervene 
in philosophical texts and challenge its modes of representation. 
It is productive to read Irigaray alongside Haraway, but also Michelle Murphy, since 
the latter look towards the United States where the speculum became the symbol of 
feminist politics in the early 1970s. In Seizing the Means of Reproduction Murphy 
recounts the history of the United States women’s health movement and the role of 
reproduction for the establishment of biomedicalization and biocapital, as well as 
feminist attempts not simply to critique but to “do” technoscience and thus to intervene 
in the domain of reproductive health. Haraway, too, refers to this history. In line with 
Irigaray, Haraway observes that ‘[v]ision itself seemed the empowering act of the 
conquerors.’597 Since the speculum signifies the displacement of the female midwife 
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by the specialist male physician and gynaecologist, reclaiming the speculum is, 
according to Haraway, an attempt to seize the masters’ tools.598 
However, within the women’s liberation and health movement, the speculum is not 
only symbolic. Offering ‘self-help and self-experimentation practices in a period in 
which abortion was still illegal and unsafe,’599 the women’s movement in the United 
States reclaimed the speculum as medical tool. As Murphy notes, the vaginal self-
exam and group sessions attempted to operate outside of professional and profit-driven 
biomedicine, and in so doing grappled with the role of capitalism and authority in 
knowledge making.600 Taking back representations of female anatomy is here not only 
a discursive task. However, as Kapsalis says, ‘putting the tool or prop of the speculum 
in the hands of the woman client is not any guarantee of control, knowledge, or 
complete agency.’601 Self-help alone is arguably not enough and might even have the 
opposite effect, since, in a neoliberal climate, rather than being empowering, ‘self-
help practices are designed expressly to incite individuals to take responsibility for 
their own health and illness.’602 
While the feminist self-help movement directed medical control in new directions, it 
also maintained liberal notions of individualism.603 The movement was by no means 
unproblematic. However, it offered a rethinking of science, medical practice and 
female embodiment. The relationship of particular and universal, for instance, was 
renegotiated. The movement ‘was concerned with challenging the generalised and 
abstract accounts of female biology by recharting bodies as instances of variability.’604 
It was argued that while the fact of embodiment is universal, bodies are individual.605 
Thus, rather than comparing themselves to an abstract, universalised norm, as might 
be found in a medical textbook, the feminist self-help movement relied on 
comparisons within small groups of women and with each woman’s own chronicity, 
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producing a topography that would allow a remapping of what is “natural” about 
women’s bodies.606 
La Mystérique 
 
We might wonder why Irigaray, in search for a positive account of speculation, looks 
to female mysticism instead of engaging with more recent attempts from within the 
women’s liberation and feminist movement at reclaiming the speculum and 
speculation. What are the motivations for her reading of the mystic tradition, and 
female mysticism in particular? 
 
Though she is never mentioned by name, the chapter ‘La Mystérique’ in Speculum is 
in part intended as a response to Simone de Beauvoir, in particular the chapter ‘The 
Mystic’ of The Second Sex.607 Irigaray stands in a negative dialogue with de Beauvoir, 
who is sceptical of the emancipatory power of female mysticism. De Beauvoir 
questions the mystic’s emphasis on love, which she argues has been historically 
assigned to women as their supreme vocation.608 While de Beauvoir distinguishes 
between different mystics, admitting that some, such as Saint Teresa and Joan of Arc 
were independent thinkers,609 her conclusion is overall critical. According to de 
Beauvoir, while mystical experiences, and even love, can be integrated into active and 
independent lives, 
 
in themselves these attempts at individual salvation can only result in failures; 
either the woman establishes a relation with an unreal: her double or God; or 
she creates an unreal relation with a real being; in any case she has no grasp 
on the world; she does not escape her subjectivity, her freedom remains 
mystified; there is only one way of accomplishing it authentically: it is to 
project it by a positive action into human society.610 
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Irigaray interprets the tradition of female mysticism otherwise. But if she intends to 
salvage the female mystic, and to write her own conclusion regarding women’s 
liberation, why does she fail to cite de Beauvoir? Why would Irigaray not 
acknowledge her own philosophical debts to another woman? It seems she repeats 
what she critiques in the male philosopher. The non-mentioning of de Beauvoir and 
the feminist movements haunts ‘La Mystérique.’ 
 
As will be outlined in the following analysis, de Beauvoir’s short analysis of female 
mysticism can be challenged, since it can be historically demonstrated that the 
discourse of the female mystic subverted gender hierarchies and challenged the 
authority of the male clergy. Mystics projected ‘positive action into human society,’ 
and their power led to a violent response on behalf of the clergy and the state, that 
ended with the enclosure of women and ultimately the witch hunts. Moreover, though 
not always, female mystics acted as a collective subject. Irigaray, however, does not 
raise these points. 
 
What inspiration does Irigaray find in female mysticism? Though La Mystérique does 
not mention de Beauvoir, this is, as Philippa Berry notes, ‘the only chapter in the book 
where Irigaray does not mimic the discourse of different male philosophers.’611 It is 
here where a different strategy and new philosophical proposition can be found. 
Irigaray’s main motivation in this chapter is, as will be argued, of a discursive or 
linguistic nature. Irigaray draws an analogy between the speech and visions of female 
mystics and her own tactics of strategic mimicry, employed throughout Speculum. 
Mystical language or discourse, according to Irigaray, is the name imposed by 
conscious rational reason to signify that which it finds cryptic.612 ‘This is the place 
where consciousness is no longer master.’613 It is also ‘the only place in the history of 
the West in which woman speaks and acts so publicly.’614 Mysticism, like speculation, 
is of a double nature. On the one hand it is defined negatively – its name, as Irigaray 
argues, is imposed from the outside – as a marginal or liminal space that goes beyond 
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the empirical and needs to be contained. On the other hand, mysticism and speculation 
offer a possible space for challenging and displacing social hierarchies. 
 
Mystical speech and visions in turn fulfil a similar role to Irigaray’s mimetic strategy, 
or specula(riza)tion. Both discourses are not freely chosen but arise out of a limited 
context where they can provide ‘an alternative mode of thought for women.’615 Style, 
Irigaray seems to suggest, as well as speech more generally, is not entirely voluntary 
and freely chosen but evolves out of a pre-given context. How to speak and write 
effectively from within a predetermined discourse? The speech and visions of female 
mystics, like her own strategic mimicry, addresses this question and the possibility for 
subversion. At the same time, questions of authority, sovereignty and subjectivity are 
raised. When does acting in public become possible, meaning, when is it effective? 
 
Female mysticism is of interest to Irigaray because this discourse experiments with 
the loss of subjecthood, at the same time as claiming public authority for women. Since 
‘women through mystical experience found the assertiveness and authority necessary 
to speak, teach and influence others,’616 mysticism demonstrates the possibility of an 
alternative discourse where women can speak publicly, and have historically done so. 
Given that the writings of women mystics are among the first by women in Western 
Europe,617 and given that they function as alternatives to the authority of the clergy 
and thus are examples of a successful subversive strategy, Irigaray’s interest in these 
texts is not surprising. In the following, the peculiar style of female mystical speech 
and writing will be examined in its historical context in order to better understand the 
potential of this discourse for a subversive critique of the Western European 
philosophical canon as imagined by Irigaray. This will then allow us to understand the 
strategic place of ‘La Mystérique’ in Speculum. 
 
While Irigaray inserts her voice directly into the mystic’s texts, the following analysis 
makes use of a different strategy in order to better understand the potential of female 
mysticism for feminist thought. Historicizing, or the work of zooming out of a 
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particular text in order to contextualise its language and claims, diverts from Irigaray’s 
immersive rereading of the mystical tradition. This is quite clearly not the technique 
of strategic mimicry. The intention, however, is not to substitute Irigaray’s analysis 
for another approach, but rather to work alongside it, to address its limitations in this 
way, and to collaborate by adding context. 
 
All you need is love? The language and genre of female mysticism 
 
From historical records it is evident that mystical thought was more prominent in 
women’s religiosity and claims to sanctity than in men’s.618 The writings by female 
mystics, moreover, differ in style from those of their male counterparts. The reason 
for this is ‘that women usually wrote not in the formal scholastic Latin taught in 
universities, but in the vernaculars – that is, in the languages they grew up 
speaking.’619 This explains why certain themes are more central to women’s spiritual 
writings. While love and courtship feature prominently in female mysticism, it is 
important to note that the major literary genres available in the vernaculars were 
various kinds of love poetry and romantic stories.620 The vocabulary provided by these 
genres is a vocabulary of feelings. Rather than being “obsessed” with love, this was 
the genre known and available in writing to women mystics who used and co-opted 
this language for their own purposes. It provided the tools and means for their own 
literary experimentation and, importantly, for their claims to public authority. 
 
Moreover, it is notable that in their attempts to claim some authority of their own, ‘[a] 
sharply defined sense of the male as superior was unimportant in women’s writings 
and visions.’621 As Carolyn Walker Bynum outlines, while men wrote about the nature 
of woman and saw gender as dichotomous, women, by contrast, worked with imagery 
more fluidly, and tended to write not about gender but about the soul or humanity.622 
Woman’s sense of self was nevertheless formed within and influenced by the symbolic 
                                                     
618 Lerner, The Creation of Feminist Consciousness, 71; Caroline Walker Bynum, Fragmentation and 
Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone Books, 
1991), 60. 
619 Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, 196. 
620 Ibid. 
621 Ibid., 169. 
622 Ibid., 175; Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food 
to Medieval Woman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 293-94. 
 172 
dichotomies of the dominant theological tradition, a tradition in which the male-
female dichotomy is a symbol for many other oppositions, where notions of God, mind 
and power are male whereas soul, flesh and weakness are female.623 Women did not 
actively contend this religious symbolism. Both men and women agreed that female 
flesh is more fleshly than male flesh, but this led both sexes to see themselves as in 
some sense female, this femaleness being in turn a sign of their humanness and, 
moreover, a means to approach the humanity of God.624 
 
Though these women wrote less in gendered terms, mysticism as a religious practice 
related to gender and had social implications. While mysticism was ‘perhaps 
especially available to women,’625 because it offered a means to claim public 
authorship and teaching outside and alongside established institutions, their means of 
expression, through visions, writing and bodily practices, was more limited and 
precarious than those of their male counterparts. Constraints in style and writing, most 
importantly the use of local languages instead of the formal and more global Latin, 
also translated into religious practice. In basic terms it can be said that men renounced 
power and wealth as part of their religious practice and women gave up and/or 
distributed food. Mystical practices, as Bynum argues, are religious manifestations of 
social facts, most importantly of the sexual division of labour.626 In a world in which 
food was woman’s primary resource, fasting and feeding was an effective way to 
manipulate their environment.627 
 
Given the emphasis on love and courtship in their writings and their obsession with 
controlling food, female mystics are easily portrayed as stereotypical – that is, 
hysterical – females. Instead of understanding their social position and constraints, 
they are often said to take female characteristics to their extreme. On a generous 
reading, female mystics are portrayed as charismatic or extraordinary. Otherwise, they 
are depicted as mad women or out of control. Instead of a feminist figure, the female 
mystic comes to amplify either a stereotypical understanding of “woman,” or the idea 
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of a heroic figure that is centred around an exceptional individual. This forecloses the 
opportunity of thinking a social and collective subject, since the mystic’s experience 
is seen to be deeply personal and private. However, if contextualised, their writings 
and practices can be seen as an active attempt to use their resources to gain some form 
of public authority and control over their lives. 
 
Le Mirouer des simples ames (Speculum simpliciarum animarum) 
 
The chapter ‘La Mystérique’ is indebted to the writings of several women mystics, 
including Angela of Foligno, Catherine of Siena, Teresa of Avila and Marguerite 
Porete.628 The latter’s text is of particular importance. Entitled Le Mirouer des simples 
ames (or Speculum simpliciarum animarum), Porete’s work, which was written 
sometime between 1296 and 1306 and was only recently rediscovered, seems to have 
inspired Irigaray’s own version of Speculum. While Porete was burned in 1310 for 
writing Le Mirouer, which was declared heretical, the book was secretly preserved. 
One copy of the original French was saved after her death by clerics, who transmitted 
the text as an anonymous work of Christian mysticism.629 The book moreover 
continued to survive in five medieval translations; two Latin, two Italian and one 
Middle English.630 For a time, it was believed that Le Mirouer was written by the male 
mystic Ruysbroeck, whose orthodoxy to the church remained unquestioned.631 The 
manuscript was only identified as Porete’s in 1946, by Romana Guarnieri.632 
The popularity and attribution of her work to a male writer suggests that Porete’s 
writing was always more acceptable than her person.633 This will have been the case, 
because Porete was a Beguine, most likely wandering, and thus not connected to an 
enclosure.634 As such, she will have had no formal training in theology and was 
unqualified to engage in a theological position of authority.635 As neither clergy nor 
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lay, married or cloistered, her life and writing openly threatened established social, 
intellectual, and theological boundaries and ultimately acquired for her the 
inquisitorial epithet of ‘pseudowoman.’636 Porete’s way of life and religious practice 
was, however, not exceptional. 
While there were many kinds of pious women in later medieval Europe – canonesses, 
nuns of old and new orders, Beguines, tertiaries, recluses, Cathars, Waldensians, 
pilgrims, ordinary laywomen in shops and kitchens – the contrast between lay female 
saint and clerical male saint became increasingly sharp.637 By the sixteenth century the 
model of holy behaviour offered to the Catholic laity was almost exclusively 
female.638 This means ‘that behind the wide variety of women’s roles a unity can be 
found.’639 In this regard, an analogy can be drawn with the female midwife. With the 
professionalisation of medicine and obstetrics in particular, the female midwife was 
increasingly seen as a lay practitioner who as such had less authority than her 
university-trained male counterpart. 
Both midwives and mystics saw themselves as caretakers. Angela of Foligno and 
Catherine of Siena, for instance, describe their vocation to care for the sick, and 
Hildegard of Bingen was deeply interested in women’s diseases, sexual reproduction 
and what is today gynaecology, and wrote on medical and pharmacological matters.640 
Society expected women to be intimately involved in caring for the bodies of others, 
especially the young, the sick and the dying, and the professionalisation of medical 
care in the later Middle Ages, which established the male control of healing 
procedures, was not intended to alter this.641 Women retained the right and obligation 
to nurse, but their positions became increasingly precarious. Lay piety as well as 
medical practice became female piety and care and, as such, more and more suspect. 
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From the Beguine movement to the witch hunts 
 
The Beguine movement, which developed shortly after 1200 in the Rhineland, 
Switzerland and northern France,642 consisted of groups of women who did not join a 
religious order or take vows like cloistered nuns did, but rather tried to develop their 
own pattern of prayer, manual work and effort of charity, in particular relief of the 
poor and sick.643 These all-female self-governed communities increasingly came to be 
seen as a potential danger to church and state. While they lived a contemplative life, 
the Beguines did not remain in one enclosed space but frequently travelled without 
male permission.644 What made matters worse was that these women, like Marguerite 
Porete, wrote in the vernacular. Not only was mysticism available to pious women 
who were not strictly controlled by a religious order, but their teaching was available 
and would extend to women and men outside ecclesiastical authority altogether.645 
 
As a consequence, visionary women and the Beguines in particular were increasingly 
suppressed: in the words of Grace M. Jantzen, in her Power, Gender and Christian 
Mysticism, 
 
Throughout Europe, the emphasis was on bringing women who sought to live 
a life of holiness into strict monastic enclosure, not allowing them to live 
independent lives which threatened anarchy to the church and to the whole 
ordering of the world.646  
 
While mysticism continued to flourish, the Beguine movement was halted in the early 
fourteenth century by accusations of heresy and witchcraft.647 As such, the Beguines 
were one of the first groups to be enclosed and their persecution acts as precursor to 
the witch hunts and the enclosure of the commons. The figure of the heretic became 
increasingly that of woman, ‘so that, by the beginning of the fifteenth century, the 
main target of the persecution against heretics became the witch.’648 
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The importance of the history of the witch hunts for Marxist and feminist thought is 
recounted by Silvia Federici among others. In Caliban and the Witch: Women, the 
Body and Primitive Accumulation Federici makes mention of the heretic movement. 
However, she does not elaborate that the enclosures of the commons, that is, the 
dispossession of communal land, the discontinuation of the open field system that 
targeted women in particular, and the professionalisation of medicine and persecution 
of midwives and lay healers, was a continuation of the earlier persecution of heretics, 
in particular of the Beguines, whose enclosure and physical containment marks a 
direct attack on the free movement, liberty and independence of women. From the 
physical enclosure of women to the general enclosure of communal land, the forms of 
political control and enclosure become more and more wide-ranging. 
 
Since Marguerite Porete’s burning at the stake in 1310 marks a historical turning point, 
it is of significance that Irigaray would name her book after Porete’s famous treatise. 
According to Michael A. Sells’s Mystical Languages of Unsaying, Porete’s trial was 
a critical moment that led to the intensification of the prosecution of women who 
claimed authority either through their religious and theoretical work or their medical 
work. At the same time as the professionalisation of both church and medicine took 
place, the inquisitorial process was gaining momentum in Europe and intensified the 
prosecution of female mystics, lay practitioners and witches as heretics.649 As already 
indicated, historically there is a link between the mystic and the witch, who was often 
a midwife or general healer. Is Speculum also alluding and responding to this particular 
historical moment? 
 
In order to break with the continuous repetition of what she terms a phallogocentric 
tradition, Irigaray recounts and in doing so re-writes both the history of Western 
philosophical thought as well as Speculum, that is, the mystic’s attempt to subvert 
male discourse. The aim of ‘La Mystèrique’ is to begin to rethink the modern European 
conception of the subject on philosophical grounds, as well as its claim to political and 
epistemological authority. Irigaray presents the problem in the following terms: 
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Given that the horizon line is already drawn, and drawn, in fact, by the 
‘subject’ who defines himself at the same time, in a circularity that knows no 
end except the return, over and over again, upon itself/himself. The problem is 
to break down the walls around the (male) one who speaks, sees, thinks, and 
thereby now confers being upon himself, in a prison of self-sufficiency and a 
clarity made of the shadows of denial.650 
 
The whole of Speculum can be read as an attempt to break down these walls, and 
Irigaray turns to female mysticism as an example of how to effectively intervene in a 
discourse from a limited positionality. Female mystics in the Middle Ages, instead of 
engaging primarily in a critique of male power, for instance of the clergy, created an 
alternative discourse and model for religious teaching and authority. These thinkers 
did not employ binary gender oppositions. What is being proposed in their writing and 
practice is not a simple reversal of opposites but the emergence of a new symbolic 
imaginary. It is for this reason that Irigaray finds inspiration in mysticism, and in 
particular Porete as a guiding figure for rethinking the speculum and speculation. 
 
The chapter ‘La Mystèrique’ positions itself strategically in the middle of the book. It 
is an intervention in the book’s own flow and successful strategy of critique by means 
of subversion, irony and playful illustration of the blind spots and paradoxical 
moments of the Western philosophical and psychoanalytic canon. ‘La Mystèrique’ is 
arguably a first attempt to go beyond what was offered so far, without abandoning the 
strategy of mimicry. What had remained unthought in the previous chapters is an 
alternative approach of philosophical writing and speech that goes beyond a critique 
of the canon, as well as an alternative model of subjectivity and authority. As such, 
this chapter is particularly interesting with regards to a positive feminist sense of 
speculation. 
 
With the exception of the quotes that open the chapter, Irigaray does not mention the 
mystics by name but refers to them by means of indirect quotations and creative 
appropriations of their texts, and thus to an extent erases their individuality and 
authorship. However, she also does not address the female mystic as a collective 
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subject. While there are examples within the mystical tradition of communal living 
and attempts for alternative kinship models, especially within the Beguine movement 
to which Marguerite Porete the author of Speculum or The Mirror of Simple Souls 
allegedly belonged, Irigaray does not engage with these aspects of the female mystical 
tradition. This is arguably also reflected in her analysis of sexual difference, which is 
not conceptualised by Irigaray primarily as a social and collective struggle. 
 
What can language do? 
 
For Irigaray, the main question as regards the mystic tradition is what language can 
do. The guiding question here is how the discourse of the female mystic subverts 
gender hierarchies and challenges the authority of the male clergy. But what happens 
if a contemporary feminist writer inserts her voice into these texts? Irigaray does not 
elaborate on in what sense mysticism evokes different connotations today and plays a 
different role in public discourse and the cultural imaginary. For instance, mysticism 
has been picked up and appropriated by the far right.651 Moreover, in most European 
nation states religious institutions are no longer the main centre of power. As Jantzen 
argues, ‘[i]t was only with the development of the secular state, when religious 
experience was no longer perceived as a source of knowledge and power, that it 
became safe to allow women to be mystics,’ and that mysticism came to be seen as 
compatible with a woman’s role and was constructed as private and personal, having 
nothing to do with politics.652 
 
Though Irigaray does not deny the political importance and implications of female 
mysticism, this aspect of the mystical tradition is not her primary concern. However, 
female mysticism arguably cannot be presented as an alternative discourse and 
celebrated as such without also addressing the difficulties and repercussions women 
mystics faced. The imagery that was employed by female mystics was re-appropriated 
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by state and clergy, most importantly the imagery of fire. In the mystical vision, as 
Irigaray observes, surfaces and spatial constructions collapse in a conflagration.653  
 
Fire flares up in the inexhaustible abundance of her [the female mystic’s] 
underground source and is matched with an opposing but congruent flood that 
sweeps over the ‘I’ in an excess of excess. Yet, burning, flowing along in a 
wild spate of waters, yearning for even greater abandon, the ‘I’ is empty still, 
ever more empty, opening wide in rapture of soul.654 
 
Irigaray here alludes to Porete, who thinks the annihilation of opposites, of the soul, 
will, and reason together in the image of a fire that is completely self-consuming.655 
Fire, however, did not remain the symbol of a joyful, transformative vision, as 
imagined by Porete. Since burning was the prevalent punishment for heretics and 
witches from the twelfth century on, fire came to be associated primarily with 
disciplining and torture.656 
 
Through burning at the stake, the reburning of the charred remains of the 
victim, the scattering of the ashes, and the burning of all copies of the 
condemned works of the heretic, the Inquisition sought total annihilation of all 
material aspects of the heretical being.657 
 
The burning of Porete and her writings was meant by church authorities to send a 
warning to women.658 The annihilation of the soul and oneness with God, expressed 
through the mystic's fire-imagery, was directed against them and materialised in a 
most brutal form. Since female mystical practices and discourses led to the enclosure 
of women and eventually escalated in the witch hunts, to celebrate these women and 
their works also means to think the repercussions brought against them by state and 
clergy. If their discourse is to have any meaning today, it will also be necessary to 
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think the repercussions women face today, especially poor, trans, and queer women 
and women of colour. Everything else would seem irresponsible. 
 
In the Middle Ages, knowledge of God validated claims to public authority. While 
women were mostly excluded from religious and public office, the mystical life 
offered a possibility to bypass official institutions. Mystics claimed to have direct 
access to the divine: 
 
What better basis for authority could possibly be claimed than a direct vision 
from God? By those who accepted it as authentic the authority claimed by the 
visionary could not possibly be gainsaid; and it cut straight across all the usual 
channels like education and ecclesiastical position, rendering them totally 
unnecessary.659 
 
Female mysticism offers not only a model of critique but also a strategy of subversion 
by way of bypassing official institutions of power. This is what appeals to Irigaray. 
But can this strategy still work today? While she points at the transformative potential 
of mystical discourse and its feminist origins, Irigaray does not elaborate what it would 
mean to learn and to borrow from mysticism today. Answering this question would 
arguably involve identifying key institutions, globally and locally, that block change 
today and require some form of bypassing. It would mean to think possible ways to 
overstep their bounds in order to claim new knowledge systems and forms of authority. 
This of course is an enormous task that means different things in different locations, 
and, if not further specified, remains an empty demand. On Irigaray’s part, it would 
mean a more serious theoretical engagement with Marx and the feminist canon, 
particularly with trans, queer and black feminist scholarship. For those engaging with 
Irigaray, it might mean to look more closely at Irigaray’s involvement with the 
Communist Party in Italy, as well as to use the theoretical resources she offers and to 
historicise her claims. 
 
Irigaray nonetheless manages to capture an important aspect of the mystical tradition. 
Offering an intuitive rather than a historically “correct” reading, she might in fact 
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remain closer to the mystic’s intention. Her poetic reading, an invitation to immerse 
yourself in the text, catches something of the mystic’s spirit. Even when her analysis 
is highly abstract and philosophically complex, it remains accessible. For even if the 
theoretical claims are not understood by the first-time reader, something is nonetheless 
being communicated. This is the affective language of the female mystic who co-opts 
official discourses for her own purposes and literary experimentation in order to 
convey her vision. Speculum, accordingly, is a text that cannot solely be read as an 
accumulation of arguments. It is not just the rational claims that carry this text but 
equally its poetic style, that is, the very doing of the writing, the subversion of the 
authors Irigaray chooses to engage. 
 
However, it should be mentioned that not only mysticism, but Irigaray, too, has been 
appropriated by the right. Irigaray is the darling of very conservative theologians who 
use her statements of the naturalness of the two sexes,660 an appropriation which 
Irigaray does not openly distance herself from. Of course, her work has also been used 
for critical and progressive ends. However, the question remains: what in her work 
lets itself be easily appropriated for regressive political purposes? First is the 
heterosexual male/female binary that is emphasised throughout her work. Thus, while 
Irigaray emphasises that she, like Derrida and Deleuze, always takes difference as her 
starting point, she is not interested in any difference, or difference as such. According 
to Irigaray, sexual difference is the most universal paradigm through which to think 
difference, as ‘an irreducible difference between two.’661 When confronted with 
questions of race and trans, Irigaray argues that these may risk focusing more on 
identity, rather than difference. That the categories of trans and race, in so far as they 
have become identity categories, have been violently imposed in an effort to categorise 
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and to differentiate human bodies is not acknowledged by Irigaray. While it might be 
argued that Irigaray’s concept of sexual difference could be interpreted differently, 
most importantly that sexual difference does not have to be binary, this would mean, 
I argue, to entirely depart from Irigaray, who never questions the (sexual) binary. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Hegel introduces a concept of performativity as speculative concept of being. Irigaray 
and, as we will see in the following chapter, Butler outline another way of thinking 
the ontological expression of speculative thought. Butler introduces her own concept 
of performativity, while Irigaray proposes the concept of specula(riza)tion as a 
response to the problematic notion of speculation that was first elaborated by Kant. 
Specula(riza)tion and performativity are intrinsically linked to questions of gender, 
sexual difference, biopolitics and the history of the gynaecological speculum. There 
is, according to Irigaray and Butler, no apolitical, non-empirical power of reason, but 
theoretical reason is still problematic, and is distinct from other types of reason. The 
questions raised by Kant and Hegel therefore still require a response. 
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Chapter six 
A Hegelian speculative ontology? Butler’s concept of gender 
performativity 
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Introduction 
 
The last chapter looked at Irigaray’s concept of specula(riza)tion, which challenges 
the transparency and immediacy of Hegelian speculative onto-logics. Speculation as 
a question of perspective becomes irrelevant for Hegel once the ontological dimension 
of speculation is established. The Logic attempts the dissolution of perspective. In 
other words, it forecloses questions of viewpoint or standpoint, which are deemed 
unimportant for an analysis of the ontological dimension of speculative thought. While 
Irigaray agrees with Hegel’s initial critique of Kant arguing that the ideas of reason, 
though abstract or, rather, purely conceptual, must nonetheless be understood as 
manifesting ontologically, Irigaray calls Hegel’s framework into question.  
 
According to Irigaray – who initially borrows from Hegel to make this point – 
speculation is not merely hypothetical. However, Irigaray poses questions of 
perspective and vision to outline a feminist critique of the Western European 
philosophical canon. In doing so, she explains what appears merely accidental in 
Hegel, namely the appearance of social and political categories in a study of non-
empirical reason. It will be argued in this chapter that Judith Butler outlines another 
way of thinking the ontological dimension of speculative thought. While Irigaray 
transforms speculation into specula(riza)tion, Butler introduces her own concept of 
(gender) performativity, one that relies, it will be argued, on a Hegelian notion of the 
Thätigkeit or “doing” of conceptual form. 
 
In chapter four it was proposed that Hegel introduces a concept of performativity at 
the end of the Science of Logic. Performativity refers to the activity or Thätigkeit of 
conceptual form and introduces a new concept of being. The following chapter will 
draw on chapter four to think performativity through a Hegelian inheritance. However, 
in this chapter, rather than only looking at Hegel, we will also look at an explanation 
of gender performativity as developed in the work of Judith Butler. Gender is one of 
the core concepts of feminist theory and philosophy, where this concept functions as 
an analytic tool to uncover and critique all forms of patriarchal relations. Though 
effective, often no reference to the history of the concept of gender is made. This, it 
will be argued, is problematic since gender was at first a clinical behaviourist category, 
introduced to medicalise intersex- and trans-bodies, and was only later appropriated 
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for feminist purposes. In this chapter I will explain that it is Judith Butler’s rewriting 
of gender as gender performativity that marked a decisive change in the meaning of 
this term. With Butler, and through the notion of “performativity,” gender became a 
philosophical concept. 
 
This chapter will begin with Butler’s critique of Irigaray, and her replacement of the 
concept of sexual difference with gender. It will then be shown that the concept of 
gender, due to its history, is problematic in its own way. A historical account of the 
concept of gender will be followed by an analysis of gender performativity as 
philosophical concept. It will be argued that gender performativity, as a dynamic and 
historical concept that only is what it performs, remains within a Hegelian speculative 
tradition. This is because both Hegel and Butler aim to think a speculative ontology, 
or a concept of being that is not static but is its own past and future acts. This is a 
deconstructive ontology since there is no foundation to being and, in Butler’s words, 
echoing Nietzsche, no doer behind the deed. Performativity as ontology, it will be 
demonstrated, is for the first time thought by Hegel and redefined in Butler’s work. It 
will be shown that Butler’s claims about ontology work in relation to Hegel. With 
Butler however, and against Hegel, performativity becomes a social ontology. 
 
The end of sexual difference? 
 
This chapter begins with an end, namely the end of sexual difference as useful 
framework for philosophical thinking. Butler critiques the concept of sexual 
difference, including Irigaray’s, at several points throughout her work, most notably 
in her essay ‘The End of Sexual Difference?’ in Undoing Gender. This essay, as well 
as Butler’s counter-proposal, will be analysed in the following. For Irigaray, sexual 
difference as a question was meant to criticise what she calls “mono-sexualism.” All 
terms in philosophy and in society and culture more broadly that seem neutral are, 
Irigaray argues, in fact gendered and by default male. While sexual difference is to 
call into question the predominance of male subjectivity, it never questions, as Butler 
remarks, the initial binary of the two sexes. As will be outlined in the following, 
Butler’s main criticism of sexual difference is that it is a static and ahistorical concept 
that cannot respond to its own conceptual history. While Irigaray claims that sexual 
difference is the most important question of our time, according to Butler this concept 
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does not allow us to address what is urgent in feminist philosophy today, most notably 
questions of race and transness. 
 
It is against this background that we must read Butler’s programmatic essay ‘The End 
of Sexual Difference?’ The title of the essay seems to announce a philosophical 
intervention. However, while the reader of Gender Trouble might expect an 
affirmative answer, followed by a proposition for a future feminist philosophy that 
would foreground thinking the historical dimension of political categories, these 
expectations are not met. The question is carried forward into the next chapter, ‘The 
Question of Social Transformation,’ where it will again be partially answered and 
partially deferred. Contrary to the bold title, the essay on the end of sexual difference 
begins in a cautious tone and with a disclaimer. Butler clarifies that she ‘do[es] not ask 
the question about the end of sexual difference in order to make a plea for that end.’662 
In other words, she does not want to propose and enumerate reasons for why that 
framework is no longer worth pursuing.663  
 
Butler outlines and follows Irigaray’s definition, according to which sexual difference 
is not a bedrock of any sorts but is rather a question for our time. According to Butler, 
it is the irresolution of this question that forms a historical trajectory for us.664 But can 
a question come to an end, lose its power and its meaning, even though no answer has 
yet been reached? How does one declare the end of something that one has not yet 
encountered or come to know? In other words, how to critique a non-foundational 
concept, such as Irigaray’s invocation of sexual difference, which ‘is not a given, not 
a premise, not a basis on which to build a feminism’?665 Butler’s strategy is to shift 
the focus and frame of the problem in question. In ‘The End of Sexual Difference?’ 
Butler traces the inconsistent histories of the concepts of gender, sex and sexual 
difference and demonstrates the political effects that these terms have, the real fears 
they cause, the associations and expectations that are attached to each individual term, 
and the misunderstandings that accompany their employment. Telling this story, it 
almost seems as if Butler forgets about her initial question. I contend that this is 
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precisely her aim. Butler remains faithful to Irigaray: she will not declare the end of 
sexual difference. But she will offer another philosophical proposition to keep 
interrogating the initial question. 
 
What interests Butler in the notion of sexual difference is its status as a ‘border 
concept,’ one which has at the same time psychic, somatic and social dimensions.666 
Since sexual difference is neither fully given nor fully constructed but is partially both, 
it registers ontologically in a way that is permanently difficult to determine.667 We are 
therefore best advised, Butler suggests, not to interpret sexual difference as a thing, a 
fact, or a presupposition, but as a demand for rearticulating a specific question or 
problematic, ‘namely, the permanent difficulty of determining where the biological, 
the psychic, the discursive, the social begin and end.’668 It is at this point that Butler 
proposes her own interpretation and departs from Irigaray.  
 
What we mean by gender, she suggests, might be that part of sexual difference that 
does appear as the social, the negotiable and the constructed.669 Rather than contradict 
it, gender interrogates a specific site of sexual difference. It is the extreme of sociality 
in sexual difference. Butler suggests that we do not have to decide whether gender is 
a better theoretical proposition than sexual difference because these are not mutually 
exclusive analytical frameworks. It might thus seem at first that the question regarding 
the end of sexual difference is resolved by Butler in a fairly generous way, by 
allocating distinct theoretical territories and fields of influence. However, throughout 
this chapter and the following, Butler also raises, almost in passing, the question of 
heterosexism and of allyship, thus suggesting that, in fact, we do have to make a 
decision on what sexual difference is and defines. 
 
Since Irigaray’s project, like Butler’s, is one of social critique, sexual difference cannot 
remain a vague and general question for thought but has to be further defined and 
contextualised. Following Irigaray, sexual difference is always already at work. The 
task accordingly is to make sexual difference visible as well as to imagine a positive 
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account of sexual difference that would construct a theory of subjectivity that is not 
automatically masculine. Is a different theory of the subject possible? This is the 
central question of Irigaray’s analysis. Butler seems to suggest that the concept of 
sexual difference remains an inadequate response to this question, because it never 
questions the binary of the two. This binary, Butler argues, is grounded in 
heterosexism. Moreover, by making the question of difference primarily about sexual 
difference, Irigaray erases or renders secondary other differences that constitute 
subjectivity, including racial and class difference. 
 
The question regarding ‘The End of Sexual Difference?’ is followed, in Butler’s 
narrative, by ‘The Question of Social Transformation.’ In this chapter, Butler reminds 
us that at the heart of feminist thought and praxis is the demand for the ‘the social 
transformation of gender relations,’ a goal that we could probably all agree on, ‘even 
if “gender” is not the preferred word for some.’670 While it may seem at first that the 
search for the right word, gender or other, is not what is primarily at stake, it will turn 
out in the course of this essay that differences in terminology are problematic after all. 
For Butler, the multiple co-existing frameworks of feminist theory are not all equally 
suited to transform social relations. They are hence not simply a matter of choice, of 
focus, or preference. Butler states that she worries about the potentially harmful 
character of the frameworks that feminists commit themselves to. More specifically, 
she worries about the stakes of sexual difference, which describes patriarchal 
domination so well that it makes us see that very domination as inevitable or as 
primary, more primary in fact than other operations of differential power.671  
 
This is not the only cause for concern. There also remains the question of whether 
sexual difference is really other to its instituted form, the dominant one being 
heterosexuality itself.672 The question of whether the framework of sexual difference 
can itself move beyond heterosexism and beyond binarity into multiplicity is one that 
Butler interrogates on several occasions.673 Butler, however, makes a further claim. 
She suggests that the choice of frame, of gender over sexual difference, is also a 
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question of allyship. Sexual difference, she writes, ‘is clearly out of favour within 
some reigning paradigms in queer theory.’674 Queer theory, according to Butler, 
describes feminism as a project unambiguously committed to gender.675 Moreover, 
Butler continues, within critical race studies too one finds ‘very little reference to 
sexual difference as a term.’676 This, it seems, is the true end of sexual difference, that 
Butler quietly declares after all. 
 
The philosophical reasons for this incompatibility that Butler detects between on the 
one hand queer theory and critical race studies and on the other theories of sexual 
difference are not further elaborated in Undoing Gender, and thus require the reader 
to return to Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter. Here, Butler argues that the 
category of gender can address what Irigaray wants to address, namely the gendered 
reality of constitutive exclusion. However, gender, as Butler proposes, will not prevent 
us from thinking other social exclusions, such as race, class, disability and sexual 
orientation, as equally constitutive. Butler proposes that gender is a better term 
because of its inherent potential or plasticity to re-interpret and expand its current 
meanings. By contrast, the structuralist concept of sexual difference, including 
Irigaray’s, refuses to engage with and to respond to its own exclusions. As such, Butler 
argues, sexual difference remains static, and consequently fails to address the demands 
of queer theory and critical race studies. 
 
The shift from the framework of sexual difference to that of gender, and with gender 
to a set of interrelating categories including race, class, sexuality and disability, none 
of which are ontologically primary, introduces the concept of “identity” as a key point 
of reference. The question central to Irigaray about the symbolic and structures of 
representation is no longer at the centre of the analysis. The pairing of gender and 
identity as interrelated analytical tools is already announced in the title of Gender 
Trouble which, if read in its entirety, proclaims its concern as being Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity. “Gender” and “identity,” “trouble” and “subversion” are 
aligned and define the theoretical framework and the political stakes of the book. The 
subtitle, however, is only printed on the first publication and disappears from the 
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second Routledge edition that remains in print (and still relatively widespread 
circulation) today. This abbreviation of the original title gives the impression that the 
topic of gender could be discussed on its own terms, separate and distinct from a 
discourse on identification and identity formation. For Butler, however, such a 
separation is, in fact, impossible. Since the concept of “gender” leaves the relation 
between different identity categories open, it is presented as a more neutral or nuanced 
category of analysis, especially when contrasted with sexual difference. However, as 
will be outlined in the following, its introduction was not unproblematic and not 
without a political agenda. 
 
The biopolitical origins of “gender” 
 
An analysis of gender performativity requires a historical and genealogical analysis of 
the concept of gender. “Gender,” introduced in order to name and describe the social 
dimension of human sexed bodily life, was not invented by Butler, but proposed in a 
clinical context. Gender performativity arguably marked a radical intervention in the 
use and understanding of this concept – subverting what was first and foremost a 
clinical behaviourist and, as we will see, highly problematic term, into a critical 
concept and feminist analytical tool, though with its own problems. In order to 
understand this shift in meaning, the concept of performativity will have to be 
analysed, alongside a historical account of the concept “gender.” 
 
As Jemima Repo outlines in The Biopolitics of Gender, ‘the idea of gender was not 
invented by feminists but rather emerged in US sexological studies of intersexuality 
and transsexualism in the 1950s and 1960s.’677 The child psychologist John Money, 
who treated “hermaphrodites” and “intersex” babies, was the first to make use of the 
grammatical category of gender as a clinical and diagnostic tool.678 In Money’s own 
words, gender was given ‘a new lease on life’679 with the 1955 publication 
‘Hermaphroditism, Gender and Precocity in Hyperadrenocorticism’ in the Bulletin of 
the Johns Hopkins Hospital. ‘In this paper the word gender made its first appearance 
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in English as a human attribute, but it was not simply a synonym for sex.’680 Rather 
than referring to the gender of pronouns, gender, as Money conceives of it, names the 
ways that people comport themselves in their roles as boys and girls, men or women.681  
 
In the 1995 publication Gendermaps, Money observes that this new usage, medical at 
first, quickly spread into the vernacular,682 though not without misunderstandings. 
Money, in this later text, demarcates his “invention” from its use in feminist and queer 
studies, but also sociological and cultural studies more broadly. Gender accordingly 
went from being a nominator of types to explaining and regulating the sexual order of 
things,683 but, as Money himself indicates, the concept took on another life, as both an 
analytic category in the social sciences, demography and public policy as well a as 
critical analytical tool within feminist and queer studies. Though a somewhat different 
concept or category in each of these areas, for scientists, governments, and feminists 
alike, the question posed by “gender” revolves around the problem of not only how to 
understand sex, but of how to govern it.684 
 
The question of how to govern sex is at the centre of Money’s research, which is 
mainly focused on the treatment of hermaphroditism, later referred to as intersex. 
Hermaphroditism, according to Money, demonstrates that the unitary definition of sex 
as either male or female has to be abandoned.685 Money argues that the term “sex,” at 
least as it is commonly used, is too narrow to cover the masculinity or femininity of 
hermaphrodites.686 Characterised as a ‘genital birth defect,’687 hermaphroditism is the 
medical anomaly or problem to which Money proposes “gender” as both an 
explanatory response and a clinical solution. In view of this “defect,” which means 
that the sex of the baby cannot be specified – at least not within the binary frame of 
male and female – “gender,” according to Money, comes to signify ‘the overall degree 
of masculinity and/or femininity that is privately experienced and publicly manifested 
in infancy, childhood, and adulthood, and which usually though not invariably 
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correlates with the anatomy of the organs of procreation.’688 While gender is not 
disassociated from the biological factors of sex, in his 1955 article Money argues that 
gender is more connected to early life experience than to chromosomal or gonadal 
sex.689 It is this proposition that is enthusiastically taken up by psychoanalyst and 
psychiatrist Robert Stoller, who popularised the term “gender identity,” as well as by 
feminists in the 1960s and 1970s, often in isolation from Money’s other claims. 
 
Money not only proposes the category of “gender” in addition to “sex,” he also 
redefines the latter. Instead of a unitary notion, Money proposes a list of five prenatally 
determined variables of sex which can be independent of one another, namely, 
chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, internal and external morphological sex, and hormonal 
sex (prenatal and pubertal).690 According to Money, two postnatal determinants have 
to be added to this list. First the sex of assignment or rearing, and second what Money 
terms “gender role” – that is, the private imagery and ideation, and the public 
manifestation and expression, of masculinity and femininity.691 For Money gender, as 
this list indicates, is part of “sex,” one of its seven variables. It is not to be understood 
as a psychological term opposed to the somatic “sex.” It is Stoller who makes this 
distinction in his Sex and Gender Volume 1: The Development of Masculinity and 
Femininity, which separates sex from gender, due to the overdetermination of the 
concept of sex.692 As a consequence, Stoller, rather than Money, is cited in the second 
wave feminist literature on “gender”. 
 
However, though not thought as opposites, “gender” still marks a radical intervention 
in the thinking of sex: Money reverses the categorial order of importance. While all 
variables of sex are important, they are, following Money, not all equally decisive. In 
Money’s work, what is projected as stable or enduring is no longer what was 
previously known as sex – the five prenatally determined variables – but rather the 
potential of every human being to achieve a stable gender identity and role. The 
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potential of this stability, the acquisition of a strong binary gender role and identity, 
justifies, for Money, early infantile correction surgery and pubertal or life-long 
hormonal interventions. It is in this sense that the invention of “gender,” as a variable 
of sex and as potential overall organizing principle, allows for the appearance and 
development of a series of new biopolitical techniques for the normalization and 
transformation of living beings.693 Thus, while Money does not precisely split off 
gender from sex, the order of stability and, with it, the order of importance, is reversed. 
“Gender” is proposed as a response to the question of how to govern (inter)sex. As 
such, gender is not simply an explanatory concept but is a strategic response, invented 
above all to rationalise and correct those bodies which visibly do not live up to medical 
standards. Given this origin, as will be shown in the following analysis, gender has 
been since its birth a site of political struggle.694 
 
Gender is trans-gender 
 
Butler only engages with Money once, in her 2004 publication Undoing Gender. 
Though her analysis of the Reimer case, Money’s most prominent study, is 
convincing, Butler does not analyse Money’s role in conceptualizing “gender” more 
broadly. But why would such an analysis be necessary? If Butler radically changes the 
meaning of “gender,” then why revisit Money? Current debates within feminist theory 
and activism, I argue, require this confrontation. Given the transphobic trend within 
contemporary feminism and, relatedly, the theoretical debates to which feminist 
philosophy has to respond to, an engagement with Money and the clinical and 
biopolitical “origins” of gender seems unavoidable. In other words, since anti-trans 
sentiments are strong within society, taking a stance against transphobic feminism and 
politics – as, for instance, elaborated in the works of Sheila Jeffreys and Janice 
Raymond695 and dispersed online by people who have been identified as “gender 
critical feminists” and “trans-exclusionary radical feminists” (“TERFs”) – is one of 
the urgent tasks that feminists are confronted with today. 
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But while feminist theory finds itself in search of theoretical tools to adequately 
address the question of trans, trans theory and activism can arguably not simply be 
“added” to a feminist agenda. Rather, it will have to be acknowledged and 
demonstrated that trans theory and activism is at the heart of feminism itself. An 
engagement with Money makes evident that no artificial link needs to be constructed, 
since “gender” was in fact from the start a discourse about intersex and trans bodies, 
albeit with the aim to normalise these. With gender being a key category of feminist 
thought – though not the only one – trans and intersex issues do not have to be “added” 
after the fact. Acknowledging the clinical “origin” of gender becomes important for 
this reason. This, however, is not spelled out by Butler. If she were to admit Money’s 
role in coining and circulating the concept of gender, then trans and intersex issues 
would be immediately foregrounded and not, as in the second preface to Gender 
Trouble, only be acknowledged in retrospect, as an addendum to the text. Since 
“gender” as a new category was developed within medical and psychological 
discourses to respond to and regulate intersex- and trans- bodies, an analysis of Money 
must precede a closer reading of Butler. 
 
Money’s publications were singularly influential from the mid-1950s to 1970s,696 and 
until very recently have been the main point of reference for medical theory and 
practice. The concept of gender-identity/role introduced psychological principles into 
the medical treatment of intersexuality, and in doing so provided a link between the 
fields of psychology, endocrinology, and surgery in gender assignment and 
treatment.697 Introducing both a relation and a point of convergence, gender became 
the major sexual discourse of the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, just 
as sexuality had been the subject of scientific and biopolitical discourse in the 
nineteenth.698 It was, however, not just Money that made this shift possible, but the 
historical context more broadly. 
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Naturphilosophie meets cybernetics 
 
As Repo points out, the medical interest in hermaphroditism that gave birth to the 
notion of gender occurred at a time when the West was rebuilding social, political, and 
economic order after the Second World War.699 While the management of sex was an 
integral part of post-World War order, war technology in turn was a condition of 
possibility for new approaches to intersex treatment. Plastic surgery, which had 
advanced in World War I, endeavoured not only to reconstruct broken bodies but also 
shell-shocked minds by means of operations.700 Surgeons emphasised the positive 
psychological impact of their operations, which came to justify surgical intervention 
more broadly. As Iain Morland notes in ‘Gender, Genitals, and the Meaning of Being 
Human,’ the symmetries between interwar treatments for inferiority, caused by the 
losing of limbs in the war, and Money’s advocacy of gender reassignment surgery are 
striking.701 
 
Until Money’s publications in the mid-twentieth century, medical intervention in 
hermaphroditism remained uncommon, partly due to a lack of technological 
capacity.702 While there was an interest in intersex bodies, the medical establishment, 
rather than thinking about possible ways of intervening, had previously focused on 
how to understand and classify these bodies.703 Advancement in surgical techniques, 
the discovery of “sex” hormones, new understandings of sex differentiation in 
embryology, and the ability to test for sex chromosomes all shaped Money’s 
understanding of sex as a differential term and his proposed protocol and movement 
toward intervention.704 However, there was another important influence that might 
seem unexpected at first. Money was motivated in his work not only by surgical and 
psychological innovation, but also by cybernetics, the study of communication and 
control that was first conceived in military research during the 1940s.705 If understood 
as part of the general post-war U.S. scientific context, this influence on his work will 
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be less surprising. As Morland demonstrates, Money uses a cybernetical vocabulary 
of “variables,” “thresholds,” and “feedback systems” to offer a more up-to date 
sexology and to provide an alternative to both psychoanalytic and biological 
explanations of sex, gender and sexuality.706 Given its cybernetic roots, the discourse 
of gender must also be understood in the context of communication, warfare and 
control. 
 
When Money was using the term “gender,” he was thinking of the possibility of using 
the new medical technologies from surgery and hormones as well as the cybernetic 
ideas of communication, feedback and control to modify intersex bodies, and to 
intentionally produce subjectivities in line with a pre-existing biopolitical and social 
order. In Money’s framework, as Repo outlines, the body no longer simply reveals the 
truth of sex; this truth is rather learned and stabilised through imprinting, which in turn 
is supported by surgery.707 Thus, one could argue, as Paul B. Preciado does in Testo 
Junkie, that gender, just like the pill or the Oncomouse, is a biotechnical industrial 
artefact.708 Yet, even though the possibility of a straightforward revelation of sex is no 
longer conceivable in Money’s framework, he does not conceive of a new 
understanding of sex/gender that escapes necessary binarism. Even if understood to 
be partly socially constructed, the body still has to live up to the same preconceived 
standards. What emerges is a new sex-gender regime – the unexpected alliance 
between a nineteenth century naturalist metaphysics of sexual dimorphism, which 
focuses on heterosexual reproduction, and the rise of cybernetics and of a 
hyperconstructivist medical biotech industry, in which gender roles and identities can 
be artificially designed.709 According to Naturphilosophie sexual difference is rooted 
in nature and structures all of human life. Schelling, Hegel and Carus propose, as 
outlined in chapter three, a theory of sexual complementarity according to which men 
and women are not physical and moral equals but complementary opposites. Money’s 
theory of “gender” does not question the naturphilosophische conception of sexual 
difference as a complementary dualism that structures all of human life, but rather 
envisages those clinical, medical, and surgical procedures that will implement sexual 
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duality. “Gender,” accordingly, is where Naturphilosophie meets biotechnological 
medical care. 
 
In absence of another protocol Money’s guidelines were rapidly and widely adopted, 
and, despite challenges from the intersex community, have remained the basis for 
much contemporary thinking about treatment interventions for intersexuality.710 
Money’s work, moreover, gained not only medical but also public recognition. In the 
1970s and 1980s, Money was interviewed in numerous mainstream magazines, 
appeared frequently on television and was often quoted in newspapers.711 In this way, 
his ideas travelled beyond a medical readership. While feminists in the same period 
hijacked the concept of gender as a means to oppose biological determinism and its 
control over women’s bodies and capacities, and while this uptake has resulted in the 
production of new knowledges and of a radical rethinking of sex, gender, masculinity, 
femininity, reproduction, and so on, Money’s influence on feminist theory has 
remained largely unanalysed. 
 
From gender to gender performativity: A question of history 
 
I begin my discussion of Butler not with Gender Trouble or Bodies That Matter, 
though both these works will be analysed throughout, but with Undoing Gender, 
Butler’s further re-elaboration of the question of gender performativity from 2004. 
The reason for this non-chronological approach is that in Undoing Gender Butler first 
mentions and engages with Money’s work and includes trans- and intersex discourses 
as inherent to the question of gender performativity. Until Undoing Gender, Butler, in 
line with feminist theory more broadly, had ignored ‘the medical and biotechnological 
dimensions of gender production.’712 In this book, moreover, the definition of gender 
performativity as a doing (Thätigkeit), as well as an undoing, is further elaborated. 
Undoing Gender accordingly brings together the two separate but related discourses 
that are of interest here, namely an analysis of gender that includes its historical origin 
as a term meant to answer questions regarding the status and medical treatment of 
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intersex and trans people, as well as a philosophical account of (gender) 
performativity. 
 
Butler’s discussion of intersex and transgender activism and theory demonstrates her 
political and theoretical commitment to intervening in and challenging mainstream 
feminist discourses. As with Gender Trouble, which was meant as a critical 
intervention in contemporary feminism highlighting and challenging the fact that ‘its 
own practice sets up exclusionary gender norms within feminism, often with 
homophobic consequences,’713 Undoing Gender shows Butler’s continued investment 
in opening up feminist theory and practice. As she states in the opening to the book, it 
is meant to investigate ‘what it might mean to undo restrictively normative 
conceptions of sexual and gendered life.’714 Though in different and varying ways, 
also dependent on other social factors such as class, race and age, this normative 
pressure effects not only women but queer, trans and intersex people – who might 
identify as women or not, but who have a shared interest and language in challenging 
the violence of gender norms.  
 
Cheryl Chase, a founder of the intersexual715 movement and one of its most outspoken 
activists, points out that much of the language of intersexuals has been decisively 
formed by the history of the gay liberation movement.716 There are, she argues, 
parallels in the process of, and in the public responses to, “coming out” as either gay 
or intersexual.717 This might be, in part, due to the fact that these discourses have a 
shared origin and history. According to Katrina Karkazis, the author of Fixing Sex: 
Intersex, Medical Authority and Lived Experience, historically the emergence of the 
terms of “homosexual” and “heterosexual” coincided with an intense interest in 
hermaphroditism.718 This double concern emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries out of medical discourses on deviance.719 There might then also be, as Chase 
hopes, parallels in the struggle for liberation. Just as homosexuality has come to be 
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understood by many people as a social construct, intersexuality, too, might be 
reinterpreted, from the thought of it as a monstrous condition to thinking of the 
management of intersexuality as monstrous.720 Feminist, queer, intersex and trans 
theory, though distinct, share common goals and strategies. 
 
Butler emphasises that she wants to understand gender historically and biopolitically, 
yet, as Repo points out, she does not look at the history of this term. A historical 
analysis of the concept of gender can be found in Repo’s The Biopolitics of Gender as 
well as in the chapter ‘Technogender’ in Paul B. Preciado’s Testo Junkie. According 
to Butler, ‘[t]o understand gender as a historical category […] is to accept that gender, 
understood as one way of culturally configuring the body, is open to a continual 
remaking, and that “anatomy” and “sex” are not without cultural framing.’721 Butler, 
as will be shown, historicises ontology and presents this as a historical account of 
gender. Her project, in other words, is to construct a concept of being that is open to 
change and that in its definition includes an understanding of social temporality and 
of the cultural shaping of what “is.” Such a concept then serves as a foundation for 
explaining gender performativity. 
 
Butler argues that the concept of gender, if understood through the concept of 
performativity, contains a reference to history inherent to its definition. Performativity 
in Butler names, in line with Hegel’s speculative proposition, as will be outlined in 
more detail, a deconstructive and temporal definition of language and of being. 
Defined as such, the concept of gender, according to Butler, stands in tension with 
some versions of sexual difference as outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The 
sexual difference framework, according to Butler, is unable to respond to the following 
questions: ‘What is the history of this category? Where are we in its history at this 
time?’722 Yet, when it comes to the concept of gender, Butler does not have an answer 
to these questions either.  
 
When Butler emphasises that gender as a concept is inherently historical, her argument 
seems close to Malabou’s conception of the plasticity of form – a means to rethink 
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ontology as always already deconstructed and inherently temporal.723 While she 
makes a convincing argument regarding the nature of the concept of gender, this is a 
philosophical claim about conceptual form and its ontological instantiation, which 
does not translate into a retelling of the particular history of “gender.” This does not 
invalidate her critique of Irigaray and of sexual difference, but Butler will have to 
specify what kind of “history” she is talking about. There are at least two histories of 
gender at stake: one at the level of conceptual form and ontology, which is about the 
nature of ontology itself; and one that looks at and traces the history and politics of 
“gender” as a social category and notes its changing meanings over time. It seems that 
when it comes to gender both accounts are necessary. While Butler addresses the 
former, the latter remains largely unaddressed in her work. 
 
Repo critiques Butler’s emphasis on rethinking ontology, which, she argues, comes at 
the expanse of a Foucauldian analysis of the operations of power that are necessary to 
understand the historical origin and workings of the concept of gender. According to 
Repo, ‘Butler’s gender theory evades these questions of biopolitical strategies and 
tactics that are central to Foucault’s analysis of the apparatus of sexuality/sex.’724 Repo 
argues that, instead of a Foucauldian analysis of power, there is in Butler’s work an 
overemphasis on ‘the rules of the dialectical production of meaning that serves to 
satisfy the subject’s laborious desire for recognition.’725 Here Butler is critiqued for 
being too Hegelian in her analysis. It will be argued in the following that Repo’s 
criticisms are justified, and that Butler does not sufficiently engage with Money and 
the clinical protocol out of which the discourse of “gender” emerges. At the same time, 
Butler’s interventions in ontology are nonetheless important and should not be 
underestimated. Moreover, they do not prevent an analysis of power. Rather, Butler 
should be credited for these interventions. A philosophical analysis of this kind does 
not imply that her findings would be politically irrelevant. 
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The “Reimer case” 
 
Considering ‘the term “sex” inadequate to describe the lived embodiment of those 
whose anatomies are either “discordant” or do not appear to match the sex roles 
associates with masculinity or femininity,’726 “gender” was a term coined in an attempt 
to solve the “dilemma” that the intersex body presented to Money. While in Undoing 
Gender Butler engages with intersex activism, she does not relate this activist work 
back to the origin of “gender,” as a challenge to this origin. Butler mentions Money 
for the first time in Undoing Gender and refers to the Reimer case that is consistently 
used in Money’s publications as proof for his claims. 
 
The “John/Joan” case, as it was referred to for reasons of anonymity, details the 
childhood and adolescence of David Reimer, an identical twin, who in 1965 had his 
penis burned off in a circumcision accident and who was subsequently raised as a girl 
under Money’s medical care.727 While this case was central to changing beliefs about 
the relationship between the social construction of gender and biological sex, Money 
failed to mention that Reimer rejected his female gender assignment as an adult and 
lived the rest of his life, until his suicide in 2004, as a male.728 In 2000, John Colapinto 
published a critical book on the case that sought to reveal Money’s mistreatment, 
leading to a number of angry responses raising concerns about the ethics of Money’s 
practice, but also vindicating biological explanations of gender.729 According to the 
latter critiques, Money’s writing and experiments had done violence to the 
unassailable nature of “man” and “woman.”730  
 
The strengths of Butler’s retelling of the Reimer case is that she makes his story heard 
and questions Money’s clinical framework, which enforces gender stereotypes and 
sexual dimorphism, without however using Reimer’s story for her own theoretical and 
political purposes. What Butler shows is that David Reimer’s experiences at school, 
at home and in the medical establishment shed light on the experience of non-binary 
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and trans people more broadly. Reimer’s experience and double transition is presented 
in its complexity by Butler, who makes no final judgement on whether Reimer is 
“trans” or not. 
 
Reimer functions, for Money, as an example of his own theoretical beliefs. Butler 
rightly observes that in Money’s work Reimer’s body becomes a point of reference 
for a narrative that is not about this body, but which seizes upon the body, as it were, 
in order to inaugurate a particular narrative about what it means to be human.731 For 
Money “gender” describes the social dimension of sexed bodily life as noncausal and 
yet as utterly predictable and controllable. By means of the concept of gender, bodies 
are “normalised” and governed under Money’s care. But why could Reimer not be a 
man without a penis? Or decide for himself, as he later did, whether he identifies as 
male, female or non-binary? Money’s emphasis on “looking normal” not only 
reinforces gender norms, it also leads to early infancy surgery, which might 
permanently deprive a person of sexual function and pleasure.732 The surgery, 
ostensibly for the patient’s sake, is in fact performed for society’s sake, a society 
which, as Butler observes, demands a “normal-looking” body.733  
 
For Butler, the real question is ‘to imagine a world in which individuals with mixed 
genital attributes might be accepted and loved without having to transform them into 
a more socially coherent or normative version of gender.’734 In Lessons from the 
Intersexed, Suzanne J. Kessler makes a similar point: ‘Why are unusually sized and 
shaped genitals not accepted as reasonable markers of gender – gender either as we 
know it in the two-option scheme or as we could know it in a new gender system?’735 
Kessler, moreover, points to the heteronormative bias that underlies Money’s clinical 
protocol. When Money argues that Reimer, because of the loss of his penis, should 
not be raised as a boy but be reassigned the female gender, one of the justifications for 
this decision is that Reimer will not be able to have heterosexual intercourse. This 
supports Butler’s claim that gender dimorphism is inherently linked to heterosexism, 
what she refers to as a heterosexual matrix or hegemony. 
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A critique of idealised gender dimorphism, as put forward by Butler and Kessler 
among others, does not, however, lead to the conclusion that transsexuals should not 
be allowed the right to surgery. The difference between intersex and transsexual 
surgery is that in the first case physicians practice gender upon others – often, as in 
the case of early intersex surgery, without the explicit knowledge and permission of 
the patient.736 In the second case, transgender people, sometimes with the help of 
physicians, practice gender on themselves – they “do” their own gender.737 This is not 
an attempt to violently implement a norm; although this practice also does not take 
place outside of a normative framework. Transgenderism illustrates the malleability 
of anatomy, gender identity and role but, as Butler points out, unlike in the Reimer 
case, malleability is here not imposed.738  
 
What, then, might be the future (of) “gender”?739 Given the various (mis)uses of the 
concept of gender in the past and present that were both medical, as a tool to normalise 
bodies, and political, to advance liberal capitalist policies, population control and 
imperial politics, its critical potential for feminist theory has been questioned, for 
instance by Repo or by Joan Scott in her landmark paper ‘Gender: Still a Useful 
Category of Analysis?’740 Due to the history of this concept, the potential of gender, I 
argue, is that it offers feminist philosophy an opportunity to truly engage and address 
trans-, intersex-, queer-, and techno-feminist demands. Thus, while it is true that 
gender is a problematic concept, and while some feminists have argued that other 
terms might be better equipped or that feminist theory can do without gender, I suggest 
here that “gender” can frame feminist theory and practice in a particular way, 
specifically by foregrounding trans and intersex bodies. 
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“Gender”: Implementing the promise of Naturphilosophie 
 
What do the biopolitical origins of “gender” have to do with the history of 
gynaecology and of the speculum? The two previous chapters outlined the way in 
which nineteenth century gynaecology emerged alongside philosophical theorizations 
of sexual difference, with both grounded in the scientific project of understanding 
nature as sexually dimorphic and, simultaneously, in the socio-political imperative of 
the heterosexual reproduction of the nation’s population. In German Naturphilosophie 
this was done by introducing such terms as generation, reproduction, sexual difference 
and sexual complementarity as key philosophical categories. This was an idealist 
position – a means to order, systematise and to explain “nature.” However, as these 
concepts were taken up in the newly institutionalised medical discipline of 
gynaecology, these concepts and philosophical propositions took on a life outside of 
philosophy and, arguably, outlived the project of Naturphilosophie. Shortly after the 
publication and teaching of Naturphilosophie in Germany from around 1790 to 1830 
and the simultaneous founding of gynaecology as an academic discipline, 
gynaecology came to be transformed – in an explicitly colonial context – in the South 
of the United States. Here gynaecology is understood primarily as a surgical practice 
and a biopolitical tool. Rather than a philosophical interest in discovering the truth of 
nature, what is at stake in this transformed gynaecology is the ongoing reproduction 
of slave labour. Intervention rather than truth, or intervention as truth, is here what 
produces medical knowledge.  
 
The emphasis on intervention as part of the production of knowledge about the sexed 
body was maintained in the twentieth century. However, from the 1950s, the post-
Second World War period is confronted, as Preciado outlines, with the political rise 
of feminism and with homosexuality, as well as with the desire of “transvestites,” 
“deviants,” and “transsexuals” to escape or transform birth sex assignment.741 As a 
consequence of these political movements and demands, the dimorphist epistemology 
of sexual difference as conceived by the Naturphilosophen begins to crumble.742 The 
concept of gender, as proposed by Money, offers a response to this challenge to the 
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conceptual tools of Naturphilosophie – Money questions the fictitious unity of “sex.” 
However, while acknowledging the malleability of sex difference and anatomy, 
Money, through his treatment protocol, keeps the normalizing functions of the 
nineteenth century sexual difference frame intact, as well as preserving the emphasis 
on heterosexual reproduction and population control. Once sexual dimorphism is no 
longer tenable as a universal description of human nature and biology, it was gender 
that implemented the promise of nineteenth century sexual difference and sex 
dimorphism through technological, surgical and psychological means. 
 
The conceptualisation of “gender” thus marks a radical intervention in the sexual 
difference paradigm, challenging the framework established by Naturphilosophie. 
Though it does complicate the concept of “nature,” this theoretical account 
nonetheless posits the “naturalness” of sexual dimorphism and complementarity, 
which it links conceptually to heterosexual reproduction. The clinical “gender” 
discourse challenges the positioning of “nature” as conceptually primary, and as 
ground for social and political conceptualisations of sexual difference within the 
family and the state. It thus challenges Hegel’s chronology, whereby the Philosophy 
of Nature grounds or precedes the Encyclopaedia’s ‘Anthropology’ and the 
conceptions of sexual difference and distribution of labour in the Philosophy of Right; 
though, as was elaborated in previous chapters, the occurrence of sexual difference in 
the Logic had already complicated this order. Instead, the cultural instantiation of 
sexual dimorphism becomes the most important and primary conceptual concern. 
While the stability of nature is challenged, the framework of sexual dimorphism – and 
the necessity of implementing it by any and all means, including violent ones – 
remains unquestioned by Money and his disciples.  
 
As regards the foregrounding and centring of the implementation of sexual 
dimorphism, the changed understanding of gynaecology as a surgical and more 
explicitly biopolitical tool, with its emphasis on intervention and the control of 
women’s bodies and reproduction is key, and forms, I argue, part of the background 
for the emergent clinical discourse of gender in the 1950s. Although this discourse is 
not primarily about controlling women’s biology and reproductive capacities, it 
remains coherent with nineteenth-century gynaecological research and practice. As 
such, it can also be read not only as a continuation of post-war psychology, surgery 
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and cybernetics, but also as a continuation of colonial gynaecological practices. While 
this “gender” was not primarily concerned with women, but with another group of 
bodies that require external intervention, namely intersex and trans people, the aim 
remains to regulate and to control. Moreover, reproduction, the couple form and 
marriage remain a key concern and guide for the implementation of this discourse of 
gender. 
 
While chapter three was concerned with the co-emergence in philosophy, 
anthropology and gynaecology of the concepts of sex, gender and sexual difference 
that become biopolitical concepts, the racialisation of these concepts came into focus 
in chapter five. However, the question of race was already a question for 
Naturphilosophie. Carl Gustav Carus wrote not only the first book on gynaecology in 
a German-speaking context, he also wrote Symbolik der Menschlichen Gestalt: 
Handbuch zur Menschenkenntniß, a text that summarises his thoughts and teaching on 
the constitution, temperaments and abilities of human beings according to racial and 
sexual aspects. This book was published and republished in several editions well into 
the twentieth century and was used as a resource by the National Socialists for their 
racial ideology.743 While Carus is celebrated for his contributions to medicine and 
culture, it is often – and conveniently – overlooked that the main aim of his 
anthropological work was to provide a classificatory scheme of the various human 
races, and that he posits a racially hierarchical division of humanity, which he 
understands to be philosophically grounded in the teachings of Naturphilosophie.744  
 
The gynaecological practice and writings of James Marion Sims, celebrated as the 
father of American gynaecology, also demonstrate that the categories of sex and 
gender are always already racialised and classed. His reinvention of the speculum, 
“discovered” through experimentation on enslaved women, and the opening of the 
first American women’s hospital in New York, where surgical experimentation was 
continued on poor immigrant women, most of them Irish, cannot be disassociated from 
the American slave trade, and, later, from the continued othering of the poor and 
racially-marked immigrant. As was argued in the previous chapter, while Sims 
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transformed gynaecology and women’s health, he also contributed to the maintenance 
of slavery. His legacy demonstrates that conceptions of sex, gender, and sexual 
difference are inseparable from both race and class. 
 
When considering the history of “gender,” it is worth reflecting on the race and class 
of the intersex bodies that were of concern to the medical establishment. For example, 
when defining the category of intersex, whose children was the medical establishment 
worried about? As Repo outlines, gender was primarily ‘an apparatus designed to 
tame, normalise, and regulate White, middle-class children and parents into 
harmonious, reproductive, and productive nuclear units.’745 But who goes without 
health insurance and never enters the hospital in the first place? Whose bodies are 
from the start not meant to ever form a part of the harmonious, reproductive nuclear 
family unit? If the medical category of gender was in the 1950s predominantly 
concerned with white and middle-class families, is this concern maintained by 
feminists who take up the category of gender and use it as a feminist analytical tool? 
According to Repo, the answer is yes. This, however, is not because gender could be 
a better and more critical term, but because the entanglement of feminist thought with 
the biopolitical practices of the post-War U.S. medical establishment have never been 
sufficiently analysed or addressed. 
 
It is the unacknowledged origin of the concept of gender in medical, psychological 
and anthropological scholarship (the latter via Margaret Mead, a crucial influence on 
Money), and in post-World War II nation building in the U.S. which, remaining 
unanalysed, continues to trouble Butler’s work. This brings us back to Butler’s 
concern with the history and historicity of a concept and its effects. While Butler, 
through the concept of performativity and through her critique of Irigaray’s sexual 
difference framework, thinks how history is inherent to the definition of ontology 
itself, the specific history of the concept of gender remains largely unaddressed, with 
the partial (and relatively belated) exception of Undoing Gender. Yet, what Butler 
wants to say – namely, that thinking trans and intersex experience is integral to 
thinking gender – as well as what should be more explicit in her work – that is, the 
ways in which sex and gender are always marked by race and class and how every 
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racial marking is always imbued with a specific gender and sexuality746 – could be 
explained by engaging more closely with this history. 
 
While Butler explains that gender and sexuality are not immediately self-explanatory, 
race and class remain within her work, by and large, abstract terms, truths taken to be 
self-evident. Butler states that all social markers are inherently related, but the nature 
of their relation is never explicitly explored. This is surprising given that 
performativity is a term that – like the prefix trans-, in which Butler seems especially 
invested in her more recent work – implies a movement across or beyond given states 
of affairs.747 However, even though “performativity,” “trans” and “queer” are terms 
that speak to each other as they try to address a processual, anti-essentialist notion of 
being and being-with, they can also at times end up functioning, in their role of 
outlining the inherently deconstructive aspects of ontology, to cover up the specific 
and complicated histories of social and political categories. This is not to reduce the 
importance of doing this ontological work, as Butler’s project demonstrates. Her 
concepts, even when critiqued, have been used by other feminists, critical race 
theorists and queer scholars for their own purposes, demonstrating the profoundly 
generative aspects of her analysis as a resource for thought. 
 
Troubling gender / “Gender trouble” 
 
What Butler offers by introducing the concept of gender performativity is an account 
of how identity categories function as ontological signifiers that come to be inscribed 
on the surface of the human body. This claim will be outlined in more detail in the 
following section. Butler’s account of performativity highlights the role and power of 
state institutions in this process. Building on Butler’s work, what feminist, queer, and 
trans theories now have to respond to is how women’s rights, gay rights, sexual 
freedom, and, albeit rarely, though increasingly, trans rights are used by state 
institutions and political groups for the purposes of nationalist, imperialist and racist 
projects. This has, for instance, been documented – in Europe – by Christine Delphy 
in Separate and Dominate: Feminism and Racism After the War on Terror, and in the 
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American context in Jasbir Puar’s Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer 
Times. In her book, Puar outlines that the successful incorporation in the late twentieth 
century of some queers into the domains of consumer markets and into the biopolitical 
optimization of life marks a shift.748 There is, she observes, ‘a transition under way in 
how queer subjects are relating to nation-states, particularly the United States, from 
being figures of death (i.e., the AIDS epidemic) to becoming tied to ideas of life and 
productivity (i.e., gay marriage and families).’749 However, as Puar remarks, this 
incorporation into “life” is contingent upon ever-narrowing parameters of white racial 
privilege, consumption capabilities, gender and kinship normativity, and bodily 
integrity.750 
 
Donna McCormack, who rethinks the concept of performativity with reference to 
Butler in Queer Postcolonial Narratives and the Ethics of Witnessing, argues that 
while living free of subjection to homo- or transphobic violence is an important socio-
political goal, ‘these ends are pursued through increased violence against those 
individuals who and those countries that do not conform to imperialist liberal 
agendas.’751 Feminism is used in a similar way as a missionary discourse, often under 
the pretence of rescuing Muslim women from their oppressive male counterparts.752 
As Delphy writes, ‘[w]omen wearing a headscarf are little by little being excluded 
from jobs in the public sector, and now in the private sector as well – in the name of 
their emancipation.’753 Moreover, in France, public swimming pools are being shut 
because of women wearing burkinis, which, according to French state authorities, 
greatly compromises the safety of these public spaces.754 This persecution, as Delphy 
outlines, is disguised as the defence of French secularism (laïcité), which was never 
mentioned by any politician before the 2004 law banning headscarves in state 
schools.755 Right wing groups in the United Kingdom including the UK Independence 
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Party (UKIP) and the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA) use a racist, 
specifically anti-Muslim rhetoric to argue that they will protect white women from 
grooming gangs, meaning specifically from black and brown men.756 In these 
instances, the feminist, queer and politically progressive subject is defined as by 
default white and is used for the purposes of racist and imperialist political projects.  
 
If gender is to remain a critical and useful concept for feminist analysis, then both its 
problematic past and the discourses that currently invoke it need to be addressed. 
Butler’s response – the concept of performativity – is still helpful in this regard, as it 
outlines a speculative, social ontology of how the markers of sex and sexuality gain 
meaning and come to be embodied. Since ontology is understood to be always already 
a political project, gender is defined not as a descriptive but as a critical category. As 
such gender, to borrow a phrase from Irigaray, remains a question for our time757 – 
currently, in two senses. On the one hand, if gender is a key category of feminist 
thought, then trans and intersex issues are, due to the history of this concept, always 
already an inherent part of feminist theory, and must be addressed as such. On the 
other hand, the ways in which gender is inherently racialised and classed require 
further analysis, since they are not prioritised by Butler. As such, gender remains a 
problematic term. It is necessary to consider how gender frames feminist theory and 
philosophy in a particular way. However, its problematic history also offers the 
potential to address current political questions. 
 
The end of (the stability of) sexual difference, initiated by Money through his 
introduction of the concept of “gender,” is pursued further by Butler, though under 
radically different premises. While Money wants to fix trouble, Butler asks ‘how best 
to make it, what best way to be in it.’758 It is therefore telling that, in the second preface 
(1999) to Gender Trouble, Butler remarks that if she were to rewrite the book under 
present circumstances she ‘would include a discussion of transgender and 
intersexuality, the way that ideal gender dimorphism works in both sorts of discourses, 
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the different relations to surgical intervention that these related concerns sustain.’759 
The discussion of gender would, thereby, come full circle. 
 
Towards a performative ontology 
 
Butler’s work arguably constitutes an important break with the legacy of Money and 
Stoller. Other important critiques of gender have come from the intersex and 
transsexual movement, as well as from postcolonial and decolonial thinkers. Perhaps 
most important amongst these was the critical intervention of Hortense Spillers in 
‘Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,’ first published in 
Diacritics in 1987. Here Spillers explains that the models of sexual difference and 
gender do not ‘suffice for occupied or captive persons and communities in which the 
rites and rights of gender function have been exploded, historically, into sexual 
neutralities.’760 This scepticism, entailing the claim of the “explosion” of both sexual 
difference and gender by race, is shared by Denise Ferreira Da Silva in Towards a 
Global Idea of Race and ‘Towards a Black Feminist Poethics,’ as well as by Maria 
Lugones in ‘The Coloniality of Gender.’761 This explosion will have to be analysed in 
more detail, along with the potential affinity between anticolonial and trans and 
intersex struggles, in terms of the unrecognizable status of certain groups of people 
before the law, public institutions and society in general, and their continuous policing 
and control via the police, medical “treatment” and public policy. 
 
The shift from a psychological, behaviourist and clinical concept towards a 
philosophical concept of gender is also addressed by Geneviève Fraisse in the 
Dictionary of Untranslatables, where it is posited that ‘[g]ender became a 
philosophical concept in Anglo-Saxon thought during the 1970s.’762 Fraisse attributes 
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the origin of the notion of gender to Stoller. Since Stoller explicitly credits Money in 
his publication as the source for his conception of “gender,” it is surprising that Money 
receives no mention in the Dictionary, neither under the category of gender nor of sex, 
both of which he had in fact redefined. Stoller’s later contribution to gender theory 
was the coining of the term “gender identity,” which then finds its way back into 
Money’s work under the conception of “G-I/R” (gender identity/role), as well as the 
introduction of a split between sex and gender as mutually exclusive categories. While 
for Money, as Repo observes, ‘gender was a new variable of sex,’ Stoller ‘split gender 
from sex, designating sex as a biological category and gender as a specifically cultural 
one.’763 Since this definition was influential for feminist theory and ‘marked the 
beginning of a terminological and philosophical debate,’764 the emphasis on Stoller is 
not unjustified, though Money also deserves mentioning, as well as the broader context 
of Money’s and Stoller’s interrelated research agendas, which were aimed at defining 
protocols for the treatment of intersex (Money) and trans (Stoller) patients. 
 
Fraisse acknowledges that feminist theory marks a break from this founding moment 
of gender in psychology and sexology. Gender comes to be redefined, and this 
redefinition, Fraisse argues, should be understood as a philosophical proposition.765 
While for Money and Stoller gender remained a clinical category, it comes to be 
transformed into a philosophical proposition, crucially through Butler’s work. This 
delineation of the concept, as Fraisse rightly remarks, is a contemporary philosophical 
event.766 Without precisely coining the term “gender,” neither within nor outside of 
feminist theory, Butler nonetheless contributes importantly to its circulation and 
function. According to Fraisse, this philosophical event is first of all a terminological 
and an epistemological challenge and difficulty.767 In what follows I will argue, with 
reference to Butler’s work, that this challenge – this “trouble” – is, equally, an 
ontological one. 
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In Gender Trouble, Butler describes her project not simply as a genealogy of gender 
but as ‘a genealogy of gender ontology.’768 The emphasis on ontology here is, I 
suggest, important to an understanding of her work. For Butler, the terminological and 
epistemological questions raised by the concept of “gender” are also ontological; 
however, ontology needs to be rethought. Butler’s inquiry seeks to demonstrate that 
there is no preestablished ontology of gender, because ontology in general does not in 
fact constitute a foundation. Rather, Butler argues, ontology should be understood in 
terms of a series of normative injunctions that operate by installing themselves into 
political discourse as its necessary ground.769 Among these normative injunctions are, 
for instance, ideal dimorphism, heterosexual complementarity of bodies, and ideals 
and rule of proper and improper masculinity and femininity, all which are also 
underwritten by racial codes.770 Political discourse, according to Butler, establishes an 
‘ontological field’ in which bodies can be given legitimate expression.771 Ontology 
thus understood will always ask questions about power, violence, resistance and 
freedom. 
 
Inherently political, (gender) ontology is open to transformation. For feminist 
philosophy this means on the one hand the possibility of change but, on the other, that 
no pre-established and stable category of “woman” exists on which to build a politics. 
What these conclusions mean for philosophy more broadly remains to be investigated. 
A different understanding of ontology comes out of Butler’s work, more precisely 
through her conception of performativity, as will be argued in more detail. By reading 
Butler’s formulation of performativity alongside Hegel, it will become clear that 
ontology is always fundamentally political, even when it presents itself as a neutral 
discourse on being. 
 
Gender as a doing 
 
In the previous section two related claims were put forward. First, that “gender” was 
transformed in Butler’s work from a clinical-psychological category into a 
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philosophical concept; and, second, that it is through the concept of performativity 
that this becomes possible. While there has been a lot of work in recent years on 
linguistics and performativity, and the relation between performance studies and 
philosophy, the question of performativity as social ontology, already hinted at in 
Butler’s work, has not been widely addressed. 
 
Butler writes in the original preface to Gender Trouble that philosophy was the 
predominant disciplinary mechanism that mobilised her as author at the time writing, 
though on her account philosophy is not entirely separate or distinct from other 
disciplines.772 Given this, an analysis of performativity as a philosophical concept is 
necessary, and here, I argue, Hegel is crucial for Butler. While Butler’s notion of 
performativity explains a very specific doing, namely that of gender, and in this sense 
differs substantially from Hegel’s aim to construct a general conceptual Thätigkeit; 
however, a more general notion, even if not explicitly addressed, is still at work in 
Butler, and allows her to transpose her concept of performativity onto other contexts, 
for instance in Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative and Notes Toward a 
Performative Theory of Assembly.773 
 
Although Butler acknowledges her Hegelian roots and engages with Hegel at several 
points throughout her work – for instance in Subjects of Desire, The Psychic Life of 
Power, and in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality774 – it is never the notion of 
performativity that is discussed in relation or proximity to Hegel. It will be proposed 
in the following that, if we are to think Hegel’s influence as going beyond a 
deployment of Hegelian conceptions of recognition and desire, then we need to 
analyse his proposition that speculation be thought as performativity. This 
conversation, I suggest, could unfold in a manner similar to Butler’s discussion of 
Hegelian universality in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Here Butler outlines 
what is valuable in Hegel – particularly in the Science of Logic – for current political 
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and philosophical debates. However, she does so without remaining entirely within a 
Hegelian frame, nor by leaving this frame as such untouched. I propose here that it is 
not her concept of universality – which remains anchored in the tradition of radical 
democracy as outlined by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe775 – but rather her 
concept of performativity which shows Butler’s proximity to Hegel. 
 
Grounding gender performativity in Hegel’s conception of speculation, as it is 
outlined towards the end of the Logic, is not to say that Butler’s core concept is only 
this – a rewriting of Hegel – nor that it can be grasped in these terms alone. Clearly 
her work is heavily influenced by Foucault and grounded much more broadly in a 
range of philosophical, feminist, political and literary canons. More importantly, her 
concepts and ideas are her own inventions and contributions to thought and to political 
activism, and they should be read as such. Rather, what I would like to suggest here is 
that a reading of Hegel’s Logic alongside Butler’s work will allow for a better 
understanding of the kind of philosophical concept Butler is after when proposing the 
concept of gender performativity. While Hegel has nothing to say about “gender,” 
since the term as used by Butler was, as discussed above, only introduced into English 
in the 1950s, Hegel’s introduction of an implicit idea of performativity – of the doing 
and undoing of conceptual form – is, I argue, central to Butler’s work. 
 
Butler states her aim explicitly in this regard: the formulation of gender performativity 
‘moves the conception of gender off the ground of a substantial model of identity to 
one that requires a conception of gender as a constituted social temporality.’776 
Hegelian conceptual tools, especially as developed in the Logic, are helpful for 
critically reflecting upon notions of essentialism, identity and substance, and for 
rethinking these as dynamic concepts. When Butler claims in Gender Trouble that 
‘gender is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-
exist the deed,’777 she seems to be in line with Hegel who, as Rebecca Comay and 
Frank Ruda have recently remarked, ‘divests the first person in all its situatedness and 
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dilation […] of its last shred of positive substantiality.’778 The doing or Thätigkeit 
described in the concluding chapters of the Logic is non-voluntarist.779  
 
As mentioned earlier, the loss of a stable or fixed subject for Hegel does not mean the 
end of all activity (Thätigkeit) but marks a different plain of instantiation and a first 
formalisation of a dynamic and relational ontology. This does not mean that individual 
subjectivity and subjectivation become irrelevant, but that they have to be rethought. 
Butler’s claim that ‘there need not be a “doer behind the deed,” but that the “doer” is 
variably constructed in and through the deed’780 is, I argue, a philosophical proposition 
similar to Hegel’s. What is being thought is a concept of activity that does not start 
from, nor rely upon, an already-given idea of subjectivity. Rather, what is thought by 
both Hegel and Butler is the activity of form. Gender, according to Butler, is 
performative in that it is a doing that constitutes the identity it is purported to be.781 It 
follows that the gendered body ‘has no ontological status apart from the various acts 
which constitutes its reality.’782 
 
It was argued in chapter four that Hegel introduces a concept of the performative under 
the heading of ‘The Idea,’ the final chapter of the Logic. Once the concept becomes 
idea it is, Hegel argues, no longer to be understood as general law subsuming the 
particular, but as active principle. While the law subjugates, a different relation 
between particularity and universality is now thought. Hegel concludes the Logic with 
the claim that the universal exists not as law but as performative. However, questions 
of violence, resistance and freedom that arise with the notion of law do not disappear 
with its replacement by a different term. The Logic ends with the conclusion that the 
universal law, if understood as in essence performative, is no longer external to the 
content to which it refers. Yet, at the same time, the question of power (Macht) remains 
present and unresolved. While the idea, according to Hegel, is ‘free release’ (and in 
this sense differs from the law which subjugates what comes before it), there is 
nonetheless a tension or contradiction that manifests itself here. This is because the 
idea is at the same time said to be a ‘machthabender Begriff,’ a powerful concept or 
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one that rules (machthaben) and, in this sense, still seems to subsume or subjugate, 
resembling the power of the law. 
 
In Senses of the Subject, Butler observes that Hegel ‘searches time and again for an 
“animating law” [belebendes Gesetz] that operates in unity with a manifold that is 
“then itself animated” [als dann ein belebtes].’783 With her notion of “gender 
performativity,” Butler too seeks to find such an “animating law,” but, supplementing 
Hegel with Foucault, she takes this law to be regulative. Here the discussion of the 
ideas of reason, as elaborated in chapter one, becomes relevant once more. In line with 
Kant, and supplemented by Foucault, Butler understands the ideas of reason as 
regulative ideals. Hegel’s animating law is to be understood at the same time as a 
normative and regulative law. Therefore, questions of standpoint, viewpoint or 
perspective, as raised by Irigaray, do not become irrelevant here. Performativity is 
conceived as general ontological activity, while gender performativity describes a very 
concrete “act.” Although Hegel, through his use of examples, hints at the inherently 
social and political nature of the ontological dimension of speculation, it is, I argue, 
Butler who develops the thought of a social, ontological doing and undoing. Though 
Butler does not propose it that way, I argue that her concept of performativity is better 
understood as performative ontology. 
 
To summarise, both Butler and Hegel put forward the claim that being only is what it 
performs. However, while for Hegel this illustrates the transparency of determinate 
being, its own speech act and simultaneous becoming (as outlined in chapter four), 
Butler emphasises the normative and regulative dimensions of performativity. In this 
way, Butler addresses what remains unresolved in Hegel, namely that determinate 
being, understood as the performativity of form, is not simply an expression of free 
activity. For Butler, gender performativity as a doing ‘is a practice of improvisation 
within a scene of constraint.’784 Gender, the social law that affects everyone, 
“subsumes” everyone, but in a certain sense is the activity of no one, is to be 
understood not as static law but as performative doing, a dynamic Thätigkeit within a 
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scene of constraint. It is this relation of constraint and freedom, not sufficiently 
addressed by Hegel, that Butler makes the focus of the majority of her writings. In so 
doing, Butler makes a specific intervention in feminist theory, but also contributes to 
the broader philosophical understanding of the concept of performativity. 
 
As will be further outlined in the following, in Hegel as well as in Butler thinking 
about performativity equally means thinking about ontology, language and 
philosophical method. Hegel introduces the idea of a speculative sentence or 
proposition in §61 of the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit in order to set up the 
performative nature of the subject. The speculative sentence describes the active 
relation between subject, predicate and copula, and their movement through which the 
subject first comes to be. The sentence is a becoming and its reading a doing, as readers 
of Hegel, most famously Jean-Luc Nancy in The Speculative Remark, have pointed 
out.785 Butler refers to this textual strategy in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 
in her analysis of Hegel’s concept of universality. The speculative proposition, 
according to Butler, is a useful approach because it makes visible how a concept like 
the universal undergoes revision in time, as well as showing that these successive 
revisions and dissolutions are essential to what it ‘is.’786 In order to bring the formative 
determination of the concept to the fore, the propositional sense of the copula must, 
Butler writes, be replaced with the speculative one.787 Since Hegel’s remarks about 
language are never only purely “textual” but serve to illustrate a broader point, we 
might wonder first what Butler’s speculative proposition looks like, and second how 
it works: as a textual strategy, and beyond. 
 
It is not primarily the formative but rather the denaturalizing aspect of the speculative 
proposition that is appealing to Butler. What seems to be a given and a fixed position 
in the sentence, and thus an essential relation between its parts, is revealed in its 
inherent movement, and thus shown to be otherwise: unstable, subject to undoing and 
to transformation. Rather than emphasising an immanent and progressive movement, 
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Butler is interested in the deconstructive elements of Hegel’s thought. In Butler’s 
speculative sentence, accordingly, the subject is not “done” but is “undone” through 
the movement of copula and predicate, and through this undoing becomes what it is. 
The speculative sentence, in Hegel as well as in Butler, serves as an interrogation of 
how ontological claims come to be. While Butler is suspicious about ontology, 
critiquing forms of ontological essentialism in philosophy and feminist theory alike, 
the speculative sentence offers a means of critique as well as an alternative 
proposition, that allows, as will be shown, for a speculative ontological account to 
come to the fore. 
 
Although sceptical of traditional ontology, Butler’s work nonetheless interrogates the 
conditions of possibility for ontological claims, since these are decisive for 
subjectivity and agency, and thus for any feminist and emancipatory project. Thus, 
despite her thoroughgoing critique of ontology, it is becoming increasingly clear, as 
Stephen K. White points out in his paper ‘As the World Turns: Ontology and Politics 
in Judith Butler,’ that Butler is herself affirming an alternative ontology.788 Unmasking 
the essentialism at work in various conceptualizations of masculinity and femininity, 
and thus of subjectivity, gender and the body,789 Butler also develops alongside this 
critique a concept of “performativity” that is mobilised to describe not only linguistic 
acts and theatrical performances, but more generally the processes through which 
ontological claims come to manifest on or in the body, or even as body. Butler, 
accordingly, by means of her concept of performativity, develops a new language of 
ontology, a new discourse describing how selves come to body forth – what Gerhard 
Thonhauser has recently characterised as ‘a theory that could be called a social 
ontology.’790 This is an attempt to move away from ontological essentialism towards 
a speculative ontology that is neither a voluntarism nor entirely pre-determined or 
constrained. What might such an ontology look like? Contrary to White, who in his 
paper draws on Heidegger to illustrate Butler’s ontological claims, I argue that, on the 
question of ontology, Hegel’s is the more relevant philosophical framework. 
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789 Ibid., 158. 
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Reading Hegel alongside Butler means understanding the latter’s project not only as 
discourse analysis, nor as simply a discussion of Derridean iterability or of 
Foucauldian analysis of power, but moreover as an attempt to construct a speculative 
social ontology. Given that, for Butler, ontology is inherently unstable and works 
through a series of normative injunctions and within a field of constraint, this is not to 
break with either Derrida or Foucault. Nor is the question of ontology superimposed 
onto them, since iterability and the discursive production of meaning are always, as 
Butler also shows, linked to their bodily instantiation as ritual and habit. Moreover, 
thinking about or in terms of ontology does not mean that all other questions are 
bracketed. Rather, the question of being is dispersed, and is shown to be often as much 
a question of language, power, identity and discourse.  
 
Understood as speculative proposition, the question of ontology comes to the fore at 
different moments in Butler’s work. It is implied in the conceptualization of gender 
performativity through statements like the following: ‘There is no gender identity 
behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the 
very “expressions” that are said to be its result.’791 Statements such as these could be 
interpreted as saying that gender is constructed and therefore is completely 
individually produced. However, recognizing that performativity is to be understood 
as social ontology complicates this claim. Norms, institutions, history, and culture 
performatively create the context out of which individuals’ genders are produced. In 
line with Hegel’s Logic, Butler’s performativity is a doing and undoing that is not the 
wilful act of an already-determined subject. If read through Hegel, a more adequate 
account of performativity becomes possible, one that avoids some of the problems 
Butler is facing, such as the criticism, repeatedly addressed at her, that her account of 
gender performativity is a voluntarism. 
 
“Performative,” according to Butler, ‘suggests a dramatic and contingent construction 
of meaning.’792 As in Hegel, this is meant as a textual strategy as well as an ontological 
proposition. Because it is, as Butler points out in the second preface to Gender 
Trouble, ‘difficult to say precisely what performativity is,’793 and because what 
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performativity might mean is changing, the concept is not defined once but is repeated, 
slightly altered and rewritten throughout her texts, and the texts and bodies of others. 
Similar to Hegel’s philosophical approach as described in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality, Butler rewrites her main concepts through the course of her work over 
time. As such performativity is itself “done” and “undone” as it travels in and through 
different contexts. Moreover, what it “is,” is not yet finished. Its definition as a concept 
translates into its textual presentation. That is, the question of how to define 
performativity comes down to a question of how to write performativity – including 
the question of what it means to write, or to think, performatively. 
 
Is gender a bad habit? 
 
‘In other words, “sex” is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialised through 
time.’ 
- Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter794 
 
It has been argued that performativity explains the ontologising of the idea(s) of reason 
in Hegel and in Butler, in the Science of Logic as a generic account of the ontological 
nature of conceptual form, and in Butler’s Gender Trouble more specifically as the 
bodily instantiation of gendered norms. Gender ideals “work,” according to Butler, 
because ‘performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which 
achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body (…).’795 In other 
words, through their performative repetition, gender norms come to be experienced 
and lived as second nature. What seems to be immediate, such as masculine and 
feminine gender norms, is a habitual production. In this sense, gender is produced ‘on 
the surface of the body’ and comes to have ‘the effect of an internal core or 
substance.’796 Gender, then, has an ontological “effect,” but, since performative, ‘it 
has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.’797 
Gender, in other words, is produced habitually. However, this is not just a personal 
habit but institutional, and the result is that gender, rather than produced, becomes 
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enforced. Moreover, this enforced habit raises the Hegelian question of a bad infinity, 
the repeated and linear production of the same. Is gender then a “bad habit”? 
According to Butler, the task is ‘not whether to repeat, but how to repeat’798 – that is, 
not how to break out of habit as such, but how to break out of a bad habit. 
 
Habit has many valences: bodily, for instance as ritualised acts of gender performance 
in a public realm; linguistic, as habituated grammar and language rules; as well as 
textual, as modes of writing and reading texts. These are the main sites of meaning 
production in Butler and Hegel, but for Butler repetition and ritual are immediately 
and explicitly regulated and normative. Not only is there no neutral ground to start 
from, the doing and undoing – what Hegel terms the speculative unfolding of 
philosophy and the world – is not teleological or progressive. Though, as was 
described in previous chapters, Hegel complicates teleology in the Logic and replaces 
teleological progression first with “life” and then with “absolute method,” there 
nonetheless undoubtedly remains throughout his work the idea that every new 
development, even if not “substantial,” is more advanced and progressive. This 
assumption is challenged by Butler, according to whom there is alteration and undoing 
without this entailing inherent progression. And while progress is possible, it is so 
only as a political project and as such needs to be actively worked towards – it will 
not happen on its own. Progress is contested, not something inherent to either 
philosophy or language as they account for the human body. 
 
To summarise, while Butler’s explanation of how bodies (come to) matter can be read 
alongside the anthropology of Hegel’s Encyclopaedia – where to account for the 
human body and soul is to account not for nature but for second nature – Hegel does 
not adequately conceptualise the scenes of constraint in which doing becomes possible 
and those cases where it is impossible or foreclosed. What is interesting, however, 
about Hegel are his remarks on language, which always go beyond language to make 
a claim about ontology or philosophical method. In both Hegel and Butler, 
performativity is explained through the example of language. Performativity, for both 
thinkers, is ontological, linguistic and textual: that is, it is an account of language and 
ontological activity, as well as a strategy of writing. 
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Not only performativity but the concept of gender too, as coined by Money and 
rewritten by Butler, is inherently tied to language. While Butler borrows from speech 
act theory and Hegel’s speculative proposition in order to outline her concept of 
gender performativity, Money suggests that the establishment of a masculine or 
feminine gender role and identity resembles the ability and process of language 
learning.799 Money writes: 
 
Gender role may be likened to a native language. Once ingrained, a person’s native 
language may fall into disuse and be supplanted by another, but it is never entirely 
eradicated. So also, a gender role may be changed, or resembling native 
bilingualism may be ambiguous, but it may also become so deeply ingrained that 
not even flagrant contradictions of body functioning and morphology may displace 
it.800 
 
Money acknowledges that neither language nor masculinity and femininity develop in 
a social vacuum.801 According to Money, just as languages vary by dialect, accent and 
individual usage, ‘[s]o also, gender comportment varies not only individually, but also 
geographically, regionally and locally, according to cultural stereotypes of what 
constitutes masculinity and femininity.’802  
 
While Money can account for variance, he remains unwilling throughout his work to 
challenge the gender binary as pre-given social grammar. Languages may vary but 
certain grammatical structures and rules are, according to Money, universal and 
beyond question. It becomes evident in Money’s work that the social and cultural 
aspects of life can be just as static as “nature.” Not much is gained in the move from 
biology to culture if both remain predetermined, uncontested fields. According to 
Money, the potential of masculine/feminine role dimorphism is, just like the ability to 
acquire a human language, ‘phylogenetically given, whereas the actuality is 
ontogenetically given.’803 This actuality is open to change – variable according to 
geopolitical location, cultural stereotypes and dialect – but the reality of the frame, of 
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sex dimorphism, is unquestionable in Money’s static understanding of biology and 
culture. 
 
Money would agree with Butler’s claim that ‘[l]earning the rules that govern 
intelligible speech is an inculcation into normalised language, where the price of not 
conforming is the loss of intelligibility itself.’804 However, for Money this means 
making the body conform to the normative rules of intelligible speech in order to avoid 
loss of intelligibility. Thus, the task opened up by the concept of gender is to help 
children and their caretakers to conform to the rules as best as possible and to stay out 
of gender trouble. What Money does not acknowledge is that ‘neither grammar nor 
style are politically neutral.’805 This means that Butler’s insight that one can practice 
styles, but that the styles that become available are not entirely a matter of choice,806 
remains undertheorised by Money.  
 
This point, though in a different context, is also raised by Irigaray in her chapter ‘La 
Mystérique’ in Speculum of the Other Woman, where it is explained that the mystic is 
not entirely free to choose her style but subverts and reinvents the language and idiom 
available to her. While Money would not necessarily disagree that one’s choices 
regarding language and style are limited, the question of subversion is completely 
absent from his work. And so, gender remains in Money’s theory and praxis a 
straightforwardly propositional sentence and ontology, failing to be superseded by a 
speculative one. As Butler argues: 
 
It would be a mistake to think that received grammar is the best vehicle for 
expressing radical views, given the constraints that grammar imposes upon thought, 
indeed, upon the thinkable itself. But formulations that twist grammar or that 
implicitly call into question the subject-verb requirements of propositional sense 
are clearly irritating for some. They produce more work for their readers, and 
sometimes their readers are offended by such demands.807 
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Money’s theoretical work and practice actively tries to diminish the “work” of having 
to be confronted with formulations and bodies that twist grammar and social norms. 
What Butler calls “excitable speech,” linguistic meaning that is fluid, provisional and 
not fixed, as exemplified in Irigaray or the speech of the mystic, is the site of a problem 
for Money. It is their interest in excitable speech and speculative grammar that is, 
despite their differences, a point of convergence between Hegel, Irigaray and Butler. 
The problem with Hegel is that power remains untheorised, with performativity 
accounting for a transparent ontological and linguistic doing and undoing free of 
constraint. On the other hand, Irigaray’s analysis is, according to Butler, problematic 
for a different reason. Despite her experiments with grammar and speech, there 
remains, as was outlined in the previous chapter, something static in Irigaray. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter began with the introduction of performativity as ontological concept, 
distinct from its meaning as speech act or performance. It was argued that what Butler 
develops, though she does not explicitly say this, is a notion of performativity as 
performative ontology. It was shown that Butler, in line with Hegel, argues that there 
is no foundation to being. Both thinkers propose a concept of being that is not static 
but is its own past and future acts. The emphasis on thinking ontology, and in 
particular gender ontology, is not on the individual that performs or does its gender. 
In this regard, the argument from the Logic that the performative deed (Thätigkeit) is 
the act of no one, and Butler’s claim that there is no doer behind the deed, has to be 
taken seriously. This emphasis is what allows Butler to think the institutional and 
normative dimensions of gender. Thus, while Butler’s claims about ontology work in 
relation to Hegel, they also elaborate and clarify the references to violence, resistance 
and freedom that seem to appear abruptly at the end of the Logic. After Butler, 
performativity has to be understood as social ontology. The implication of this is that 
claims about ontology are inherently political, even when presented as neutral claims 
about being. However, what will need to be further elaborated is Butler’s relative 
neglect of history and with that of race and class. The claim that gender is trans-gender, 
in the sense that the concept of gender originates in elaborations of trans, intersex and 
non-binary bodies, needs to be set against this background. Bodies are also classified 
by race and class and have to be thought across the contexts that produced them as 
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such. Furthermore, the question of the relation between speculation, as 
epistemological proposition, and performativity, thought as social ontology will have 
to be addressed. This is because Butler, contrary to Hegel, and following Irigaray, does 
not collapse these too. 
 
To begin with, ontology was split from language and linguistics in order to highlight 
the aspect of performativity as social ontology, which had not been elaborated in 
relation to Butler. However, in the final section, it became apparent that a clear 
separation of ontological claims from those of language is not possible and also not 
desirable. Both Butler and Hegel use the example of language to explain how 
performativity works. It turns out that language enacts, at the level of the text, what 
subjects perform at the level of the body. Or, in other words, the functioning of 
language is analogous to the explanation of how bodies (come to) matter. 
Performativity, for both thinkers, is ontological and linguistic: that is, an account of 
language and ontological activity, as well as a strategy of writing and reading texts. 
As such it is linked to the question of habit, which, for Butler, is a political question. 
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Concluding remarks – Staying in trouble 
 
This thesis aims to explain and contextualise a philosophical concept of speculation. 
By looking in particular at the concept of the sexual relation in Hegel’s Science of 
Logic, I argue that political concepts, through their exemplarity, bear an integral 
relation to speculative thought. The thesis demonstrates that the confrontation with 
speculation in philosophy is unavoidably political.808 An attempt is made to analyse 
the history of speculation as philosophical concept alongside the history of the 
gynaecological speculum, and to look at the effects both have on thinking sex, gender 
and sexual difference. This focus brings the concept of performativity, as a speculative 
concept of being, to the fore. While speculation in philosophy is defined as an activity 
of theoretical reason, this thesis argues that, as ontological activity, speculation is 
performative. But what effects do these two concepts have beyond their strictly 
philosophical definition and use? To respond to this question, the thesis also illustrates 
how, on the one hand, the concepts of speculation and performativity are necessary 
for an explanation of social and political concepts such as “race”, “sexual difference,” 
and “gender,” while on the other hand these very concepts exemplify the nature of 
speculative, performative thought. 
 
Speculating on performances: Exemplarity 
 
The emergence of a philosophical concept of speculation is traced to Kant’s critical 
philosophy and its attempt at constructing a modern definition of philosophy as 
“scientific,” in the sense of not overstepping the secure bounds of human knowledge 
by relying on a notion of God as final cause in the explanation of nature. The first 
chapter analyses the ambivalence inherent to speculative reason, its necessary use 
alongside its necessary limitation. On the one hand, the delimitation of speculation is, 
according to Kant, a criterion for converting metaphysics, and thus philosophy, into 
science. On the other hand, a positive and necessary use of speculative reason is 
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identified in the systematization and ordering of cognitions, knowledge and empirical 
laws. The ability for speculation to make a system out of a mere aggregate of 
knowledge is identified by Kant as that which transforms knowledge into science. But 
how to philosophically justify a positive and scientific use of speculative reason? 
Natural history, Kant argues, is confronted with a similar epistemological problem. 
Here, the harmony between natural and logical forms first emerges as a theoretical 
issue. Are the latter a merely artificial scheme of classification arbitrarily imposed 
onto nature? 
 
Natural history, according to Kant, has so far been unable to ground its logical 
categories as empirical concepts of nature. In the essay ‘On the Use of Teleological 
Principles in Philosophy’, the concept of “race” (Rasse) and, subsequently, in the third 
Critique, the concept of the “living being” are said to resolve the philosophical 
problem of justifying an order of reason. While the ability of speculative reason to 
order and to systematise remains uncertain in the first Critique, the example of “race” 
demonstrates that certain concepts and categories of reason, even though they are not 
simple facts of nature, are also not “merely” logical, abstracted from any connection 
to experience. With reference to these concepts, Kant attempts to redefine the relation 
between the logical and the empirical and, in so doing, to justify the use of speculative 
reason for scientific purposes. 
 
Chapter two looked at the sudden appearance of social and political concepts and 
categories in Hegel’s Science of Logic, a text which redefines the nature of speculative 
reason after Kant. While the example of the sexual relation in the ‘Chemism’ chapter 
might seem accidental or insignificant at first, this thesis argues that speculative reason 
in fact relies upon social and political categories, which in turn exemplify its nature 
and functioning. Because these concepts are contested and more visibly open to 
change than others, they are especially suited to exemplify the temporal and 
performative nature of speculative reason that Hegel attempts to uncover. The 
performative aspect of speculative reason is examined with particular reference to 
Hegel and Butler. 
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Performing the speculative 
 
Chapters two and four attempted a close reading of the final chapters of Hegel’s 
Science of Logic with a view to uncovering an ontological concept of speculation. 
Hegel opens his Logic with the statement: ‘Being, pure being – without further 
determination’809, suggesting that the concept of “being,” if not further developed, 
remains a merely empty category. It was argued that the Logic returns in the end to its 
beginning in order to propose a concept of determinate being. However, since the 
entire book aims to explain and to demonstrate the non-empirical development of 
speculative reason, also defined by Hegel as conceptual form, this definition cannot 
rely on any empirical content to further determine the opening, the category of 
“being.” Instead, a concept of the dynamic activity (Thätikeit) of form is proposed as 
the new and determinate but still non-empirical concept of “being.” This is a 
speculative ontological concept. Speculative reason, according to Hegel, is not only a 
requirement for knowledge and cognition but should equally be understood as 
ontological Thätigkeit, as an activity or a doing. 
 
In chapter four I propose that, as ontological activity, the concept is performative. 
While this term is not itself available to Hegel, it best describes his intention to define 
speculation as both an epistemological and ontological activity. In other words, while 
philosophical speculation is the activity of pure or theoretical reason, as ontological 
activity, speculation is performative. The concept of performativity, accordingly, 
names and defines speculation as ontological form, despite not being spoken or written 
by Hegel himself. 
 
Material reliance and effects 
 
Throughout this thesis, an attempt is made to define both the material dependence and 
the effects of speculative thought. This thesis demonstrates that Kant already 
complicates the definition of speculative reason as strictly non-empirical. By referring 
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to the speculative concepts of race and the living being, Kant attempts to show that 
the relation between the logical and the empirical might not be strictly oppositional, 
and that it therefore needs to be rethought. While Hegel thinks this relation further, he 
thinks it purely conceptually by defining an ontological concept of speculative reason. 
Irigaray and Butler, it is argued, offer an alternative response by demonstrating that 
those political concepts used by Kant and Hegel as examples are not coincidental, but 
are rather intrinsic to theoretical reasoning as such. 
 
Speculative reason, given its temporal and performative nature, needs to be 
contextualised through those examples that illustrate its functioning. While Kant’s 
account of speculation has to be read in the context of methodological debates in 
natural history and the emerging discourse of anthropology, Hegel’s example of the 
sexual relation becomes intelligible only against the background of the philosophy of 
nature and the history of gynaecology. The concepts of race and sexual difference, 
used by Kant and Hegel to illustrate the legitimate use of speculative reason, were at 
this point in time being redefined – medically, anthropologically, culturally but also 
philosophically – as scientific terms. While Kant and Hegel do not acknowledge the 
extent of the reliance of speculative reason on these concepts, instead presenting the 
example as secondary, Irigaray points to the material dependence of speculative 
reason, highlighting the construction in philosophy of a universal and abstract concept 
of “woman” that functions as support structure and condition of possibility for 
theoretical reason. By introducing the concept of specula(riza)tion, Irigaray intends to 
render those support structures visible through theoretical work. It is in this context 
that Irigaray points to the connection between the gynaecological speculum and 
theoretical speculation, suggesting that their link is not merely etymological. Chapter 
three points to the disciplinary foundation of gynaecology in Germany; and chapter 
five gives a (selective) account of the long and complex history of the gynaecological 
speculum. In so doing it is possible to carry Irigaray’s critique of Kantian and Hegelian 
speculation further – to do what Irigaray proposes but ultimately does not do; namely, 
to visualise and historicise speculative reason. 
 
Irigaray demonstrates that the sexual relation, which seems accidental in Hegel’s 
Logic, is in fact intrinsic to philosophical thought in general. Critiquing the 
philosophical canon on social and political grounds, her analysis is, however, 
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weakened by her unwillingness to locate her own findings historically. For instance, 
she rightly points out that both philosophy and modern medicine construct abstract 
and universal categories of woman: in the case of philosophy, as an outside that is 
equally a condition of possibility; and in medicine as the subject of gynaecology and 
reproductive health care. However, in both philosophical and medical discourses, the 
categories of woman, femininity and embodiment are more complex than this. Both 
construct a differential notion of womanhood and sexuality, especially through race 
and class. I illustrate this by looking to the founding moment of gynaecology in the 
United States, where it developed under conditions of slavery. These experimental 
surgeries, which transformed gynaecology in the United States and then worldwide 
through the rapid advancement of caesarean sectioning, obstetrical fistulae repair and 
ovariotomy were performed first on enslaved women in the American South and, later, 
at the first women’s hospital in New York, on poor immigrant women, most of them 
Irish Catholic. These medical advancements thus depended upon female bodies that 
were othered, not just by virtue of their (presumed) sex, but by their enslaved status, 
their race, and their class. This complexity is lost in Irigaray’s work. 
 
Sexual difference and/or gender? 
 
Irigaray, by uncovering the situated nature of theoretical reason and its support 
structures, points to a European philosophical and cultural symptom – the default 
gendering of seemingly neutral concepts as male. However, as already indicated, her 
argument reduces the complexity of that which it reveals. I therefore suggest that her 
thesis is most useful when read as part of a broader attempt, on behalf of the women’s 
liberation and feminist movements, to reclaim both the speculum and speculation as 
theoretical and practical tools. As such, Irigaray’s work remains important, despite the 
necessary critique of her concept of sexual difference, which does not account for how 
race, class and sexuality are intrinsic to its construction. Moreover, as Butler points 
out, Irigaray’s framework fails to question the givenness and ostensibly natural 
necessity of the gender binary; this framework must therefore be rethought in light of 
such contemporary, “queer” critiques. 
 
As outlined in chapter six, Butler claims that the concept of “gender” is a better 
conceptual tool to critically engage the philosophical canon than that of sexual 
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difference. Butler’s central criticism is that Irigaray does not critically reflect on her 
own concepts and their limitations. For instance, Irigaray does not sufficiently address 
the complexity, and problematic nature, of the history of the concept of sexual 
difference – even if posited as a question rather than a fact. If this remains 
unacknowledged, Butler argues, then sexual difference will remain a static framework 
that continues to be enforced via harmful and reactionary norms. While Irigaray claims 
that sexual difference is the most important question of our time, Butler contends that 
this concept is ill fit to address what is most urgent in feminist philosophy today: that 
is, questions of queerness, race, trans experience, as well as their interrelation. 
 
However, as I outline in chapter six, the concept of gender, due to its history and 
origin, is problematic in its own way – and one not fully accounted for by Butler. 
Though introduced in order to designate the social dimension of human sexed bodily 
life, the term “gender” was not invented by feminists. Rather, the concept emerged in 
U.S. clinical studies of intersexuality and transsexuality in the 1950s and 60s. The 
child psychologist and sexologist John Money, who treated “intersex” babies, was the 
first to make use of the grammatical category of gender as a clinical and diagnostic 
tool. Though the phenomenon of intersex, according to Money, demonstrates that the 
unitary definition of sex as either male or female has to be abandoned, his treatment 
protocol does not in fact question the male-female binary, but instead outlines how to 
implement it both surgically and psychologically in cases of ambiguously gendered 
bodies. Money acknowledges the malleability of sexual difference and anatomy, and 
thus challenges the paradigm of the Naturphilosophen, who understood sex difference 
to be naturally binary, and so construe this binary as a basis for a gendered distribution 
of labour. And yet, Money’s concept of gender forms part of a clinical protocol that 
keeps the normalizing functions of the nineteenth century sexual difference 
framework intact, as well as preserving the emphasis on heterosexual reproduction 
and population control. Even though sexual dimorphism is no longer tenable as a 
universal description of human nature and biology, the role of Money’s gender is to 
implement the promise of nineteenth century sexual difference and sex dimorphism 
by contemporary technological, surgical and psychological means. 
 
In chapter six, I argue that Butler’s gender performativity marks a radical intervention 
in the use and understanding of gender as invented by Money, transforming a highly 
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problematic clinical-behaviourist term into a critical concept and tool for feminist 
praxis – though with its own attendant problems. This thesis explains that it is Butler’s 
notion of performativity that allows her to break with Money and to introduce a 
radically new understanding of gender. Yet, the precise meaning of performativity 
remains unclear. Though Butler attends to what language can do, a purely linguistic 
concept of performativity is not sufficient as explanation of gender performativity. 
The latter necessitates a more explicitly ontological account. While Butler does not 
propose it in these terms, I argue that her concept of performativity is best understood 
as a performative ontology. 
 
Towards a performative ontology 
 
Even though Butler is critical of ontology and seeks to demonstrate that ontological 
markers, such as gender, are not fixed but are – politically – contested, a new definition 
of ontology nonetheless emerges out of her work. In Butler, as in Hegel, the concept 
of performativity names an anti-essentialist concept of being that is inherently 
relational and temporal. This concept of being, it is argued, can be understood through 
Hegel’s speculative proposition. Defined as such, ontology is not entirely distinct from 
claims about language and epistemology. Rather, speculation refers to a specific 
activity that, if ontological, is performative. 
 
In line with Hegel’s logical definition of determinate being, Butler’s concept of 
performativity describes a doing and undoing that is not the wilful act of an already-
determined subject. If read through Hegel, it becomes possible to avoid some of the 
problems Butler’s position faces, such as the criticism (repeatedly addressed to her) 
that her account of gender performativity is a voluntarism. However, while Hegel, 
through his use of examples, hints at the inherently social and political nature of 
speculation, it is Butler who first proposes the thought of a social, ontological doing 
and undoing. Performativity in Butler explains how ontological claims, which are 
always to some extent political, come to manifest on, in, or even as the body. Since 
ontology is understood to be always already a political project, gender is defined not 
as a merely descriptive but rather as a critical category. 
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While Butler transforms “gender,” this thesis argues that the origin of the concept still 
matters for its current use. This is because the term, as employed in English now, 
originally formed part of a medical protocol established to make intersex and trans 
bodies conform to normative gender and body standards. Thus, “gender” essentially 
concerns intersex and trans bodies. This should be acknowledged in feminist theory, 
which ought to critically foreground the experience of trans, intersex and non-binary 
bodies in its analysis of gender. As already acknowledged by Money, the categories 
trans, intersex and non-binary bodies trouble the assumed naturalness of binary sexual 
difference. However, if understood through the concepts of speculation and 
performativity, gender is no longer a solution to this “problem” but rather offers the 
means to think intersex and trans differently. While non-binary bodies and identities 
do not pose a problem, either medically or culturally; to some (including some 
feminists) they pose a threat. As a consequence, these subjects often do not receive 
vital health care services, social and cultural recognition, and basic respect. A return 
to the “origins” of gender is required in order to challenge current negative or limiting 
perceptions of trans, intersex and non-binary experience. This thesis therefore 
proposes to reclaim the concept’s origin for feminist theory. Moreover, I argue that if 
gender is thought as speculative and performative, then a predetermined and fixed 
gender ontology is no longer possible. 
 
Concluding reflection on method 
 
Speculation is defined by Kant and Hegel as a question of relation. To explain the 
legitimate use of speculative reason, Kant and Hegel employ social and political 
categories. These, they suggest, best exemplify the difficult relation between empirical 
and purely conceptual forms of thought. This explanation of philosophical speculation 
raises methodological questions about the relation between philosophy and those 
disciplines that also explain and develop social and political categories alongside it. 
 
In view of this, a different approach to close reading is proposed in this thesis. 
Philosophical texts are interpreted alongside other disciplinary modes of inquiry, in 
particular historical and feminist modes of analyses. For example, while a close textual 
analysis of the final chapters of Hegel’s Science of Logic is undertaken, some 
examples used here, such as the sexual relation in the ‘Chemism’ chapter, demand a 
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different mode of inquiry. This example, as well as the emergence of the concepts of 
violence, resistance and freedom in the final chapters of the Logic, appear abruptly but 
are crucial to the argument. The reader, accordingly, cannot simply remain within the 
framework of the Logic. If, then, to read the Logic means to step outside it, what 
exactly does it mean to approach a text “on its own terms”? 
 
A reading of the final chapters of the Logic makes evident that Hegel’s philosophical 
argument loses some of its depth and power if read “strictly” on its own terms. It 
therefore becomes necessary to negotiate the relation between philosophy and its 
disciplinary others – for instance gynaecology, anthropology and natural history – in 
order to understand the reception of philosophical concepts in other disciplines, and 
vice versa. Against this backdrop, the relation between the empirical and the purely 
conceptual, as first raised by Kant, emerges once more. This question still requires a 
response, especially when attempting to explain social and political categories such as 
race, sex, gender, trans and intersex. 
 
What does this mean for our reading of Kant and Hegel? While we find theoretical 
tools in their texts, it is also necessary to understand the cultural and scientific debates 
that their conceptualisations are responding to. It should be evident that even though 
philosophy deals with concepts and thoughts, this does not mean that these can be read 
outside of their historical and cultural contexts. This moreover requires 
acknowledging the political stakes of philosophical concepts. Such a reading does not 
limit philosophy but, in complicating and even “troubling” its history, opens it up to a 
new life. Thus, the philosophical concepts of speculation and performativity, as first 
outlined by Kant and Hegel, and as reworked and redefined by Irigaray and Butler, 
are still relevant and applicable today. A speculative and performative ontology offers 
crucial theoretical tools for thinking trans, intersex and nonbinary experience – some 
of the most urgent concerns of contemporary feminist philosophy and political theory. 
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Helen King: Midwifery, Obstetrics and the Rise of Gynaecology 
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History of gender and modern medicine 
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The European Witch Hunt (1 5th - 19th century)
1484: publication ofMalleus Maleficarum
1580 -1630: most intense phase
1440/50: invention of the printing press
1 500 - 1 599:
state + church become interlinked/more powerful
↕
rise of the universities/professions
1600-1699:
mercantile capitalism
more land in Africa and the Americas is colonised
cities are growing
16th + 17th century:
communities are breaking up due to the enclosures
migration
rise of individual private property / wage work
→ social control moved away from the village into the
domain of the authorities (state, church, etc.)
→ magic + miracles became the sole domain ofGod /
the church
supression of female healers
prior to this period health was the
domain of peasant women healers
authorities did not want to leave the control over
reproduction in the hands of peasant women
witches were attacked for being
pragmatic/empirical, i.e. for knowledge
gained through cause-effect
experimentation (today's definition of
modern science)
doctor's professionalism
(everything else is denounced)
one outcome of the witch trials:
view ofwomen's gender + sexuality changed from being
seen as powerful to powerless
the decline ofmidwifery undermined traditional
knowledge of contraception (as late as 1600,
women in parts ofEurope had access to around
200 contraceptives + abortificients)
1 7th + 18th century:
male practitioners make inroads into the last
preserve of female healing
→ midwifery (remains in the hands ofwomen
until the 19th century)
herbal remedies
developed by peasant
women healers, such
as ergot, still used
downgrading midwives:
confine midwifery to poor women
≈ 1634: invention of forceps
late 1700s: physicians gained
access to forceps
many years passed until forceps
are proper use
oxytoctic found in rye grain
fungus → tool midwifes used
for centuries to speed labour
through intensification of
contractions
physicians come into
cultural authority as
representing science
(especially once they
begin to supervise child
birth)
+ forceps:
this knowledge aided William Smellie's retooling of the forceps
18th century:
William Hunter (English physician) outlined the physical changes
in a woman's body during the nine months of pregnancy
medical education
is increasingly
denied to women
medicine becomes
profession requiring
university training
↓
universities, with
few exceptions, bar
women
Obstetrics
this practice eventually
excluded women
practitioners
Gynaecology
19th century
obstetrics
= midwifery + obstetrics + surgery
late 18th, early 19th:
emergence of scientific medicine
↕ coincides
shift in understanding of
sex/gender
18th century: 'sex as we know it is
invented' (Laqueur)
↓ Laqueur's one sex/two sex
model is contested by historians
rather:
1 ) introduction of a biopolitical
vocabulary
2) emphasis on sexual dimorphism
+ complementarity
not fully established as a formal
branch ofmedicine until the 1870s
importance ofmedical journals
→ pioneering gynaecological
surgeons were heavily involved in
medical publishing
gynaecology is at the forefront of the
professionalisation in medicine
slavery
medicine
medical publishing
scientific
revolution
alongside the
revolution in
understanding
sex, gender,
sexuality
bodies are
regarded as a
microcosm of
some larger
cosmological
order
by 19th century:
social role is less
revelant to the
understanding of
sex/gender
sex is dimorphic
→ a question of
anatomical fact
end of 17th century:
various intellectual currents that made up the scentific
revolution:
Baconianism, Cartesian mechanism, empiricist
epistemology, Newtonian synthesis
science conceives of the categories of 'male' and 'female'
as dichotomous but complementary
→ ovaries + testicles are now linguistically distinguished
→ organs that had not been distinguished by a name of
their own, e.g. vagina, were given one
→ structures thought common to both, e.g. the skeleton,
nervous system are differentiated to correspond to the
cultural male + female
Late 17th and 18th century:
shift in western Europe from early modern
monarchical states to modern democratic policies
↕
in this shift science negotiated the positions of
women and non-Europeans in the new social orders
until 1 759:
no detailed female skeleton in
anatomy books to illustrate its
difference from the male
Natural history:
was one of the premier sciences of the 18th
century; also popular → natural history books
were widely read
sex: key organising principle
Linnaeus, for example, based
his botanical taxonomy on the
sexuality of plants
Naturphilosophie
battleground of gender shifted to:
nature/biolgocial sex
↓
epistemological status of nature as bedrock of
distinctions
↓ existed before (see Elsa Dorlin) but now:
nature/social distinction becomes more distinct
science as process of unveiling
unveiling of "nature"
visuality/visualising as a
question of
=
how are scientific objects
and orderly relationships
revealed and made
analysable
"Nature"
In the eyes of
European law
“woman” is a
universal:
all women, regardless
of age, class, race are
disenfranchised
↕
By the late 18th
century, many natural
historians were
postulating a universal
reproductive woman
reproductive politics:
need to produce
greater populations in
both Europe and the
colonies
Visibility
=
knowability
=
mastery
Western medicine/"birth of the
clinic" founded on visibility
reproductive organs as a place open
to/suitable for medical intervention
women as a group
19th century
medicine:
advances in the fields
of surgery,
anaesthesia, sanitation
samed:
for purpos of
extracting
reproductive
knowledge
othered:
based on class +
construction of
race (medical
treatment, e.g.
use of anesthesia)
Speculum
slavery: served medicine by providing subjects for
experimentation
reproductive medicine:
essential to the maintenance + success of southern slavery
vesico-vaginal fistulas ↔ malnutrition, rickets
mishaped pelvis, prolonged labour
1855: Woman's Hospital → New York
first hospital dedicated to female disorders
→ supply of human material on which to experiment
Woman's Hospital: assumption of a connection
between the biological processes/cycle in
females & appearances of nervous disorders
James
Marion
Sims
Development of psychiatry
hysteria → from Latin hysterus or
uterus: linked to female by way of
her reproductive organs
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Carl Gustav Carus gynaecological timeline and tools 
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